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Abstract 
 
    This thesis explores British policy towards Iran in the context of great power 
rivalry between 1908 and 1914. In the said period, British policy experienced 
changes in responses to a collapsing Iran, in which foreign powers, namely Russia, 
Germany and the Ottoman Empire, also became involved. The thesis concentrates 
in particular on negotiations and incidents in the margins of Iran, such as the 
south-west region, which came to be seen as being as important as Tehran. The 
discovery of oil in 1908 as the authority of the central government collapsed led to 
increasing British involvement in the South-West by the signing of agreements 
with the local powers, in contravention of Britain’s long-standing policy of 
non-intervention. Neither the constitutionalists nor the vision of Mohammad ‘Ali 
Shah served the British need for order. On the other hand, Germany’s project for 
the Baghdad railway seemed to threaten British interests, which resulted in 
impediments to Iran’s plans for railway development. The British mediated in the 
dispute over the Ottoman-Iranian border, especially on Mohammerah, in order to 
secure their interests. In the employment of foreign advisors in the North and 
South of Iran, the British avoided irritating Russia rather than supporting Shuster 
in Tehran. In the South they favoured the Swedish Gendarmerie to protect their 
trade interests.  
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Chapter I Introduction 
This study examines British policy in Iran from the discovery of oil in the 
South-West of Iran by Britain in 1908 to the outbreak of the First World War in 
1914. It is more particularly concerned with the impact of the discovery of oil in 
the years leading up to 1914, and its effect on British policy. This discovery 
proved a major turning point in British policy towards Iran, and as a result Britain 
paid increasing attention to the strengthening of power in the region. However, the 
extraction of oil took place against both long standing great power rivalries over 
Iran, and internal political developments which began to emerge at the end of the 
nineteenth century. There had been significant rivalry between Britain and Russia 
in the Middle East and Central Asia, with particular focus on Iran as a buffer state, 
from the early nineteenth century. Though other powers, notably France in the 
early nineteenth century, showed some interest in Iran, they had little impact as 
compared to unified Germany, the emergent power in Europe by the early 
twentieth century. Then its influence was particularly reflected in the Ottoman 
Empire, Iran’s neighbour, most notably through the construction of railways 
which reached into Mesopotamia. This in turn had implications for British control 
in the South-West of Iran, which forms a major theme in this study. Thus by 1914 
not only had Britain’s commercial and strategic interests in Iran grown and 
changed, their security had become affected by more complex great power rivalry.  
At the same time Iran was undergoing a major political upheaval with the fall 
of the absolutist system in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, and the 
introduction of rule by an elected assembly (Majles). However, the position of the 
constitutional government was very weak, and the country descended into 
disorder and fell under great power control. One of the principal aims of Iran’s 
constitution, to eliminate foreign power influence, especially that of Russia in 
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northern Iran, thus proved entirely unsuccessful. Iran had an empty treasury, and 
so needed foreign advisors to assist reform a financial programme. The Iranian 
Majles endeavoured to reject loans from the British and the Russians, and to 
refuse any candidate as advisor whose name was put forward by the two European 
powers. In the meantime, Britain and Russia, owing to the rise of Germany, 
tended to reach an understanding with each other on Iranian affairs. The two 
powers preferred to act unanimously. As Iran encountered pressure from Russia, 
Britain made no effective attempt to defend it. In addition, the British had already 
made Iran aware since the early nineteenth century that they would not intervene, 
by which they meant significantly, in its internal affairs. 1  A policy of 
non-intervention in Iran was thus formed and lasted into the twentieth century. 
However, the discovery of oil in 1908, and the increasing internal disorders, led to 
a major shift in this policy. In 1914, at the start of the First World War, Iran 
declared its neutrality in the futile hope that it would be free of foreign power 
involvement in its affairs, but it remained under foreign control.   
Therefore, this study, based on both English and Persian original documents, 
aims to explore how Iran’s politics and foreign policy alongside developments in 
Europe and the discovery of oil caused the British to change their policy towards 
Iran in the early twentieth century, and also, how other powers were also drawn 
deeper into involvement in Iranian affairs, and thus into Anglo-Iranian relations. 
The rivalries of the European powers, Britain, Russia and Germany, not only 
influenced Iranian affairs. They also caused reaction on the part of the Iranian 
government in the development of its foreign policy in order to protect its political 
and economic interests from diminishing. The reaction of the Iranian government 
in turn affected British policy. One other significant issue which engaged not only 
                                                 
1
 Edward Ingram, ‘An Aspiring Buffer State: Anglo-Persian Relations in the Third Coalition, 
1804-1807,’ The Historical Journal, Vol. 16, No. 3 ( Sep., 1973), p. 530. 
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Britain, Russia and Iran, but also the Ottoman Empire, was the Ottoman-Iranian 
border demarcation, which, at specific points, the British saw as significant for 
their interests. 
 
1. A background review 
    The development of Anglo-Iranian relations in the early twentieth century 
was influenced not only by the policy of protecting India, Britain’s biggest colony, 
and European rivalry dating from the previous century, but also evolving British 
policy itself, particularly in reaction to events in Europe.  
In the nineteenth century, Britain had adopted a policy based on the balance 
of power, as a result of events arising from the French Revolution of 1789 and the 
emergence of nationalism in Europe. However, the balance of power proved 
increasingly difficult to maintain. The rise of Germany in the late nineteenth 
century became a threat challenging Britain’s world role, and affected Britain’s 
foreign policy.2 From 1882, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy created the 
Triple Alliance which lasted till 1914. By the turn of the century, the Alliance 
caused Britain to look for allies to balance their impact of the Triple Alliance. The 
most significant was the end of splendid isolation by the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
in 1902. In addition, Britain generally tended to prefer the status quo, and only 
changed when the position became untenable, particularly as a result of the rise of 
another great power.3 Accordingly, Britain established the Entente with France in 
1904, settling their disputes over Egypt and Morocco in order to face the rise of 
Germany. In the meantime, Russia’s weakness, after its defeat in the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and it revolution of 1905, gave Germany greater 
                                                 
2
 Max Beloff, Britain’s Liberal Empire 1897-1921: Volume 1 of Imperial Sunset, London: 
MacMillan Press, 1987, p. 118.  
3
 Kenneth J. Calder, Britain and the Origins of the New Europe 1914-1918, London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976, p. 3. 
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freedom in international affairs. Russia also wanted to curtail the emerging 
German power in Europe and moved towards cooperation with Britain. In 1907, 
Britain and Russia signed a convention at St. Petersburg, settling their disputes 
over Iran, Afghanistan and Tibet, and enabling them to concentrate on Germany in 
European affairs. The Triple Entente of Britain, France and Russia was then 
formed to confront the Triple Alliance.  
    In the Middle East, the Ottoman Empire was losing power as compared to 
Britain and Russia in particular. Russia had disputes over the Balkan issue with 
the Ottoman Empire, and its power also stretched to the Bosphorus Straits. This 
led in the 1870s to the Balkan revolts that culminated in the Ottoman-Russian War, 
where Britain redressed the Ottoman setbacks and kept the Ottoman Empire 
alive. 4  Britain also encouraged the Ottoman reform movement. Of course, 
Britain’s principle intention in supporting the Empire was to safeguard its interests 
in the Middle East.5 Owing to the Triple Entente, Britain’s interests and dealings 
with the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century were without threat from 
either Russia or France. The latter was even more careful not to irritate the British 
in the Mesopotamian sphere. And, the Entente also led to Russia being regarded 
as less of a threat via Istanbul and the Straits. Thus, before the First World War, 
the new threat to Britain’s influence and interests in the Ottoman Empire was 
Germany. German influence was gaining ground in Istanbul, whence it extended 
into Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf by 1903. That year, Germany signed the 
Baghdad Railway Convention with the Ottoman Empire for construction of a 
railway connecting Berlin and Baghdad, which caused the British to be concerned 
with its progress eastwards, creating a threat to almost every area of Britain’s 
                                                 
4
 Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East 
1789-1923, London: Harvard University Press, 1999, p. 5. 
5
 Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire 1914-1921, 
London: Bowes & Bowes, 1956, p. 18. 
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established commercial and trading interests in the area. In 1912, a British consul 
in the Iranian province of Fars alleged that Germany’s commercial policy had 
political motives challenging Britain’s commercial supremacy in the area, and in 
India.6 The British Resident at Bushehr, in the South-West of Iran, argued that 
there were ‘evident efforts of Germany to create vested interests on which she 
may ultimately base a claim to be associated with the political as well as the 
commercial future of Southern Persia in the Gulf.’7  
    Another factor in the Middle East was the Suez Canal, which assumed 
importance in British policy from the mid-nineteenth century. The construction 
took place from 1854, which was during the Crimean War 1854-1856. After the 
War, its causes and its consequences, however, were all seen as part of the Russian 
threat, as perceived by the British, to their interests in the region. When the 
construction of the Suez Canal was in progress in the 1860s, Indian trade and 
British policy in Egypt gradually became more significant than the Dardanelles or 
Afghanistan.8 As soon as it was clear that the project was going to succeed, 
British shipping companies began preparations to use it to capacity, and by 1875, 
four-fifths of the ships transiting the Suez Canal were British. From that moment 
onwards, the security of the Canal became Britain’s primary strategic interest in 
the Middle East. Owing to the importance of the Canal, Britain paid much 
attention to the stability of Egypt. However, in Egypt in the late 1870s there were 
serious tensions between Egyptians and the European powers. By the early 1880s, 
Egypt was under occupation by Britain.  
    As already indicated India, which was of major political and economic 
                                                 
6
 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The Logistics and Politics of the British Campaigns in the Middle 
East, 1914-22, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011, p. 26.  
7
 Marian Kent, Moguls and Mandarins: Oil, Imperialism and the Middle East in British Foreign 
Policy 1900-1940, London: Frank Cass, 1993, p. 12. 
8
 William Jackson, The Pomp of Yesterday: The Defence of India and the Suez Canal 1798-191, 
London and Washington: Brassey’s, 1995, p. 66. 
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significance to the British, it played a crucial role in their foreign policy to the 
Middle East and Central Asia. Britain had a long tradition of concern over the 
security of India. Any threat to India would be not tolerated by the British, a factor 
which gravely affected Anglo-Iranian relations in the mid-nineteenth century, in 
the form of an Iranian claim to Herat. The Iranians marched to Herat in October 
1856. The British perceived that Herat was vital to the forward defence of India 
against their great rival, Russia. Eventually, the Iranians were defeated by the 
British in 1857. It was clear that Russia and Britain were engaged in serious 
competition over Iran, and Russia’s manoeuvres in Iran, though largely 
concentrated in the north, and its influence over the central government, were 
perceived by the British as threatening India. The British were otherwise 
indifferent to the neighbouring states except in punishing troublemakers.9 All the 
same, the British began to consider it ‘necessary to end the disagreement with 
Russia in the regions that bordered India,’10 and relations between the two 
became less hostile and more cooperative towards the end of the nineteenth 
century. 
    The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 greatly facilitated trade with India, 
and with Mesopotamia as well, with the effect that trade between Basrah and 
Bombay also boomed. Cumulatively this trade meant that in 1914 British and 
British-Indian commercial interests controlled more than two-thirds of the imports 
and half of the exports that passed through Basrah.11 Thus in 1914, the Suez 
Canal remained crucial to India. Supporting Britain’s political position in the 
Middle East in the years before the First World War were Britain’s commercial 
interests. The security of Britain’s strategic routes to India and the East, both by 
                                                 
9
 WM. J. Olson, Anglo-Iranian Relations During World War I, London: Frank Cass, 1984, p. 4.  
10
 Mikhail Volodarsky, ‘Persia and the Great Power, 1856-1869,’ Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, 
No. 1 (Jan., 1983), pp. 83-84. 
11
 Coates Ulrichsen, The Logistics, p. 25. 
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water, via the Suez Canal, and by land and sea, through Mesopotamia to the 
Persian Gulf was of vital importance to Britain. By 1914, owing to Britain’s 
concerns with India, the Persian Gulf, and the Suez Canal, the South of Iran 
became more and more important in British policy, an importance that was 
enhanced by the discovery of oil in 1908 there. 
    Thus it may be understood that of the margins of Iran, the South, and 
increasingly, the South-West of Iran were of particular importance to Britain. The 
non-intervention policy maintained towards Iran, gradually only fitted in Iran’s 
centre, and there were stresses emerging in Iran’s margins. The Iranian 
Constitutional Revolution of 1906 can be viewed as a significant event that had an 
impact on Anglo-Iranian relations in the early twentieth century. There were 
various opinions among the British. To the Foreign Office, it was not necessary to 
intervene in Iranian affairs based on Britain’s traditional policy of 
non-intervention in a major and direct sense, even if it was accompanied by 
constant meddling. Precisely how the British acted towards the Iranian 
Constitutional Revolution of 1906 and its consequences, what the Iranians, the 
Shah and the constitutionalists thought of Britain’s actions, and how 
Anglo-Iranian relations were affected by the period of the revolution, will be 
discussed in later chapters. 
    In 1907, a convention covering Iran, Afghanistan and Tibet was signed by 
Britain and Russia at St. Petersburg, which resulted from the aforementioned 
British and Russian fear of Germany. The 1907 Convention stipulated that a main 
purpose of Britain and Russia was to maintain Iran’s independence and integrity. 
In addition, however, should the country come under threat from another foreign 
power or in any sense gravely weaken, the northern part of Iran was to be made a 
Russian zone of influence (in effect control) and the East-South was to be a 
British zone, with a neutral zone in the centre. The Convention demonstrates that 
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Britain had no specific interests to northern Iran, again showing its concerns with 
the South of Iran, which, at this stage, still related principally to the security of 
India.     
Oil was thus not yet the most significant factor that affected British policy in 
Iran. However from 1908 onwards it was increasingly to become important. 
Britain and Iran signed a concession to prospect for oil in 1901, which granted the 
British the right of drilling oil in Iran’s territory for 60 years. The eventual 
discovery of oil by the British in the South-West of Iran took place in 1908 in the 
Bakhtiyari territory, at a time when the Iranian government, increasingly weak, 
was losing its control in the local regions. This new significant factor meant that 
the South-West of Iran assumed a position of equal importance for the British as 
the centre of Iran, and meant a shift in British policy towards Iran. In contrast to 
Britain’s previous non-intervention policy in Iran’s political affairs, local affairs 
were seriously subject to Britain’s intervention.  
    As a result of oil and other interests in the South-West of Iran, Britain also 
looked for security in the south. In October 1910, Britain delivered an ultimatum 
to Iran concerning the security of southern Iran.12 It was also a time that Iran 
attempted to establish an effective national gendarmerie to modernize their 
military force, which was a means of state-building.13 The gendarmerie was 
initially supported by the British in finance and diplomacy. Hence, the British 
indeed attempted to use any means to intervene in the affairs in the South of Iran, 
even though they still ostensibly held to the non-intervention policy with regard to 
Iran’s political centre. By 1914, generally, Britain had already established more 
influential power in Iran, especially in the South, than ever before.  
                                                 
12
 Janet Afary, The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1911: Grassroots Democracy, Social 
Democracy, & the Origins of Feminism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 305.  
13
 Stephanie Cronin, ‘Building A New Army: Military Reform in Qajar Iran,’ in Roxane 
Farmanfarmian (ed), War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and Present, London and 
New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 69. 
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2. Literature review 
In The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909,14 E. G. Browne provides a detailed 
description of the new political system that emerged in Iran through revolution. 
Browne claims that the causes of the 1906 Revolution derived from absolutist 
oppression and a modernizing response, Pan-Islamism, and the rivalry between 
Britain and Russia, as well as the Tobacco Concession of 1890 and numerous 
subsequent riots. The Iranian Constitution was granted in 1906, but in 1907 this 
was followed by more friction between the new Shah, Mohammad ‘Ali, and the 
constitutionalists. The author relied extensively on newspaper reports and on 
letters from both British contacts in Iran and Iranian themselves. Browne was 
deeply sympathetic to the sufferings of the Iranian constitutionalists, suppressed 
by the Shah. He did not, however, acknowledge the problems created for Iran by 
the differences of the various groups in the constitutionalist regime, and the 
problems of its failure to control the country. He also did not consider 
perspectives of Mohammad ‘Ali Shah.  
    According to B. H. Sumner’s ‘Tsardom and Imperialism in the Far East and 
the Middle East 1880-1914,’15 the article drew a broad picture of Russia’s policy 
in the East overall. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Russia made a loan 
to Iran with the purpose of freeing the country from British influence. Russia was 
also endeavouring to prevent any other power from obtaining a dominant position 
in Iran, thereby continuing to strengthen its own political and economic influence. 
The loan, said Sumner, was nominally for the construction of a trans-Iranian 
railway, which would have allowed Russia to reach the Indian Ocean. The railway 
                                                 
14
 Edward G. Browne, The Persian Revolution 1905-1909, London: Cambridge University Press, 
1910.  
15
 B. H. Sumner, ‘Tsardom and Imperialism in the Far East and the Middle East 1880-1914,’ 
Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. XXXVII, 1940, pp. 3-43. 
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was a means for Russia to act against other powers, too. Since 1890, a prohibition 
on the building of railways had greatly reduced any possibility of British influence 
extending from the South to the North of Iran, but when the prohibition lapsed in 
1910, Russia did not make any effort to renew the agreement, because, said 
Sumner, it was aware that the Baghdad Railway was being built by Germany from 
1903, passing through Mesopotamia and then connecting with northern Iran. In 
addition, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 provided Russia with an 
opportunity to maintain its influence in northern Iran, where Russian troops 
played an influential role at the time. However, the article does not identify what 
difficulties Russia encountered in Iran, and precisely what the changes in Russian 
foreign policy to Iran were. Factors, such as Britain’s role or Iran’s reactions, 
would have provided a more complete vision. 
In Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in 
Imperialism,16 Edward Mead Earle argues that in the political sense the Baghdad 
Railway was more than a railway, and that it represented the great diplomatic 
struggle for prestige and dominance between the European powers, and also naval 
rivalry between Britain and Germany, in this case in the Persian Gulf. The signing 
of the Potsdam Agreement between Russia and Germany in 1911 led to Germany 
believing that it had achieved a major diplomatic triumph. On the other hand, in 
1914 Britain also reached an agreement with Germany over the Baghdad Railway, 
in which Germany apparently abandoned its hope of establishing influence in the 
Persian Gulf, while Britain assured unlimited access to the southern terminus of 
the Baghdad Railway for German ships. However, Iran was not included in 
Mead’s argument, and he did not discuss how Britain and Russia both had fears 
that the Baghdad Railway would extend German influence to Iran, and eliminate 
                                                 
16
 Edward Mead Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in 
Imperialism, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924. 
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their own prestige in the country.  
    Norman Dwight Harris, in Europe and the East,17 addresses that Britain had 
two objectives in Iranian affairs: the extension of British-Indian commerce in 
southern Iran, and cooperation with Iranian rulers to develop the country’s 
resources. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which was of considerable 
importance, established that Russia had its sphere of influence in the North of Iran 
while Britain had the south, and settled British and Russian differences on an 
international basis so that they would not undermine their unity on European 
affairs. Harris argues that Russia had three aims: to obtain a major share of Iranian 
trade and natural resources, to ease Russia’s route to the borders of India, and to 
perpetuate a weak government in Iran for its own exploitation. In Harris’s view, 
the British consistently undertook a passive policy of non-intervention, though 
this view overlooks the main concern of British policy, the defence of India, in 
which context the country’s attitude to Iran could not be considered passive. In 
addition, Harris maintains that Britain preferred to sacrifice Iran to Anglo-Russian 
interests, by keeping it weak, divided and impotent, overlooking the fact that Iran 
was viewed as a buffer state for the protection of the security of India, and would 
hardly be useful if Iran was weak. In sum, Harris does not see the key reason for 
the signing of the 1907 Convention but simply argues that Iran was a sacrifice in 
the event. Thus his argument is not entirely consistent.  
    According to Maybelle Kennedy Chapman’s Great Britain and the Bagdad 
Railway 1888-1914,18 Britain was not initially, in 1902, worried about a railway 
convention granted to Germany by the Ottoman Empire, because Russia’s 
encroachment on the Persian Gulf was seen as much more serious. In the course 
of their cooperation with Germany over the construction of the Baghdad Railway, 
                                                 
17
 Norman Dwight Harris, Europe and the East, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1927. 
18
 Maybelle Kennedy Chapman, Great Britain and the Bagdad Railway 1888-1914, Northampton: 
Massachusetts, 1948. 
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the British even considered a share issue, but a few years later the railway issue 
came to complicate the political panorama between Britain, France, Russia, and 
Germany, owing to a possible encroachment by Germany into the Persian Gulf, an 
important commercial area for Britain, and to the fact that Britain was attempting 
to sign an agreement with Russia and France to oppose Germany. Up to the time 
of the signing by Germany and Russia of the Potsdam Agreement in 1911, which 
was viewed by the British as a breach of the Triple Entente, Britain had itself 
begun an initiative for an Anglo-German treaty on the Baghdad Railway, which 
eventually came to light in 1914. Chapman mainly pays attention to Britain and 
the Baghdad Railway, but the author’s viewpoint that the Potsdam Agreement of 
1911 breached the Triple Entente is not consistent with the fact that Russia’s 
purpose in signing the Agreement was partly to stop Germany’s approaching Iran.  
    In his work Russia and the West in Iran, 1914-1948: A Study in Big-Power 
Rivalry,19 George Lenczowsky argues that a German factor had been at play since 
the early twentieth century. In 1903, the Deutsche Bank, a German bank, obtained 
a concession to construct a railway linking Berlin with Baghdad, and this was to 
be the main route for Germany’s expansion into Mesopotamia and the Persian 
Gulf. Then, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, an expression of détente 
between Britain and Russia, made German penetration into Iran more difficult. 
From a perspective of great power rivalry, Lenczowsky thus argues that Britain 
and Russia were in cooperation to block Germany’s expansion of its influence. 
However, this was simply a part of the historical background of the author’s 
research period 1914-1948, and therefore how Russia and Britain also used 
railways built in Iran as a means to block Germany was not included in the book.  
    A. P. Thornton’s article, ‘British Policy in Persia, 1858-1890 I,’20 argues that 
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an important incident which took place between Britain and Iran was the opening 
of the Karun river in the South-West of Iran in 1888. Naser al-Din Shah had no 
desire to approve the opening of the Karun river, and in the course of negotiations, 
the main concern expressed consistently by the Shah was that of Russia’s attitude. 
The Shah was concerned that once the Karun river was opened for Britain, Russia 
would ask for navigation rights to the Enzali Mordab lagoon. The Shah, therefore, 
attempted to push the British to guarantee that the granting of the concession 
would not lead to trouble from Russia. In 1888, the opening of the Karun river 
was eventually approved. The British effort had been principally devoted to the 
promotion of commerce in the southern provinces of Iran and to the improvement 
of their communications with the Persian Gulf. Thornton’s article clarifies that 
Britain’s concerns were with the South of Iran, which was to be a character of 
British policy to Iran in the later period, the early twentieth century.  
    In German-Persian Diplomatic Relations 1873-1912,21 Bradford G. Martin 
comments that German-Iranian cooperation was beginning to emerge at this time, 
establishing German influence in Iran. The two countries signed an agreement that 
Germany would support Iran if the latter was under attack from other powers. In 
the late nineteenth century, Germany used railway schemes to threaten British and 
Russian interests in Iran, and also attempted to found a bank in Tehran to 
strengthen its economic influence in the country. However, this plan was 
frustrated by the Potsdam Agreement of 1911 with Russia. From the Iranian point 
of view, with German influence, Iranian national independence would be assured. 
Yet, this plan failed in the end. Bradford Martin’s book was a rarely seen work on 
German-Iranian relations. A German perspective is able to fill a gap that cannot be 
filled by the British or Russian perspectives alone.  
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    Firuz Kazemzadeh’s article, ‘Russia and the Middle East,’22 argues that 
Russia’s intention in Central Asia and southwards made Britain worried from the 
nineteenth century to the early twentieth century. The Herat War between Britain 
and Iran in 1856 was an example that confirmed the importance of the security of 
India against Russian influence in British policy. In the early twentieth century, 
the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 was concerned with Russian foreign 
policy, in the wake of defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and the 1905 
revolution. To the Russians, their defeat exposed their military and economic 
limitations as regards to competing with Britain in the Middle East, as well as 
their domestic weaknesses. Moreover, Kazemzadeh also notices that Germany’s 
role in the Middle East had to be taken into account. Yet, Kazemzadeh argues the 
facts from a Russian perspective so that other factors seem to be of secondary 
significance in his article.  
    Rose Louise Greaves, in ‘British Policy in Persia, 1892-1903,’23 claims that 
Iran’s position as a buffer state was a concern for the security of India. British 
diplomatic interest in Iran began in the early nineteenth century when an invasion 
of India by a European power (Russia) seemed possible, and British diplomacy 
thereafter aimed to make Iran into a buffer state. In 1878, the British Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Salisbury, viewed Iran as a possible substitute for Afghanistan as 
the main barrier in the way of the Russian push towards India and the Gulf. 
Regarding railways, debates on the construction of railways in the South of Iran 
were inseparable from consideration of the security of India, as without railways 
in Iran Russia would have no means to reach any part of the Indian border. 
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Opposition to the development of Iranian railways, in Greaves’s article, is seen a 
British means of blocking Russia’s penetration southwards. In fact the Iranian 
railway issue is also relevant to the Baghdad Railway passing through 
Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf. Further, the British sought to strengthen 
themselves via various railway schemes in Iran.  
Ravinder Kumar, in India and the Persian Gulf Region 1858-1907: A Study 
in British Imperial Policy,24 deals with several cases that show how British policy 
derived its influence in the Persian Gulf through India. From the early nineteenth 
century, some British had felt the importance of establishing a British protectorate 
over the Persian Gulf and British India also made efforts to make London realize 
the urgency of maintaining British control over the region. Later, control over the 
south-eastern section of the German Baghdad Railway was also a concern for 
Indian interests. The author reveals that India always opposed any concession 
with Russia, and pushed for internationalizing the Baghdad Railway to cast off 
Russia. His view overall shows the significance of the Indian view in shaping 
British policy towards the area and the Persian Gulf as well.  
    In The Foreign Policy of Iran: A Developing Nation in World Affairs,25 
Rouhollah K. Ramazani claims that Russia and Britain were rivals in Iran for a 
long time. A reason behind Iran’s inclination towards Britain was its concern 
about Russia, which it particularly distrusted. The dispute between Iran and 
Russia over Georgia had not ended, despite Iran’s defeat in the Russo-Iranian in 
1812, which resulted in the Treaty of Golestan in 1813. In this treaty, Iran 
abandoned its claim to the Georgian provinces, and Russia was confirmed as the 
possessor of the central and eastern Azerbaijan. Ramazani argues that Russia’s 
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influence was far greater than Britain’s, and for that reason Iranian nationalism 
focused on Russia rather than Britain, which appeared to be merely concerned 
with its own interests. In his view, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 
especially provided an opportunity for Russia to intervene in Iran. He 
misunderstands, however, the purpose and impact of the 1907 Convention, 
considering only that it gave Russia an opportunity to intervene in Iran, and 
ignoring the fact that Russia would have had the opportunity without the 
Convention. He, yet, fails to perceive how far Britain judged its policy by its own 
interests and does not fully understand what they were.   
In ‘The Strategic Background to the Anglo-Russian Entente of August 
1907,’26 Beryl J. Williams points out a number of reasons why the British 
government chose to negotiate with Russia rather than opposing it. One of these 
was that Germany was viewed as a menace and a disturbing factor because of its 
naval and military supremacy in Europe. With regard to the Russian threat, the 
prevailing view was that the British army was not sufficiently strong to fight a war 
on the north-west border of India. One of the chief benefits of the 1907 
Convention was that it was considered a means to block the Russian path to the 
Persian Gulf, and the other was that an agreement with Russia would not isolate 
Britain themselves. These considerations had an influence on the British 
government’s decision to come to an agreement with Russia. 
    In her article ‘British Policy and the Iranian Opposition 1901-1907,’27 Nikki 
Keddie considers the view that the British played an active role in supporting the 
opposition movement is mistaken. The British considered the Iranian 
constitutionalists to be a major nuisance, and British policy never favoured the 
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revolution and gave only very limited encouragement to those Iranian 
constitutionalists who were seeking help. There was indeed a conviction on the 
part of the constitutionalists that the British were on their side, and that Britain 
would be against Russian intervention, which was the main threat to the 
revolution. This conviction, unfortunately, resulted in an unexpected shock with 
the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Keddie’s argument was correct, though it 
focuses only on Iran’s centre.  
    Briton Cooper Busch, in Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914, 28 
addresses the German factor in the Persian Gulf affecting British policy toward 
this area preceding the First World War. In addition, the Gulf was also an 
international waterway in an age of imperial rivalries and also during Ottoman 
and Iran’s revolutionary period. The expansion of Russia and the projected 
Baghdad Railway made the British strengthen their policy for defence of India. 
Britain eventually joined the construction of the last part of the Baghdad Railway, 
close to Kuwait owing to its providing a useful connection with the Persian Gulf. 
Their overall resistance to the railway meant that India and the Persian Gulf could 
not be claimed by Germany. The author, however, does not develop the 
implications of this point for Britain’s relations with Iran and Russia. 
    In Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914: A Study in Imperialism,29 Firuz 
Kazemzadeh provides details of Anglo-Russian relations from the late nineteenth 
century to World War I. In the late nineteenth century, Britain had far greater 
economic interests in India, and therefore attempted to maintain as close ties as 
possible with Iran, viewing it as intimately tied to the need to protect India. The 
Russians, meanwhile, exerted a strong influence from the North to the South of 
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Iran, an influence that could not be ignored for both political and economic 
reasons. According to Kazemzadeh’s argument, there was therefore serious 
competition between Russia and Britain in the fields of railways, trade, loans, and 
concessions. Kazemzadeh is of the opinion that it was not easy for the two 
European countries to reach an agreement to guarantee the independence and 
integrity of Iran. Indeed, the two countries both had their own interests in Iran so 
that there were difficulties to completely maintain their understandings on Iranian 
affairs. However, Kazemzadeh considers that the British were weaker than the 
Russians in their rivalry in Iran. British policy towards Iran was not as solid and 
strong as that of Russia, and was more hesitant and irresolute in character. In 
coming to this view, he fails to understand what Britain saw as their particular 
interests, and whether they were successful in guarding those, which was all that 
was relevant to them.  
    Two articles by Rose Louise Greaves ‘Some Aspects of the Anglo-Russian 
Convention and Its Working in Persia, 1907-14—I and II,’30 argue that the 
signing of the 1907 Convention was a change not only in Anglo-Russian relations 
but also Britain’s policy towards Europe. In Greaves’s research, the Russians had 
a will to make themselves stay in northern Iran, while Britain had no clear 
objective as to what their essential interests in Iran were. The British Foreign 
Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, was criticized owing to his friendliness to the 
Russians, but his defence was that such an arrangement with Russia was good for 
commercial interests in Iran and for having an ally to European circumstances. In 
addition, when in 1911 the Shuster Mission caused Russian reaction, Grey 
received criticism in the British parliament that the Entente was not working in 
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Iran. Grey’s policy was seen by Greaves as inadequate. Grey’s policy, Greaves 
argues, was denounced as weak and undignified. Greaves, in fact, does not see 
that in the context of the approach of war, Grey’s policy maintained an underlying 
continuity. She also mainly puts emphasis in Grey’s policy towards Iran’s political 
centre, and did not see how Grey’s management of policy towards the South of 
Iran worked to British advantage, especially the south-west with its abundant oil.  
Zara S. Steiner’s work, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914,31 
argues that it was not until the turn of the century, when Germany seemed to be 
outperforming Britain in the both economic and industrial fields and had begun to 
build a navy, so that the British started to perceive Germany as an antagonist. On 
his appointment to the Foreign Office in December 1905, Grey therefore 
welcomed the French entente, on the assumption that Germany was the main 
threat to peace in Europe. Once in office, he not only extended Britain’s 
obligations to France, but he also had the German threat very much in mind in 
making peace with the Russians, leading to the signing, in 1907, of the 
Anglo-Russian Convention in St. Petersburg. Steiner’s work only discusses 
Britain’s foreign policy, and generally focuses on incidents in Europe. Yet, there 
were connections between Europe and other worlds. An Iranian factor included 
could have provided a broader vision of British policy.  
    In ‘British Intervention in the Persian Revolution, 1905-1909,’32 Ira Klein 
analyses the role played by Britain in the Iranian revolution, and in doing so 
explains the impact of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 on British policy. 
Conceivably, he said, the policy of Grey may be deemed non-interventionist, but it 
was aimed directly at shaping Iran’s internal affairs. Initially, the Iranian 
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revolution of 1906 ended with the fall of Qajar absolutism, a triumph for the 
British in Klein’s view, though as indicated the British government did not see it 
that way, and with a diplomatic defeat for the Russians. Klein attempts to present 
Britain’s actions in the Iranian provinces as intervention in the Iranian revolution. 
However, in Tehran, the British generally did not support the either 
constitutionalists or the Shah in any effective financial or military sense. Klein 
also fails to see British concerns over Iran’s great financial difficulties, and also 
the whole problem of Germany, and the question of British interests in the south.  
     In The Diplomatic History of the Baghdad Railway,33 J. B. Wolf provides 
details of Germany’s considerations and intentions. Wolf argues that Germany was 
well aware that the Baghdad Railway, which served as a short cut to India, would 
be objected to by Britain, and by Russia as well. Once the Baghdad Railway was 
built, its very nature as a purely German venture was sure to lead to major 
political issues among the great powers. In 1906, for instance, the British insisted 
on their position of ensuring control over the line to the Persian Gulf, which 
would secure British interests in the area. Germany believed that the Triple 
Entente objected to the Baghdad Railway, and that Britain saw the Baghdad 
Railway as Germany’s attempt to undermine Britain’s relationship with Russia in 
the East. Like previous scholars Wolf identified Britain’s serious concerns over 
the impact of the railway on their interests in India. However, he did not address 
the significance of Iran and especially Mohammareh to Britain’s attitude to the 
Baghdad Railway.  
    ‘Persia on a Cross of Silver, 1880-1890,’34 by P. W. Avery and J. B. 
Simmons, may be viewed as the first discussion to focus on the significance of a 
crucial financial issue in Anglo-Iranian relations. The dual motivations of the 
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pursuit of reform and the danger posed by Russian ambitions led Iran to attempt to 
associate itself with Britain. In July 1872, therefore, Naser al-Din Shah’s Prime 
Minister, Mirza Hosein Khan, and Baron Julius de Reuter, a British subject, 
signed an agreement, which granted de Reuter transport construction rights in Iran 
for 70 years, along with a wide range of public works. This concession was not in 
Russia’s favour at all, and to the British, government, meanwhile, the concession 
was overambitious, and in fact London had lent Reuter little support in his 
schemes. The second major event in this context was the opening of the Karun 
river, in the South-West of Iran, in 1888. To the British, the extension of 
navigation along the Tigris to the neighbouring Karun, which would shorten the 
distance for land carriage of goods from the Gulf to the interior of Iran, would 
enable them to compete more successfully with Russia; to the Iranians, however, 
such a measure would obviously lead to Iran losing control over the transport of 
goods within the country. The article focuses on the opening of trade and 
navigation in the South of Iran, an important development in British policy that 
would have implications for the early twentieth century. Most significantly, Avery 
and Simmons drew attention to the fact that Iran’s reliance on silver in its 
currency affairs led to its suffering from the decline of the value of silver 
world-wide, with consequent serious inflation.  
    Ishtiaq Ahmad, in Anglo-Iranian Relations 1905-1919,35 argues that from 
1905 Britain had supported the Constitutional movement, which as discussed 
above, was not really the case beyond the expression of sympathetic interest. On 
the other hand, during the Revolution, the Shah was supported by the Russians in 
crushing the Iranian constitutionalists, demolishing the Majles and abrogating the 
Constitution. With Russia’s intervention, Iran’s cities, such as Tabriz and Qazvin, 
were besieged by Russian troops. In fact, the British also had Indian army 
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personnel in the South of Iran, but this was appreciated by some Iranians as it 
helped keep order. In addition, Britain did not intervene in the internal affairs of 
Iran. This, of course, is a simplistic view of the British role, for despite their 
policy of non-intervention, they did constantly attempt to advise the Iranian 
government on policy. Ahmad perceives Russia’s imperious approach as a threat 
to Anglo-Iranian relations, which in a sense it was, but with central government 
control collapsing, the British came increasingly to see the Russian point of view. 
Ahmad, however, overlooked Britain’s intervention in the South of Iran over oil 
works and the security of India.  
Stuart A. Cohen, in his British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914,36 follows 
the line that Germany’s construction from 1903 onwards of the Baghdad Railway, 
was seen by the British as affecting their position in Mesopotamia, the Persian 
Gulf and even India. On the question of Mesopotamia Cohen considered that the 
railway did in fact pose a considerable threat to British trade, and this is why the 
British sought to ensure that they obtained predominant control over their end of 
the line. Cohen draws attention to how the Indian government was also anxious 
about the future commercial development of Mesopotamia and about the 
expansion of German economic competition in the region. Eventually, Britain’s 
main goal for the railway project became clear: instead of sharing the project with 
international financers, Britain wished to maintain control over the southernmost 
section of the line. In the end, the railway project was transformed from an 
international one into a sectional one. Cohen’s work thus highlights the 
significance of Mesopotamia, connected as it was to the Persian Gulf, in the said 
period, and how determined the British were to keep it under their own protection, 
to the point of exacerbating further their relations with Germany if need be. 
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    In German Foreign Policy, 1871-1914,37 Imanuel Geiss argues that, during 
the unfortunate period of negotiation for a naval agreement between Britain and 
Germany in 1909, the latter attempted to garner Russia’s goodwill, seeing as in 
October 1909 the new Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was not unsympathetic 
to their foreign policy. This resulted in a meeting at Potsdam between the two 
countries in early November 1910 and an Agreement in 1911, which partly 
resulted from Britain’s failure to support Russia in the Balkans. The focus was on 
the implications of the Baghdad Railway for Russia’s position in Iran, particularly 
in the north, and was perceived by the British as advancing both Russian and 
German interests in Iran at the expense of their own. The author comments that 
Germany intrigued to make Russia break away from the Triple Entente. However, 
this view overstates the case, as Germany was not completely hostile to Britain 
and Russia, and vice versa at this point, when negotiations between the three 
countries on the whole sought to resolve issues peacefully.  
    Malcolm Yapp’s article, ‘1900-1921: The Last Years of the Qajar Dynasty,’38 
discusses changes in Iran in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Yapp 
argues that the domestic development of the Qajar period was intertwined with 
two factors, firstly the influence of the West, and secondly the efforts of the Qajars 
to alter the traditional balance of political influence in favour of the state. Yapp 
also illustrates two viewpoints on internal politics: the first posits that Tehran, the 
central government, struggled to extend its authority sufficiently to strengthen the 
country through reform, while the second, from a provincial perspective, sees the 
Constitutional Revolution as a struggle for local freedom from the power of the 
centre. By 1905 the campaign against the Belgian customs officials was at its peak, 
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and various other issues of local government mismanagement, anti-foreign feeling 
and economic discontent were also coming to a head. These grievances developed 
into more generalized political instability, with some Iranians promoting 
constitutional reform with a view to introducing a national assembly, the Majles, 
to replace the old monarchy. Yapp drew attention to two kinds of clashes between 
Iran and the West, at both the central and provincial levels.  
    F. H. Hinsley’s edited book, British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey,39 
looks at Grey’s period in the Foreign Office. Like earlier scholars, he views the 
1907 Convention as the result of British concern for the balance of power in 
Europe, in the context of the rise of Germany. To the British, Germany had 
emerged in the early twentieth century as a powerful industrial and military power, 
both in Europe and in the Middle East. Given the strength of Germany, Grey’s 
purpose was to create a balance within Europe, through the integration of the 
country’s entente with France and its relations with Russia. From Hinsley’s point 
of view, it can be seen that Grey was very concerned with what was taking place 
in Europe. The 1907 Convention was signed with Russia because of Germany 
even though the contents were about Iran, Afghanistan and Tibet. This book is 
thus concerned with European affairs, but does no more than touch on those of 
Asia.  
    David Gillard, in his The Struggle for Asia 1828-1914: A Study in British and 
Russian Imperialism,40  considers a broad area, Asia, to discuss Britain and 
Russia’s rivalry in the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. The 
Crimean War (1853-1856), for instance, increased the possibility of a Russian 
threat to India. From this war, it can be seen that Britain assumed that Russia 
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would somehow establish a formidable naval power base in the Black Sea and 
thus gain control over the Bosporus Straits. Control of the Straits by Russia was 
perceived by the British as potentially threatening the Suez Canal, the master key 
to a short route to India from the Eastern Mediterranean. In the late nineteenth 
century, both Britain and Germany were working on railway projects, so had both 
mutual and conflicting interests on the matter. Gillard also explains that although 
Britain and Russia signed the 1907 Convention, the basic facts of their 
contemporary Asian politics had remained unchanged. Russian power was still on 
the increase and the British government had still found no means of halting it. 
However, Gillard does not see that till the twentieth century the British did not see 
it necessary to interfere with much of Russian policy because they had already 
secured their interests along India, the South of Iran and the Persian Gulf.  
Stuart Cohen’s article, ‘Mesopotamia in British Strategy, 1903-1914,’41 
examines Britain’s concern with Mesopotamia and its neighbouring area, the 
Persian Gulf and India. The Tigris and Euphrates, in his view, made a natural 
highway form Syria to the Persian Gulf, and then the Indian Ocean. Britain 
claimed that they had no political purpose in Mesopotamia, beyond protecting 
their interests in the northern Gulf. Railways in the area received much attention 
because Britain intended to block Russia and Germany heading towards India. 
The German Baghdad Railway was the important issue for the British from 1903. 
However, when the Potsdam Agreement of 1911 by Germany and Russia was 
signed, in which Russia ceased its objection to the Baghdad Railway, Britain 
displayed a moderate attitude to Germany and Russia in order to cool rivalries. 
However, Britain was in fact still worried about German influence in the Persian 
Gulf via the Baghdad Railway, which was constantly mentioned in British 
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documents. In the time just up to 1914 it became more and more relevant to the 
oil interests of Britain. 
    Robert Michael Burrell, in Aspects of the Reign of Muzaffar al-Din Shah of 
Persia 1896-1907,42 pays attention to Mozaffar al-Din Shah’s reign, with his 
reforms in the army and the customs, and affairs in the provinces of Isfahan and 
Fars. Burrell perceives Mozaffar al-Din Shah as weak and his government as 
ineffective, even claiming that he was not interested in politics at all. This 
produces the weak analytical position that the problems of the country stemmed 
personally from the Shah, with local areas not under control at all. However, 
Burrell draws attention to the growth in power of such local potentates as the 
Sheykh of Mohammearh, who held more influence over the administration of the 
Customs than the political centre. Although many British diplomatic documents 
were used in the thesis, it was not a study of Iran’s foreign relations, and could not 
see the implications of Anglo-Iranian relations, and the growth of British 
influence the South-West of Iran.  
    David McLean, in Britain and Her Buffer State—The Collapse of the Persian 
Empire, 1890-1914, 43  argues that the British government had neither the 
inclination nor the means to impose its own administration on Iran. McLean 
claims that Britain did not want to do anything to weaken the Iranian government. 
In the face of the Russian threat, Britain’s aim was to establish Iran as a buffer 
state between the two countries, and this remained the policy. He makes the 
important point that Britain wanted stability in Iran, but did not want the 
responsibility for its imposition. No matter what happened in Iran, Britain’s main 
concern and purpose was still focused on India. Non-intervention is therefore 
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regarded as the main strategy of British policy in Iran. Yet, by the twentieth 
century, British non-intervention policy was gradually mainly limited to Iran’s 
political centre. In the South of Iran, which was related to Britain’s new source of 
energy, oil, the construction of railways and the navigation of the Karun river, 
Britain’s intervention was more and more to be seen.  
    The emergence of nationalism, a popular theme during this period, was 
comprehensively discusses in Richard W. Cottam’s Nationalism in Iran.44 Cottam 
views Iranian nationalism in the early twentieth century as a new trend. In his 
view, this nationalism, coupled with programs for economic and social reform, 
became the basis of modernising leaders’ appeal to the newly-awakened people. 
Those Iranians who became the early nationalists were also those who could be 
defined as modernists: their objectives were a strong central government sincerely 
dedicated to ending corruption, the feudalistic landholding system, and the 
wholesale distribution of Iranian resources to foreigners, aims closely related to 
the values of nationalism. On achieving power, the modernisers then proceeded to 
establish a parliament and liberal institutions involving free elections, political 
parties, and civil rights. Iran, in Cottam’s perspective, was on the way towards 
reform and progress. However, Cottam did not consider the problems of the 
conflicts created by the different interpretations of nationalism and the way it 
weakened central control to the advantage of foreign powers at this period. 
    With regard to British policy in Iran, WM. J. Olson, in Anglo-Iranian 
Relations during World War I,45 states that in British policy there was an evolving 
diplomatic approach between 1800 and World War I, divided into the following 
periods: seeking contact with Iran (1800-1830); hostility to Iran (1830-1870); 
strengthening Iran (1870-1890); and accommodation with Russia (1890-1917). 
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This framework provides an easy way to summarise the direction of British policy 
in Iran, but, given the continuity of British policy, there is no real evidence of 
much difference between one period and another. Let us take ‘hostility to Iran 
(1830-1870)’ for an example. The Herat War between Britain and Iran, which took 
place during this period, did not represent any alteration in long term British 
policy in securing India; and as for ‘accommodation with Russia (1890-1917),’ 
there were numerous other factors involved, such as the rise of Germany and the 
end of the phenomenon of splendid isolation. The Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs was also attempting to develop closer ties with Britain, which played an 
important role in gradually encouraging the two countries to sign a convention. It 
was, therefore, the general political climate that pushed Britain and Russia to 
reach a mutual understanding, rather than the specific position of the two powers 
at any one time. 
    Mikhail Volodarsky, in ‘Persia’s Foreign Policy between the Two Herat 
Crises, 1831-56,’46 argues for proactive Russophobic (in the sense of fear of 
Russia) view in Britain. In 1856, according to Volodarsky, Russia took advantage 
of worsening Anglo-Iranian relations, whilst the Palmerston government had no 
intention of furthering its policy in the Middle East which might provoke Russia. 
According to Volodarshky, Palmerston’s Russophobia was clear. Palmerston and 
his successors continued to give ground in Central Asia, and avoided 
confrontation in Iran, overwhelmed by their fear of further disturbances in India, 
where they felt that Russia was beginning to gain influence. However, 
Volodarshky’s interpretation of British policy is highly questionable, as the 
specific pursuit of British interests according to the British perspective was the 
cornerstone of British policy in Iran, and ‘Russophobia’ does not feature in the 
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British documents. In accordance with Britain’s traditional policy, the security of 
India was its main diplomatic and strategic concern. Since there was no direct 
threat to India on the part of Russia, it would be neither a pivotal concern nor a 
major fear to the British.  
    Martin Sicker’s work, The Bear and the Lion—Soviet Imperialism and 
Iran,47 deals with Russo-Iranian relations in the nineteenth century and the early 
twentieth century. With the Treaty of Golestan of 1813 and the Treaty of 
Torkmanchai of 1828, Russia had assumed a dominant position in northern Iran. 
At the turn of the nineteenth century the rise of a third imperialist power, namely 
Germany, caused Britain and Russia to reconcile their differences, at least 
temporarily, in order to prevent Germany from encroaching Iran. Russia 
intervention in Iran’s politics grew in the years before 1914, particularly with the 
two Russian ultimatums in 1911 suppressing the Iranian Majles. However, 
Sicker’s argument fails to integrate sufficiently the British and German factors 
into his discussion of Russo-Iranian relations.  
    In ‘Iranian Relations with Great Britain and British India, 1798-1921,’48 
Rose Louise Greaves claims that caution towards Germany increased pressure on 
Britain to reach an understanding with Russia. From a British viewpoint, the 1907 
Convention was concluded solely in the interests of maintaining the balance of 
power in Europe. The Convention, in fact, did not aim to change the nature of 
Anglo-Iranian relations. It is Greaves’ view that after the promulgation of the 
Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907 relations between Britain and Iran steadily 
deteriorated. To the Iranians, Russia was an enemy, and in joining her Britain too 
became an enemy, despite the fact that, as a result of the aforementioned changes 
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in British foreign policy, Iran had become a distinctly peripheral concern for the 
British cabinet in London. This argument is valid on the growing significance of 
Europe but is overstated, largely because it ignores the emerging interest in oil and 
British interests in the South and South-West Iran, and the protection of India.  
    In a case study of Anglo-Russian relations in the early twentieth century, 
‘Hartwig and Russian Policy in Iran 1906-8,’49  Vanessa Martin argues that 
Nicholas G. Hartwig, the Russian Minister in Iran, was acting in the context of a 
climate of rapprochement between Russia and Britain. It had previously been 
considered that Hartwig had urged the Shah to do away with the Majles, the 
constitution and free press established in Iran in 1906, and had tried to undermine 
the policy of the Russian Foreign Minister, Alexander P. Isvolsky, which resulted 
in the 1907 Convention. However, Martin questions this perspective, basing her 
argument on two points: firstly, that Hartwig understood the new rapprochement 
and supported it; and secondly, that he was considered by his colleagues to be a 
far-sighted individual. The Russian Minister therefore sought the stability of Iran 
in order to protect Russian interests. For example, when a constitutional 
government was confirmed by the Shah, and the Majles swore an oath of 
allegiance to him, Hartwig sided firmly with new status quo, and when the former 
Prime Minister, Amin al-Soltan, was recalled, his attitude was to support the 
middle ground in the expectation of achieving a climate of political moderation. 
With regard to the bombardment of the Majlis in 1908, which was planned by the 
Shah, Hartwig neither expected the attack nor was involved in planning it. 
Martin’s article indicates how the Russian Foreign Ministry at this period were 
committed to cooperation with Britain over the problems of Iran.  
    Roger Adelson, London and the Invention of the Middle East: Money, Power, 
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and War, 1902-1922,50 examines how in the early twentieth century some British 
in Tehran were worried that Russia’s control in northern Iran was expanding, and 
British India argued that Britain had to strengthen their position in the south. The 
author argues that the British Foreign Office did not pay much attention to the 
situation in Tehran, even the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906, but was 
primarily concerned with Anglo-Russian relations and British prestige in the 
Persian Gulf. This argument is flawed because the events unfolding at the centre 
inevitably had implications in the provinces, and thus affected Britain’s relations 
with both Russia and Iran. Britain had to deal with the repercussions in the south 
of events in Tehran.  
While scholars agree that the ‘German menace’ was the main factor behind 
the 1907 Convention, there are two studies that argue otherwise. In Endgame: 
Britain, Russia and the Final Struggle for Central Asia, 51  Jennifer Siegel 
expresses the view that the argument for the European factor being significant 
with regard to Iran comes from a Eurocentric perspective. The author believes that 
in the early twentieth century Britain came to consider more deeply the security 
and financial state of its empire, ending its traditional policy of ‘splendid 
isolation’ first with its alliance with Japan, and then with the Anglo-French 
Entente of 1904. However, the British still needed to avoid a military clash with 
Russia over India, which would have been more than Britain could bear. 
According to Siegel, the 1907 Convention is therefore commonly, but incorrectly, 
considered to have marked the end of the Great Game, in the face of an increasing 
threat posed by Germany. Siegel indicates that such a Eurocentric analysis 
focusing on the origins of the First World War and overlooks the reality of 
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Russian and British policymakers, and the fact that the relationship in Central 
Asia was, first and foremost, directed towards addressing regional and not 
European concerns. For both Britain and Russia, however, the Convention did not 
represent a solution, given that competition in Central Asia continued to exist. The 
German threat also was not solely the result of a Eurocentric viewpoint, but was a 
reality of the time. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Triple Entente of 
Britain, France and Russia, and the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary 
and Italy, had emerged, and the political climate of Europe was indeed more 
conflicted than that of Central Asia. Even though it is true, as Siegel argues, that 
the rivalry of Britain and Russia was not suspended because of the 1907 
Convention, European concerns were nonetheless the main factor. 
    Sneh Mahajan holds a similar view to that of Siegel, maintaining in British 
Foreign Policy 1874-1914: the Role of India,52 that Europe was not the key factor 
behind the 1907 Convention, but that instead the Indian border was a 
never-ending source of anxiety for British strategy. Russian troops attacked 
Afghanistan in 1885, though, which did lead to antagonism between Britain and 
Russia, though it resulted in a settlement after prolonged negotiations on the 
question of Afghan borders. Generally speaking, therefore, the reasons behind the 
British government’s anxiety about Russian expansionism can be summarized 
firstly in the perception of Russia’s expansion towards the Mediterranean and the 
Persian Gulf as a threat to the most efficient routes towards India, particularly the 
Suez Canal; and secondly, in the view that the consistent expansion of Russia 
towards Central Asia could pose another threat to British India. British policy 
often viewed the Indian border with Russia as the most likely area of conflict. 
With regard to Europe, during the two years preceding the outbreak of the war, 
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there were clear signs of optimism in Anglo-German relations, and similarly, the 
signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907 did not automatically result in 
the establishment of friendly relations with Russia. Until 1907, though German’s 
growing economic, military and imperial power was watched with anxious 
concern, the British government did not see any military threat from Germany to 
Britain’s security or to its world status. Russia was the enemy, and the entente 
with Russia was likely to make the Indian Empire more secure. This argument, 
however, does not really accord with the view reflected in the British primary 
sources. 
Mansour Bonakdarian in Britain and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution 
of 1906-1911: Foreign Policy, Imperialism, and Dissent, 53  looks at British 
dissenters in Britain claiming to support the Iranian constitutionalists during the 
1906 Revolution, and considers whether the British opposition was effective in 
changing Grey’s policy towards Iran, an original approach. Bonakdarian argues 
that the British dissenters had a vision that Iran, without their efforts, could not 
successfully reach their goal of establishing a constitutional government. From 
their perspective, the British Foreign Office’s friendship with Russia did not 
respect the liberal spirit which was a tradition in the Foreign Office at all. He 
demonstrates that they had some transitory successes, such as Grey’s refusal of a 
joint loan to the shah in January 1909, in view of the shah’s rejection of reforms. 
Nevertheless, despite Grey’s anxieties over the Russian-German meeting at 
Potsdam, he kept to his policy on Iran, and Bonakdarian does not fully comprehend 
that British interests rather than liberal idealism, were his prime concern. In terms 
of the gathering storm in Europe, there was much to justify his chosen course.  
     In Touraj Atabaki’s edited book, Iran and the First World War: Battleground 
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of the Great Powers,54 Atabaki contributes an article ‘The First World War, Great 
Power Rivalries and the Emergence of a Political Community in Iran,’ which 
argues that the outbreak of the First World War created more foreign pressures on 
Iran, in which the long-standing rift between different groups and views widened, 
thus further weakening the country. The central government was divided and was 
no longer the sole source of power in the country. Atabaki argues that from 1910 
the British delivered an ultimatum to Iran for the security of southern Iran, and 
Russia followed the move by delivering their own ultimatum to Iran in 1911. In 
particular he draws attention to the futility of Iran’s attempt to be viewed as 
neutral. In another article, entitled, ‘Iranian Nationalism and the Government 
Gendarmerie,’ by Stephanie Cronin, discusses the establishment of the 
Gendarmerie of Iran in 1910, and places it in a series of measures modernizing the 
armed forces under the leadership of foreign officers, in this case Swedes, dating 
from the Qajar period. The Gendarme officers were to take up a position of 
national leadership during the war. Cronin also mentions the bitter position of 
Iran’s unacknowledged neutrality during the war.  
James D. Clark, in Provincial Concerns: A Political History of the Iranian 
Province of Azerbaijan, 1848-1906,55 deals with Azerbaijan in a weak Iran from 
the mid-nineteenth century up to the time of the Constitutional Revolution in 1906. 
Iran in the nineteenth century was a centralized country, in which the provinces 
were ruled by governors, who had a considerable degree of autonomy, the result 
being weak central control. On the one hand, Azerbaijan was also under Russia’s 
influence from the early nineteenth century, and on the other hand, Azerbaijan 
suffered from official corruption, famine and inflation causing it to be in a poor 
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position in the late nineteenth century. From time to time there were resistance 
movements in the province, particularly that of the Constitutional Revolution of 
1906. This book is specifically helpful for studying the situation in Azerbaijan, 
which was Iran’s wealthiest and most advanced province, and had a key 
connection to the politics of the centre, and thus provides an example of 
provincial-centre relations. As a result of the predominance of Russian influence, 
however, Britain did not play a significant role in the politics of Azerbaijan.  
    Vanessa Martin and Morteza Nouraei’s article, ‘Foreign Land Holdings in 
Iran 1828 to 1911,’56 clearly illustrates Iran’s attitude to the purchase of Iranian 
land by foreigners. In comparison with those works which argue that the Iranian 
government during the Qajar period was weak, naïve and ineffectual in the face of 
the challenge posed by the intervention of the great powers, this article claims that 
Iran dealt skilfully with foreign powers on the issue of land during in the 
nineteenth century, and with some success. The Iranian government was intent on 
preventing or at least seriously discouraging foreigners from purchasing land in 
Iran: while the government allowed the ownership of houses, offices and storage 
space, it was only the buildings, and not the land itself. Martin and Nouraei’s 
article discusses a number of cases involving foreign missions and consulates, the 
long-standing rights of British Indians and Russian subjects, and outright 
purchases of land by the Russians, particularly from 1904 onwards. The article 
makes the point that the Iranian policy of resisting land purchases was more 
successful in the south, where the British discouraged it as not particularly in their 
interest, than in the north, where Russian land purchases were much more difficult 
to control. However, the article did not see how the British dealt land issue for oil 
works with the Bakhtiyari tribe and the Sheykh of Mohammerah. As oil became 
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an important factor in Anglo-Iranian relations in the twentieth century, there was a 
change of British attitude to land ownership in Iran.  
    Rashid Armin Khatib-Shahidi, German Foreign Policy towards Iran before 
World War I: Political Relations, Economic Influence and the National Bank of 
Persia,57 argues that Germany’s strategy of establishing a bank in Iran began in 
the late nineteenth century, and was a means for the promotion of trade between 
Germany and the Middle East. Then, a banking concession granted by Iran to 
Germany in 1906 led it to being perceived as a rival by Britain and Russia, who 
also suspected that Iran was using Germany to control and diminish their own 
influence. The rise in German influence caused Britain and Russia, according to 
the author, to change their policy to ensure Iran had a more solid economic base, 
rather than to suppress its aspirations as before. In fact their policy was try and 
sort out the finances and strengthen the economy, objectives undermined by their 
pursuit of their own economic interests.  According to Khatib-Shahidi, the 
Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 intended to enable the two countries to 
establish their own dominant economic influence in Iran, and one purpose was to 
discourage Germany’s economic penetration, an argument which ignores its major 
strategic purpose. A valuable aspect of this work is that it provides a German 
perspective, and is thus distinctive from other works, which concentrate 
particularly on Britain or Russia. Iran viewed Germany as a neutral power in 
Europe which it could balance against Britain and Russia. However, German 
commercial endeavours in Iran did not receive support from the German 
government, and Germany does not seem to have made a concerted effort to 
establish Iran as an ally in 1914.   
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3. Approach to and Sources for the thesis 
In previous academic studies, it can be seen that mostly the arguments focus 
on discussions between London and Tehran, discussions on the long period of 
Anglo-Russian rivalry in Iran and discussions on the policies of European powers 
to Iran, in the early twentieth century. In other words, not many studies look at 
British policy and Anglo-Iranian relations specifically. In particular, they do not 
consider in any detail incidents outside of Iran’s political centre. Further, British 
policy towards Iran was not simply devised in response to Russian actions there, 
but developed as a result of the vicissitudes of Iranian affairs, both at the centre 
and on the margins.  
The thesis, thus, attempts to explore British policy in the context of the 
variety of Anglo-Iranian relations between 1908 and 1914. The thesis 
demonstrates how the interaction of British and Iranians in the marginal areas of 
Iran had an impact on the relationship between the two countries. It focuses in 
particular on events in the South-West of Iran over the discovery of oil, and the 
Ottoman-Iranian border issue, and on the role of the Swedish officers in the South 
of Iran, a matter in which the British were involved and in which they seriously 
intervened. On the other hand, the incidents mentioned in the margins had an 
impact on Iran’s overall foreign relations with Britain. The thesis will also cover 
the role of foreign factors other than Russian policy in Anglo-Iranian relations. 
For example, it will look at British response to the influence of Germany and the 
Ottoman Empire on Iranian affairs. Although Russia was the main rival to Britain 
in Iran, Germany, had influence via the Baghdad Railway from 1903, which 
seriously affected Anglo-Iranian relations, and the position of the Ottoman Empire. 
Furthermore, the thesis will explore continuity in Anglo-Iranian relations during 
the said period. The Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906, the Anglo-Russian 
Convention of 1907 and the discovery of oil in 1908 were new factors at that time, 
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which resulted from previous incidents in the nineteenth century and led to new 
developments afterwards.  
The thesis will then consider British policy on the Constitutional Revolution 
in Iran and the political views of Mohammad ‘Ali in the context of Anglo-Russian 
relations during his reign. Therefore the disagreements between the Shah and 
Majles had significant implications not only for Anglo-Iranian relations, but also 
Anglo-Russian reactions. The thesis will consider how far Britain intervened in 
Iran’s internal disputes and how far it was draw in by Iran itself, in particular in 
response to Russian actions. Within this context, the thesis will study the problems 
facing the Majles in terms of financial reform and the maintenance of order which 
required the assistance of carefully selected foreign advisors, namely Shuster and 
the Swedish officers of the Gendarmerie.   
This thesis is mainly based on primary sources in English, such as the 
Foreign Office diplomatic correspondence, the British Petroleum and the India 
Office Records. It can be seen that British documents from the Foreign Office, 
such as the FO371, FO248 and FO416 series have been used in most academic 
studies on Anglo-Iranian relations. However, most studies look at Iran’s political 
affairs in terms of the centre, Tehran. There are many documents relating to the 
marginal areas of Iran which have not been widely used, and which are able to 
provide valuable insight into British attitudes and policies towards the provinces. 
As the British had a close interest in the South-West of Iran as a result of the 
discovery of oil, Foreign Office dispatches relating to these areas have much to 
reveal. In addition, with regard to disputes over the Ottoman-Iranian border, in 
which Mohammerah was also in question, Britain was involved deeply in 
protecting their interests in the area, on which dispatches have much to say. 
Documents relevant to the border, including maps, have not been broadly used for 
academic studies. The same may be said regarding the construction of Iranian 
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railways. There have been close studies of the Potsdam Agreement of 1911 which 
show how Germany and Russia arrived at an arrangement regarding the Baghdad 
Railway and its branch lines. However, there has been little on Britain’s schemes 
for railways in the South of Iran to block German influence penetrating through 
Mesopotamia into the Persian Gulf via the Baghdad Railway. The FO documents 
have much material on this issue which has been barely used.  
The British Petroleum Archive has also been helpful to this thesis. The 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company (now is called BP) was established in 1909, and 
many documents relating to the very beginning of the Company are stored in the 
BP Archive. Although some records about negotiations between the British and 
the Iranian local powers can be seen in the FO, there are original documents in the 
BP Archive, and some records of correspondence between the Company and the 
Iranians which have proved valuable for this work. The Company was also 
involved in the construction of Iranian railways and the disputes on the 
Ottoman-Iranian border. Therefore, the BP Archive provides important material 
for understanding British policy on these issues. Another source of primary 
material has been the India Office Records in the British Library. Although this 
thesis does not focus on British India’s perspective, it nevertheless played a role, 
and its opinion and those of the British government, especially on the issues of oil, 
railways and border, are set out in the India Office Records which thus provide an 
insight into the connections between the South of Iran, the Persian Gulf and India 
in British policy.  
There are some published documents in English rarely seen in academic 
studies. George Abel Schreiner’s edited documents, Entente Diplomacy and the 
World: Matrix of the History of Europe, 1909-1914, provides many European 
documents relevant to this thesis. Some Russian documents included have been 
helpful in interpreting the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and the construction 
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of the Baghdad Railway.      
Some published Persian document collections, such as Ketab-e Narenji and 
Ketab-e Sabz, are very valuable. Ketab-e Narenji, a translation into Persian of the 
despatches and telegrams of the Russian Minister in Iran, Hartwig, are important 
for the study of Russian attitudes and policies during the Iranian Constitutional 
Revolution period. And, Ketab-e Sabz, which contains a collection of materials 
relating to the First World War, contributes much information relating to that time. 
Particularly significant is the selection of political documents on relations between 
the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran, which contains much material about the 
Ottoman-Iranian border.  
 
4. Structure of the thesis 
    This thesis is organised into five chapters, in addition to Chapter I 
Introduction and Chapter VII Conclusion. Chapter II, ‘Oil: A New Facet of 
Anglo-Iranian Relations,’ explores the impact of the discovery of oil in 1908 on 
Anglo-Iranian relations from the perspective of Iran’s regions rather than its 
central government. Owing to the fact that the most promising oil areas were 
located in the South-West Iran, such as the Bakhtiyari territory, Britain’s oil works 
required the goodwill of the local powers, such as the Bakhtiyari Khans and the 
Sheykh of Mohammerah, to protect the oil works from disturbances. There was a 
range of different attitudes to British oil works, too, on the part of the Sheykh and 
the Khans, and this chapter will examine the Iranian government’s attitude to the 
relationship between the Sheykh and the Khans and the British. The discovery of 
oil also took place within the context of the rivalry between Britain and Russia in 
Iran, and of competition throughout the world between oil companies. The chapter 
also aims to reveal how Britain secured its oil interests in the face of competition 
from other powers. 
 51
    Chapter III, ‘British Policy on the Constitutional Revolution in Iran and the 
Return of the Ex-Shah in 1911,’ looks at the actions of Britain and Russia during 
the reign of Mohammad ‘Ali Shah, including his abdication and his return, 
between 1907 and 1911. The Shah’s clashes with the Majles were not only a 
domestic issue but also an international one, and it is debatable whether the Shah 
sought out the assistance of foreign powers in his opposition to the Majles, or 
whether Britain and Russia, especially the latter, intervened in Iranian affairs by 
exploiting incidents such as the bast in the British Legation, the bombardment of 
the Majles under the command of a Russian colonel, and the return of the deposed 
Shah to fight for the restoration of his throne.  
    Chapter IV, ‘British Policy and Railways in Iran 1903-1914,’ paints a broad 
picture of the rivalry between the three European countries in relation to the 
Iranian railway issue. From 1890 there had been a ban on railway building in Iran, 
and the Baghdad Railway, built by Germany from 1903, threatened British and 
Russian prestige in Iran by passing through Mesopotamia. As the prohibition 
lapsed in 1910, Britain and Russia submitted various railway schemes to the 
Iranian government in order to block or delay Germany’s railway line from 
reaching any part of Iran. In 1912, Russia was also planning a trans-Iranian 
railway. It is clear that there was a great deal of competition between Britain and 
Russia as regards railways in Iran, as well as rivalry between all three powers 
when Mesopotamia came into the equation.  
    Chapter V, ‘Disputes over the Ottoman-Iranian Border and the Involvement 
of Britain 1905-1914,’ argues that the Ottoman-Iranian border disputes also bore 
the marks of British and Russian influence. The chapter reveals that the settlement 
of the border between Iran and the Ottoman Empire was also a matter of concern 
to the two European powers. Because of the border between Russia, the Ottoman 
Empire and Iran, Russia was concerned with disputes between Iran and the 
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Ottoman Empire, while Britain, on the other hand, was concerned with the 
South-West of Iran, especially Mohammerah. There the security of its oil interests 
necessitated a clearly-defined Ottoman-Iranian border. This issue highlighted the 
weakness of Iran, which could only verbally challenge statements made by the 
Ottomans, and rely on assistance from Britain and Russia.  
    Chapter VI, ‘The Employment of Foreign Advisors in Iran and British Policy 
1911-1914,’ explores the role of foreign advisors in Iran, and the belief of the 
Iranian constitutional government that they constituted a means whereby the 
country could secure its independence and eliminate foreign power influence. 
From 1911, the most significant foreign advisors came from America and Sweden. 
An American financial expert, Morgan Shuster, was invited by the Iranian 
government to act as Treasurer-General in Tehran, while some Swedish officers 
were hired as advisors for the establishment of a gendarmerie in the South of Iran. 
Shuster irritated Russia by appointing a British subject to work not only in Tehran, 
but also in the north, the area of Russian influence, which lead to his dismissal 
and acrimony between Russia and Iran. The Swedish Gendarmerie then also 
encountered pressure from Russia. This chapter will look specifically at how the 
British handled both affairs in the North and South of Iran, and how they 
negotiated with the Russians over the issues. It will consider the repercussions for 
overall British policy.
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Chapter II Oil: a New Facet in Anglo-Iranian Relations, 
1908-1914  
 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the discovery of oil in Iran in 1908, which was a key 
point in the subsequent history of Iran, and in the development of its role in the 
world economy. Up till this time, the British focused on their trade in Iran whilst 
pursuing a policy of no direct military or substantial intervention in Iranian 
political affairs. As long as Iran remained stable, and the security of British 
interests in India were assured, the British were content with advising and 
consulting with the Shah, and giving British trade in Iran diplomatic support.1 By 
contrast, from the late nineteenth century, Russia’s oil exports had grown 
worldwide,2 and had become dominant in Tehran, giving it some leverage over 
Britain in terms of influence.  
Britain realized the significance of oil and was anxious to explore the 
possibility of oil production in Iran: above all because of its significance as a 
source of energy, but also to allow Britain to compete with Russia in gaining 
leverage over the Iranian government. Oil works were located in the South-West 
of Iran, in Bakhtiyari territory from 1905 and in Mohammerah from 1909, (Map 1) 
at a time when the financially indigent central government was gradually losing 
control of the provinces.3 To protect their newly discovered interests, the British 
signed agreements relating to oil with, respectively, the Bakhtiyari Khans, and the 
Sheykh of Mohammerah before the outbreak of the First World War. As a result of 
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the quest for oil, therefore, the importance of these local powers increased, partly 
because it was on land that they largely controlled, and partly because they were 
needed to protect this new British interest. 
Studies relating to the story of the discovery of oil by the British include R. 
W. Ferrier’s colossal research, The History of the British Petroleum Company,4 
which covers the development of the oil industry in detail, but only gives a brief 
description of issues regarding the negotiations for the Oil Concession of 1901, its 
connection to the South-West of Iran and its local players, such as to the Sheykh 
of Mohammerah and members of the Bakhtiyari tribe. Instead, he examines the 
background to the discovery of oil by the British solely, and does not consider 
implications in the development of British policy in the South-West of Iran in 
general. Studies of the Bakhtiyari tribe specifically mention their connection to oil, 
for example Gene R. Garthwaite’s ‘The Bakhtiyari Khans, the Government of Iran, 
and the British, 1846-1915,’ ‘The Bakhtiyari Ilkhani: An Illusion of Unity,’ and 
Khans and Shahs: A History of the Bakhtiyari Tribe in Iran,5 which partly 
addresses the relationship between the British and the tribe over oil, but mainly 
focuses on the history of the tribe. A doctoral thesis, The Reign of Shaykh 
Khaz‘al,6 by William Theodore Strunk, solely discusses Sheykh Khaz‘al’s period 
in Mohammerah, in relation to issues of oil, railways, and the First World War. In 
this thesis, the relationship between the Sheykh and the British is the main 
concern, while the Bakhtiyari Khans receive much less attention.  
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Arash Khazeni’s article ‘The Bakhtiayri Tribes in the Iranian Constitutional 
Revolution’ looks briefly at how the discovery of oil caused British influence to 
overcome geographical limitations in the South-West of Iran; and his recent work, 
Tribes and Empire on the Margins of Nineteenth-Century Iran,7  contains a 
chapter which specifically looks at oil from the tribe’s perspective in order to 
interpret oil within the context of their relations with the British. However, 
Khazeni, like Garthwaite, does not provide a broad vision on the development of 
oil by the British. Instead, the two authors are mainly concerned with the 
Bakhtiyari tribe and their internal conflicts. Alireza Abtahi’s Naft va 
Bakhtiyariha,8 which provides details and debates from Persian and English 
documents, focuses on agreements signed between the Khans and the British. 
Abtahi’s article, ‘Bakhtiyariha va Naft: Avalin Gamha 1319-1323,’ 9  looks 
primarily at the initial period of the oil-Bakhtiyari relationship. The first step was 
the signing of the Bakhtiyari Agreement of 1905, which indicated that the two 
parties had not only participated in negotiations but also enjoyed close 
cooperation. In his Engelis va Bakhtiyari 1896-1925 Miladi,10 Khodabakhsh 
Qorbabpur Dashtaki has several sections discussing the relationship between the 
discovery of oil by the British and the Bakhtiyari Khans from the early twentieth 
century to the outbreak of the First World War. He argues that the Iranian 
government in Tehran refused to acknowledge the negotiations and agreements 
signed by the British and the Khans.  
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The studies abovementioned successfully cover the various negotiations 
between the British and local power figures like the tribes, but they do not provide 
a broad vision of Anglo-Iranian relations at the time, or how Iranian oil featured 
and impacted within British policy towards Iran. This chapter will examine the 
background to the discovery of oil in Iran within the prism of Anglo-Iranian 
relations. It will analyze the characteristics of British policy towards Iran over the 
discovery of oil, and how the British protected their oil interests, given their 
considerations towards Iran’s domestic issues, and rivalry with other foreign 
powers. This chapter, therefore, will demonstrate that the discovery of oil was not 
simply the beginning of a new political era, but it introduced a new and vital 
factor within the long-standing history of the relations between Britain and Iran.  
 
1. The signing of the Oil Concession of 1901 
    Since the late nineteenth century, Iran had been developing closer relations 
with Britain through commercial enterprises, such as the opening of the Karun 
river in 1888, the establishment of the Imperial Bank in 1889, and the less 
successful Tobacco Concession in 1892. During this period, Iran was looking for 
cooperation with foreign powers to develop the country, owing to its irregular tax 
revenues and financial difficulties. The Oil Concession of 1901 was a new 
co-operative project between Iran and Britain, which dovetailed with the policies 
of both parties. In addition, the British gained a new opportunity to strengthen 
their position in the South of Iran and the Persian Gulf.11 
A British oil project had been included in the Reuter Concession of 1872, and 
although the 1872 Concession was later cancelled, the British Minister in Tehran, 
Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, and the Director General of the Persian Customs, 
General Antoine Ketabchi, continued to pursue the oil project. Then, a series of 
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surveys indicated that oil might be discovered in the the South-West of Iran. A 
French report of 1891, published in 1892, had investigated oil at Chah Surkh, in 
the region of Qasr-e Shirin, ninety miles west of the Ottoman frontier.12 In 1901, 
oil negotiations fell under the purview of William Knox D’Arcy, an adventurous 
Australian, who had been successful in mining ventures, and who enjoyed the 
support of the Iranian Prime Minister, Amin al-Soltan. A concession was duly 
signed on 28 May 1901 and included 18 articles in Persian and French.13 The 
British paid much attention to their oil venture, and the 1901 Concession received 
support from the British Foreign Office and the British government.14 In his 
dispatch of 30 May, after the signing of the Concession, Sir Arthur Hardinge, the 
British Minister in Tehran, reported that the ‘Persian Government have granted Mr. 
D’Arcy monopoly of seeking oil, petroleum, etc throughout Persia ……. He may 
acquire lands for the purpose and construct pipes to Gulf ports.’15  D’Arcy 
employed George Bernard Reynolds, an engineer who had experience with oil 
drilling in Sumatra, for the oil work in Iran.  
As mentioned already, the Concession had 18 articles. In Article 1, Iran 
granted Britain the right ‘to search for, obtain, exploit, develop, render suitable for 
trade, carry away and sell natural gas, petroleum, …… throughout the whole 
extent of the Persian Empire for a term of 60 years…’ With regard to lands, it was 
stipulated in Article 3 that, ‘The Imperial Persian Government grants gratuitously 
all uncultivated lands belonging to the State which the Concessionaire’s engineers 
may deem necessary for the construction of the whole or any part of the 
abovementioned works. As for cultivated lands belonging to the State, the 
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Concessionaire must purchase them at the fair and current price of the Province.’ 
Article 10 stipulated that the concessionaire should pay the sum of £20,000 
sterling in cash and a further sum in shares one month from the date of the start of 
exploitation. ‘It shall also pay the said Government (Iranian Government) 
annually a sum equal to 16 percent of the annual net profits of every Company or 
of all and any Company that may be formed in accordance with the said Article.’ 
As for the expiration of the Concession, Article 15 stipulated that ‘all materials, 
buildings and apparatuses then used by the Company for the exploitation of its 
industry, shall become the property of the said Government and the Company 
shall have no right to any indemnity in this connection.’16  
Vanessa Martin and Morteza Nouraei argue that the Iranian government had 
always strongly opposed the purchase of land by foreigners ever since the 
nineteenth century.17 Therefore, it seems that Article 3 of allowing the British to 
buy Iranian lands was contrary to the traditionally independent position of Iran. 
Although the two scholars argue that the British were not interested in the 
purchase of land,18 the Iranian lands for British oil works were not included in the 
afore-mentioned discussions. The reason why Amin al-Soltan granted D’Arcy the 
right to buy land is not evident from the primary documents, or discussed in any 
secondary sources. However it can be argued that D’Arcy did not actually buy 
land for any oil works at this time, and so British policy of discouraging the 
purchase of land, to preserve the integrity of Iran, was not tested at this point.  
The drilling commenced at Chah Surkh on 8 November 1902. D’Arcy was 
confident that this would be the best oil in the world.19 Reynolds expected to 
‘strike any day a gush of oil which would amply prove the value of the 
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Concession, and justify the formation of a Company before the date on which the 
Concession lapses.’ 20  In October 1903, oil was found at Chah Surkh. 
Unfortunately, the quantity and quality of this oil did not suggest a promising 
profit.21 There were alternatives, such as Masjed-e Soleyman (Map 2, no. 1) in 
the Bakhtiyari territory, but until early May 1908 there was still little optimism 
over the drilling of oil.22 On 26 May, however, Reynolds’s telegram recorded that 
‘Musjid-i-Suleiman 26th May ‘08. Depth of No. 1 Hole is 1180. Oil struck, 
flowing.’23 After seven years of drilling, the discovery of oil marked a new and 
important turn in Anglo-Iranian relations. Subsequently, the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company (the APOC henceforth), established in April 1909, replaced D’Arcy in 
further developing oil production in Iran.24 In addition, the British and the local 
powers, such as the Bakhtiyari Khans and the Sheykh of Mohammerah, were 
involved in negotiations over oil, as will be discussed below. 
 
2. Agreements between the British and the Bakhtiyari Khans 
    After years digging without any satisfactory result, D’Arcy, in September 
1905, considered that “no delay shall ensue in the commencement of drilling 
operations, as such delay would to a certain extent absorb some of the limited 
money allocated to this work, …….”25 Both money and time were therefore very 
limited from D’Arcy’s point of view. In September 1905, Mr. J. R. Preece, the 
British Consul in Isfahan, reached a satisfactory agreement with the Bakhtiyari 
Khans to ensure the process of oil prospecting would run smoothly. The British 
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Foreign Office felt it necessary to stay on good terms with the Bakhtiyaris. Thus, 
at this time when the Iranian Constitutional Revolution was taking place, British 
diplomats were paying considerable attention to the local tribes to serve their oil 
interests, partly to ensure the development of those interests, and partly in case 
that a weak Iranian government would not be able to provide any effective form 
of protection.  
Preece noted, however, that it was not easy to make the Bakhtiyari Khans 
accept terms to open up their lands for oil exploitation. For example, an influential 
Khan, Sardar As‘ad, ‘commenced by agreeing to the money terms, but only for 
guards, stating that the Chiefs would not lease a yard of their country for money, 
but that they must be partners in the concern. He then began talking of 20% of the 
profits …….’26 Hardinge in Tehran gave Preece instructions to insist ‘a 16% 
share of oil proceeds be given to Iran and avoid any form of it (share of profits for 
the tribe),’ stating that ‘it is necessary to force the tribes and nomads to abandon 
their claims.’27 Eventually however, the Khans agreed to reduce their demands to 
5% of profits issued by any companies created to undertake oil works in the 
Bakhtiyari lands. In the end, the Khans accepted 3%, and the agreement was 
finally concluded on 15 November 1905. 
The complete agreement comprised of six articles. Article 1 clearly indicated 
the different responsibilities of the British and the Bakhtiyaris. The British had the 
right, for a period of five years from the date of the signing of the Agreement, to 
make all examinations, borings, inquiries, and investigations necessary for the 
finding of oil in Bakhtiyari country. The tribe, in consideration of an annual 
payment of £2,000, undertook to appoint guards on the road, and to watch houses, 
buildings, dwellings and structures of all kinds. Should oil be found, as many 
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gangs of guards as might be required to guard the various spots where drilling 
might take place would be supplied by the Bakhtiyari, affording due protection. 
And the acquisition of lands included that ‘the Chiefs of the Bakhtiari tribe will 
give free of cost all uncultivated ground required for this work ……’ Besides the 
shares abovementioned, in Article 3, if the existing springs of oil were damaged 
by the work of the British and be of no further use, the British agreed to 
compensate the tribe. Ultimately, after the expiration of the period of the 
Concession granted by the Shah, such buildings as were the property of the British 
would then belong to the Bakhtiyaris.28  
Subsequently, the agreement ran into problems. The Iranian government of 
the time denied the legitimacy of the 1905 Agreement. The agreement was signed 
in November 1905 at a time when the central government was struggling with a 
growing movement for reform. It was perhaps an opportune moment for the 
British to approach the Khans. To the British, negotiating with the Khans might 
have seemed more advantageous than with a weak government. When the Iranian 
government caught up with the matter once more in January 1906, Moshir 
al-Dowleh, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, expressed his view that any land 
purchased or acquired by the British was not in the spirit of the 1901 
Concession. 29  Hardinge, however, considered that the real reason for this 
objection was that the Iranian government wished to hinder close relations 
between the British and the Bakhtiyari tribe, and that ‘an arrangement under 
which they (the Bakhtiyaris) are directly interested in a British enterprise, and 
receive an annual payment from a British company, will strengthen our political 
influence in Bakhtiaristan.’30 He might have added that it would strengthen the 
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tribe against the centre. Hardinge also believed that the 1905 Agreement bore no 
political will and no intention to derogate from the Shah’s authority.31 In July 
1906, Moshir al-Dowleh expressed the view that with regard to Article 3 of the 
Concession ‘I have the honour to state that the article in question only refers to the 
lease or purchase of lands about which the concessionaires can come to terms 
with the owners, but the latter cannot, without the knowledge or approval of the 
Persian Government, make with any person an agreement, the stipulations of 
which affect the rights of the Government.’32 Preece insisted that the oil works on 
the Bakhtiyari territory was legitimate according to the 1901 Concession and the 
1905 Agreement.33 Moshir al-Dowleh asserted that all lands belonged to the 
central government,34 and announced the annulment of the 1905 Agreement. Iran 
obviously had different views in 1905-1906 towards its attitude to the signing of 
the Oil Concession in 1901. Nevertheless, to the Khans and to the British, given 
the support of London, the 1905 Agreement was binding,35 even though it could 
not be considered legitimate given the view of the central government. 
The British made efforts to protect their rights and interests. One sensitive 
matter was the nature of the role of the Bakhtiyari guards. According to the 1905 
Agreement and as already mentioned, the Khans had to provide with guards for 
the oil works. To the British, though, these guards were not reliable. In November 
1905, Reynolds attempted to tell the Khan, Samsam al-Saltaneh, a signatory of the 
1905 Agreement, that the guards, though present at the oil works, were ineffective 
in keeping watch.36 However, the situation did not improve, in fact there were 
instances when the guards themselves became threatening. A company surveyor 
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was even warned by certain Khans that he was not allowed to work in this country, 
and that he would get hurt if he did not have a guard.37 The Foreign Office 
considered that it was important to have the Khans’ consent before operations 
began on their lands, to avoid disputes and delays, and to settle all matters as 
described in the 1905 Agreement.38 The British were thus concerned about the 
security of oil works and the workers stationed there. However, the Khans raised 
certain objections to the 1905 Agreement, mainly that the pay of the guards should 
be adjusted to a higher rate.39 Pay for the guards had been agreed at £1,500, but 
Sardar As‘ad, requested that this should be increased to £2,000 annually.40 
However, D. L. R. Lorimer, the Consul of Mohammerah, opined that no written 
agreement had been made, and the payment of the extra £500 remained in 
abeyance.41 The Khans were not satisfied with this refusal.42 Regarding the extra 
payment, Charles Marling, the Acting British Minister in Tehran, replied that 
‘until satisfaction is given in this respect I cannot recommend to the Syndicate 
(the D’Arcy Oil Syndicate) the payment of an extra £500 a-year as suggested.’43 
In fact, the Oil Syndicate agreed to the £500 payment to the Khans to eliminate 
these issues, and also agreed that it was made as much for permission to use the 
tribe’s ground as for their role as guards ‘…… we think it desirous that …… the 
extra £500 per annum should be paid the Chiefs, provided they give adequate 
guard under a responsible Chief, ……’44 The Syndicate also thought that once the 
desired result had been attained, the situation would completely change. Reynolds 
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considered that payment of the £500 should be made in full, to ‘leave no excuse 
for the Bakhtiari Chiefs to quarrel with us’.45 Nevertheless, Lorimer pointed out 
that the extra payment could not guarantee any promise made by the Khans.46 He 
also doubted that the situation would be improved by the discovery of oil. To the 
Khans the extra £500 was important for the fulfillment of their duties regarding 
the security of the oil works, but to some of the British in Iran it was an 
unreasonable request.  
Disputes between the British and the Khans were seemingly endless. In 
September 1907, Spring-Rice sent a telegram to the Foreign Secretary, Grey, 
noting that the tribes were becoming aggressive, and they were beyond all 
control.47 Owing to the disturbances in the Bakhtiyari territory, the British began 
making plans to bring in military guards of their own for the security of the oil 
works. Spring-Rice decided that ‘the local guards, supposed to be supplied by the 
Khans, are quite useless, and from the Persian Government nothing is to be 
expected.’48 As a result of the deteriorating state of order in the country, the 
British considered bringing in Indian guards, which was in line with developing 
British policy. This policy was not an altogether new idea. With the increase of 
Russian forces to protect consulates in the north of Iran, since 1901, Hardinge had 
already suggested that Indian guards might be used to protect British interests in 
Iran in the event of a Russian force approaching Isfahan.49 In August 1903, 
Hardinge was concerned that at a time when there were likely be more rivalries 
among the Bakhtiyaris, the Russians might ‘try to create a party among them, as 
they are devoting some attention to Bakhtiaristan and are beginning to recruit men 
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from there …….’50 On 13 September 1907, by which time the country was 
becoming seriously disturbed, Spring-Rice thought that it was necessary to afford 
armed protection to the British in the oil working area, pointing out the 
disadvantages of having to withdraw the oil equipment in its stead: ‘firstly, that it 
would be a fatal blow to British prestige; secondly, that it would involve a huge 
loss of equipment, and, last but not the least, a possible supply of petroleum 
would be lost or indefinitely postponed.’51  
As aluded to earlier, a way for the British to protect their oil works was to 
dispatch guards to the oil areas themselves. In September 1907, Spring-Rice 
telegraphed Grey to say that, in view of a recent increase in Russian guards in 
Isfahan, ‘Indian military authorities should decide question of increase of 
Consular guards on military grounds.’52 As a result, the Foreign Office, on 11 
October 1907, replied that an increase in the number of guards had been arranged. 
In November, Grey confirmed that the main purpose for them was: ‘firstly to 
protect British persons, who could, if threatened with danger, concentrate in one 
or two camps; secondly, to prevent the whole undertaking from being 
abandoned.’53 From the Iranian point of view, Moshir al-Dowleh objected to 
British guards because he did not want the matter to come to Russia’s attention,54 
thus providing an excuse for a responding request for more Russian guards; 
especially as there had already been an increase in Russian guards in Tabriz in 
March, and then in Isfahan in September.55 Nevertheless, the British went ahead 
anyway, and the Indian guards, led by Lieutenant Wilson, eventually arrived on 17 
December 1907. Thus, the British having made little progress with the oil works 
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for several years were obliged to bring the Indian guards into Iran, early in 1908, 
which Elwell-Sutton views as ‘a remarkable violation of a country’s sovereignty 
that passed quite unnoticed at the time.’56 The central government had raised 
some objections but this was largely ignored. To some extent, as Khazeni argues 
in his article, the British overrode the Khans’ opposition, and adopted a firm 
stand.57 Generally the British followed their traditional policy of non-intervention, 
and additionally the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 was signed with a respect 
to the integrity and independence of Iran, but obviously the dispatch of the Indian 
guards, though this was only for the oil works, meant Britain was starting to veer 
from its long-standing policy of avoiding such intervention. It would seem that the 
security of Britain’s oil interests, with all that that implied, had become an 
important policy objective. 
    Although the Indian guards were considered an additional support for the oil 
works, the British did not want to spend any extra expenses for them. Discussions, 
therefore, began on whether or not to retain the guards there if it would cost a lot. 
Cox telegraphed to Lorimer that India was enquiring whether it was necessary to 
retain the Indian guards in the next hot season, and Cox considered that with ‘the 
improved attitude of the Khans it will perhaps be possible for the guards to be 
withdrawn after March.’58 Even D’Arcy was of the opinion that it would not be 
necessary to retain the Indian guards because the conduct of the Khans had been 
good.59 However, Lieutenant Wilson argued that, from his knowledge of the 
Khans, there was little hope that they would continue to provide satisfactory 
guards.60 He recalled in his memoir that ‘the detachment which I brought out was 
ostensibly intended to reinforce the guard of the Ahwaz Consulate, though in 
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practice it was to protect the drillers until the attempt to find oil was successful or 
was abandoned.’61 Lorimer also put forward three points for consideration: 
 
    Firstly, it was not (has not been) on account of any active good-will on the 
part of the Khans that quiet has been maintained at the oil works; secondly, 
their guards have not improved, and have been the cause of trouble; and 
thirdly, how far (would) the Government be able or willing, in case of need, 
to reintroduce the (Indian) guard(s).62 
 
In the meantime, Grey considered that it would be inadvisable to make a decision 
until the question of how long the retention of the Indian guards should last was 
concluded.63 Reynolds also told Lorimer that D’Arcy might not be aware of how 
seriously the Bakhtiyari Khans were disrupting the oil works by their failure to 
protect them, and that the consequences of the removal of the guards needed to be 
taken into account; the Khans might not remain friendly, either. Lieutenant Wilson 
agreed with Lorimer, saying that there would be similar encounters with the 
Khans when new boring operations commenced, and that the Indian guards would 
be essential. It was his view that the guards must be retained, but for future 
necessities rather than for the present.64 D’Arcy, who did not agree with their 
retention in September 1908, changed his mind at the end of December (no doubt 
as a result of the deteriorating security in the country), and wrote a letter to the 
Foreign Office, stating that ‘the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Shah 
was, and is, absolutely incapable of enforcing its authority over the Bakhtiaris’. 
He pointed out that catastrophe or violence would result from the withdrawal of 
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the guards. In the end, D’Arcy suggested that the British government should 
protect this important British interest, as otherwise Britain would lose its right to 
ask for any reimbursement from the Iranian government.65 On 11 January 1909, 
D’Arcy, who had pushed for the signing of the Bakhtiyari Agreement of 1905, 
pressed the Foreign Office to maintain the Indian guards. 66  However, the 
withdrawal of the guards was concluded on 5 August 1909, and the Indian guards 
left on 25 September 1909.    
    Land was another important issue in the Bakthiyari territory. Owing to the 
laying of pipelines there, the issue of compensation for land arose. On 29 March 
1910, Chalres Greenway, the Manager of the APOC, said that: 
 
the Bakhtiari khans have demanded extortionate compensation from the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company for the cultivated land required by the latter for 
their pipe line and works, and they threaten to stop the operations of the 
company’s workmen unless these demands are satisfied, and (the Company 
have) asked that a telegram might be sent to His Majesty’s Minister at Tehran, 
instructing him to urge on the khans’ representatives that reasonable 
compensation should be accepted, and to insist that the company’s work 
should on no account be interfered with.67 
 
In order to ensure the smooth running of the oil works, Greenway chose a 
conciliatory approach to the issue. On 9 April 1910, an agreement between the 
APOC and the Bakhtiyaris regarding land at Masjed-e Soleyman and other 
neighbourhoods concluded that the APOC should pay £5,000 cash to the Khans in 
compensation for works on the oil lands, until February 1911. The APOC was also 
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held at liberty to construct machines, buildings, roads and pipelines, and do 
whatever other work they might require, and no one had the right to interfere or 
trouble them. Furthermore, the Khans would be responsible for compensation for 
any losses.68  
    A local people in the Bakhtiyari area, the Lors, did not, however, agree to the 
British drilling oil on their lands. According to the argument of Dr. M. Y. Young, 
who was the representative of the APOC in the Bakhtiyari territory: 
 
the Lurs are resisting all our attempts to make use of any land, whether they 
actually require it or not. The Khans have done very little to stop such 
resistance and it seems as if at best they are able only to mitigate it. …… Not 
only do they (the Lurs) plough unoccupied land, but they do so on drilling 
sites.69  
 
Young considered that, ‘delays will only result in a higher rate and I really do not 
see how they can be forced to meet us in any way other than by arguments, and 
these have failed.’70 Young foresaw further problems if there was no satisfactory 
agreement in this land dispute. At this time, therefore, the Khans who represented 
the Bakhtiyari tribe and Young negotiated a settlement that included purchase of 
lands. Eventually, an abstract of a Land Agreement on 1 May 1911 stipulated that:  
(1) The … lands …… are possessed by the Bakhtiaris, and they have been sold 
with all that is appertaining thereto, …… for the sum of £22,000; 
(2) the above mentioned and defined lands hereby become the absolute property 
of the Company …… ;  
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(3) any Lurs inhabiting the neighbourhood of the said lands, shall have no right 
whatever to enter, to cultivate, or to graze their flocks and cattle within these 
boundaries.71  
However, the Khans wanted the Agreement made in secret. Young’s telegram 
explained that ‘they (the Bakhtiyaris) seemed very cut up over the agreement, and 
they begged of me …… in keeping the whole transaction a secret matter for six 
months at least. They were afraid that it would get in to the Persian papers in 
Teheran that they have handed over a portion of the Bakhtiyari territory to the 
British, …….’72  
Circumstances in Tehran altered when a prominent Bakhtiyari, Samsam 
al-Saltaneh became Prime Minister from July 1911 to the end of the year. With the 
advantages of this political change in mind, Young went on to suggest that the 
Land Agreement be sealed or otherwise affirmed by the Iranian government. After 
all, all lands belonged to the state. Nevertheless, it was also Young’s view that the 
British should be ‘on good terms with them now, and indeed this should be our 
policy at all times.’73 However, being on good terms with the Khans had become 
more significant than keeping good relations with the central government. It can 
be seen that the APOC was desirous of adequate security for their oil works. And 
the Khans’ failure to provide it derived from the presence of different attitudes 
among them. Some of whom were endeavouring to support the revolutionary 
movement, while others were in favour of the British, because of the money they 
offered.74 Whether the central government was aware of the purchase is not at 
present clear, and needs more research. 
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3. The relationship between the British and the Sheykh of 
Mohammerah 
    From 1909 the British took an active interest in laying oil pipelines and 
constructing refineries in Mohammerah (Map 2, no. 2), in the Province of 
Khuzestan. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 helped facilitate trade between 
Europe and the Persian Gulf, and this, followed by the opening of the Karun river 
in Iran in 1888, led to an increase in the significance of Mohammerah, which is 
located at the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab close to the Persian Gulf. Mohammareh 
started playing an increasingly important role in the trade in the area and its 
neighbourhood, and gradually drew it deeper into the orbit of British interest. By 
1900, the British were also beginning to feel a threat to their interests in the 
Persian Gulf from other powers, particularly Germany. As a result, an increasingly 
close relationship developed between the British and the Sheykh of Mohammerah, 
Sheykh Khaz‘al. The ensuing cooperation between the Sheykh with the British 
created a political climate to their mutual benefit.75 Owing to the Sheykh’s 
monopoly of authority in Mohammerah, the British favoured his consolidation of 
power in order to securely develop British interests there.76  
    British recognition of the need to be on good terms with Sheykh Khaz‘al was 
already evident at the end of the nineteenth century. On 13 November 1899, 
Lieutenant-Colonel M. J. Meade, who was then British Political Resident in the 
Persian Gulf, presented his attitude to the Sheykh as follows: 
 
We consider him (the Sheikh of Mohammerah) …… the most influential 
individual in this part of Persia and desire to see him strong and the Arabs 
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united under his authority as it will (be) conduc(ive) to the interests of the 
country (i.e. Mohammerah). The Shaikh may rely on the support of the 
Minister at Tehran (Sir Arthur Hardinge) whenever that support can be given 
without ill-faith to the Persian Government and he will always advise the 
Shaikh on any subject on which he requires it. In return the Minister trusts 
that the Shaikh will further the interest of British trade in every way he can.77  
 
This favourable attitude was reciprocated by the Sheykh, who aspired to play a 
significant role in supporting British interests in the South-West of Iran, provided 
they advanced his position with regard to the central government. The relationship 
that developed was indicative of the growing interest of the British in a marginal 
area of Iran, at the expense of their relationship with the centre.   
The subject of assurances to be given to the Sheykh was discussed by the 
British in Tehran and London in late 1902. The British Legation in Tehran 
expressed the view that ‘we should not allow any foreign Power, on behalf of the 
Persian Government or otherwise—e.g., Russian naval or military forces—to 
depose or coerce him so long as he acts in accordance with our advice.’78 The 
British Foreign Office, according to their non-intervention in Iran policy, 
instructed Hardinge to inform the Sheykh that ‘so long as he continues to act in 
accordance with our advice and remains a faithful subject of the Shah, he will 
have the good offices and support of His Majesty’s Government.’79 Hardinge 
argued to London that the influence of the Russians in Mohammerah was growing, 
and that there was a danger that the Sheykh would align himself more closely with 
Russia if he received an ambiguous reply from the British. As a means of bringing 
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pressure on the British, the agent of the Sheykh in Tehran also consistently warned 
of the possibility of Russian encroachment in Mohammareh.80  
By December, London, still adhering to the non-intervention policy, declared 
that there was no objection to informing Sheykh Khaz‘al that ‘Mohammerah 
would be protected by us against (a) naval attack of a foreign Power …… and we 
might also equally promise him that he will have our good offices and support so 
long as he remains faithful to the Shah and acts in accordance with our advice.’81 
On 7 December 1902, Hardinge sent a letter to the Sheykh informing him of the 
abovementioned assurances from London, with a prerequisite, which further 
clarified Britain’s attitude to Iran:  
 
The relations between the British and Persian Governments are of a friendly 
character and the preservation of the integrity and independence of the 
Persian monarchy has for many years been one of the great objects of British 
policy in this part of the world. Disturbances of a nature to imperil that object 
would be a serious evil, and you would gain little and might endanger much 
by throwing off the sovereignty of the Shah.82 
 
Thus, the loyalty to the central government on the part of the Sheykh was a basic 
request of Hardinge and the British Foreign Office for the integrity of Iran. 
However, should either another power was at war with Iran, or under the pretence 
of being a friend, send forces to Mohammerah, the British would ‘interfere 
provided you had acted in accordance with our advice, and our fleet which is the 
strongest of any in the Persian Gulf would be employed to prevent any forcible 
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measures against you.’83 H. Lyman Stebbins comments, in his thesis, that Britain 
had usurped the authority of the Iranian government.84 Although the British 
wanted the Sheykh to be loyal to the Shah, the assurance of 1902 more or less 
trespassed on Iran’s sovereignty.  
In January 1903, Mozaffar al-Din Shah issued a farman (a royal command) 
to Sheykh Khaz‘al. In the farman, the Shah claimed that a place, Falahiyeh (an 
area in the province of Khuzestan, Map 2, no. 3) ‘from ancient times to the 
present, …… has been part of the jurisdiction of His Excellency Shaikh Khazal 
Khan.’ This place had been granted to the Sheykh, and in return, each year he had 
to pay the usual annual revenue to the Iranian government, and did not have the 
right to sell or transfer the said properties to foreigners. On this land, the Sheykh 
was permitted and empowered to exercise all possible rights of ownership.85 In 
other words, Sheykh Khaz‘al had the rights to ownership, without actually owning 
the property, which still belonged to the Iranian government though only 
implicitly. The 1903 farman was in appearance an expression of approval of the 
Sheykh’s power, but in essence, it was a representation of the Shah’s authority in 
the Sheykh’s territory, given that it was largely intended to prevent the area from 
submitting to or being occupied by others. This farman also represented an 
intention of the Shah to strengthen his control in the provinces, though the action 
was to have little effect on the relationship between the Sheykh and the British.  
In December 1903, the Shah attempted to undermine the assurances given to 
Sheykh Khaz‘al by Britain in 1902. Although the British Foreign Office’s view in 
this case was that the assurances of support from the British in 1902 should be 
confirmed to the Sheykh, Hardinge considered that it was preferable not to 
intervene in the matter between the central government and the Sheykh, because 
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such an intervention ‘would be a strong measure which would be deemed very 
unfriendly by the Shah and might re-act on our general relations with him.’86 
While the British Foreign Office expressed the view that the Sheykh was justified 
in opposing the Shah’s attempt, Hardinge kept on trying to eliminate the 
possibility of a clash between the Sheykh and the Shah by telling the former that: 
‘it will be better in the interest of good relations between the Persian authorities 
and yourself that our intervention should not be invoked until all other means of 
adjusting matters directly between them and you have been exhausted.’ 87 
Hardinge intended the 1902 assurance to Sheykh Khaz‘al to thwart possible close 
relations between other powers, such as Russia, but to the Iranian government the 
assurance had the effect of strengthening British political influence in Iran. 
Hardinge and the British Foreign Office carefully maintained their friendliness to 
the Shah, but their relationship with the Sheykh could not be disconnected either. 
In other words, Sheykh Khaz‘al was viewed as an important and powerful figure 
by the British for the security of their interests in Mohammerah. 
    Such were the circumstances in Mohammerah before oil was discovered in 
1908 at Masjed-e Soleyman in the Bakhtiyari territory. This discovery carried 
with new implications for British policy of attempting to secure the goodwill of 
Sheykh Khaz‘al, and of protecting its interests in the South-West of Iran. The 
connection with oil, as the British planned to lay pipelines from the Bakhtiyari 
country to Mohammerah, and wished to acquire lands in Abadan Island opposite 
Mohammerah, subsequently resulted in an agreement in 1909. In December 1908, 
Lieutenant Wilson was aware that the Sheykh ‘expressed a desire to find some 
means whereby British capital might be invested in his lands, thus increasing our 
stake in his country.’88 This argument was calculated to attract the British, who 
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had an interest in investing in well-ordered areas. The Sheykh knew clearly what 
the British desired in his territory and also knew the advantages of strengthening 
his relations with the British. Since oil at that time was a new source of British 
interest in Iran, the Sheykh then used this chance to reinforce the security of his 
position in Mohammerh. Oil therefore pulled Britain closer to the Sheykh.89  
    In addition, one new and potential opponent of British influence was 
Germany, which also made Britain consider strengthening the relationship with 
Sheykh Khaz‘al. Britain had been concerned about Germany since the late 
nineteenth century. The Baghdad Railway, which was begun by the Germans in 
1903, caused the British to resist their approach towards the Persian Gulf. In 
addition, in the early twentieth century German trade in the South-West of Iran 
emerged as competition to Britain.90 With the 1908 discovery of oil, the British 
therefore contemplated expanding their 1902 assurances to Sheykh Khaz‘al and 
extending them to his successor.91 In March 1909, the Sheykh, who was aware of 
Britain’s concern over Germany, was looking to gain advantages from this 
situation, even threatening that if the British could do nothing for him, they would 
have no right to object to his friendliness with other powers.92 Sir Geroge Barclay, 
the British Minister in Tehran, warned Grey of:  
 
the importance of maintaining our influence over him (the Sheykh) and 
keeping his good-will at the present critical moment in our struggle against 
German influence in the Persian Gulf. It is, I presume, clear that we shall be 
obliged to find money for the Sheikh when he really requires it, whether we 
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now give him any assurance on this question or not, in order to avoid the 
danger of his applying for it elsewhere.’93  
 
Eventually, negotiations between the British and the Sheykh for a loan and oil 
works on Abadan Island took place in 1909.  
Regarding land for oil works on the island, Sheykh Khaz‘al requested 
£10,000 repayable in ten years. The British government on behalf of the APOC 
suggested giving him a loan of £5,000 to £6,000,94 which Cox bargained for. The 
APOC was anxious to acquire the land, either by purchase or by lease; the British 
government, on the other hand, considered the satisfaction of the Sheykh and his 
cooperation even more significant.95 Sheykh Khaz‘al rejected the offer of £6,000, 
and as a result the British government was obliged to promise the higher sum of 
£10,000. At the end of April, a draft agreement was drawn up by the Sheykh and 
the APOC, just formally established, by which the APOC was granted the right to 
lay pipelines wherever they might be required and free of all costs, while Sheykh 
Khaz‘al was to gain ownership of the oil works on the expiry of the Concession of 
1901, in 60 years.96 The question arose as to whether the Iranian government 
should be informed of these negotiations. In Grey’s view Article 2 of the 1901 
Concession concerned the construction of pipelines, and so required no reference 
to the Iranian government.97 This ignored the question of who was ultimately to 
own the oil works.  
In the meantime, early 1909 saw a possibility of a civil war between 
Mohammad ‘Ali Shah, who had ruled the country from early 1907, and opposition 
factions from the provinces. As a result, Grey perceived the negotiations with the 
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Sheykh as offering a more practicable to secure British oil interests than seeking 
assistance from the Iranian government. In other words he began distinctly to 
move away from his adherence to non-intervention policy. In May, therefore 
without acknowledgement of the rights of the central government and with British 
acquiescence, Sheykh Khaz‘al and the APOC reached an agreement on land areas, 
which observed that a strip of land to bring the pipelines from the head of the oil 
pipes to the refinery was needed. A plot of uncultivated land on Abadan Island 
was therefore designated for the purpose, and the APOC was required to pay the 
Sheykh for the lease. Furthermore, the APOC agreed it had no right to interfere in 
the affairs of Sheykh Khaz‘al.98 In June 1909, a draft of a 19-Article agreement 
between the Sheykh and the APOC was drawn up on 9 June. This agreement also 
stipulated that a decennial rental of £6,500 would be payable by the APOC on 
Abadan Island, and that it could lay pipelines, free of all costs, on the Sheykh’s 
lands, and also on uncultivated lands.99 In addition, the British government would 
also provide £10,000.100 
Eventually, in July 1909, the final agreement between the British and the 
Sheykh was concluded. It stipulated that the Sheykh would be granted a strip of 
land for the laying of pipelines on his lands or lands under his jurisdiction, or 
leased or purchased by him. In turn, the company accepted that, on the expiry of 
the Oil Concession or of the period of the extension or renewal thereof, the APOC 
would have no rights to these lands.101 Sheykh Khaz‘al, however, was worried 
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that the Iranian government would be hostile to his close relations to foreign 
powers, and he therefore asked the British to keep their agreement secret from 
Tehran, especially the nationalist factions, and not to commence works on Abadan 
Island immediately.102 Conveniently, the signing of the final agreement on 16 
July took place just when Mohammad ‘Ali Shah had abdicated from the throne on 
17 July. Thus, since the British feared Iran’s marginal areas had become anarchic 
following the Iranian Constitutional revolution of 1906, they attempted to secure 
their interests in the south-west area.103 Further, perhaps the Sheykh considered 
that the collapse of the central government might soon affect his power at 
Mohammerah, and his decision to sign an agreement with the British was in order 
to provide himself with protection. Therefore, to the British and the Sheykh, the 
agreement was a means to secure their mutual relationship and interests.104  
    Subsequently, the Bakhtiyari Khans came to power in July 1909, with Sardar 
As‘ad as Minister of the Interior, meaning that the Khans were in a superior 
position in terms of dealing with how Sheykh Khaz‘al acted regarding the oil 
issue with the British.105 Sardar As‘ad pressed Sheykh Khaz‘al to submit a copy 
of the 1909 Agreement to the central government. Cox advised the Sheykh to 
communicate the Agreement to the Iranian government.106 Marling told Grey that 
Sardar As‘ad questioned the Sheykh’s right to lease land to the APOC on Abadan 
Island, given that it was the property of Iran as a whole.107 Cox and Marling all 
saw a possibility of clash between the Sheykh and Sardar As‘ad. As the Bakhtiyari 
government was interfering with the 1909 Agreement, the India Office wrote that: 
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it is reasonable and proper …… to guarantee the sheikh against any 
organized Government, whether Persian or foreign, and therefore indirectly 
against Bakhtiari aggression so far as it may be attempted by Bakhtiari 
Ministers acting through the Central Government, …….108 
 
In Marling’s opinion, Sardar As‘ad’s power might create difficulties for the APOC 
in the future. Sardar As‘ad continually asserted that Sheykh Khaz‘al had no right 
to lease or sell land, as it all belonged to the central government. Marling was 
aware that the government ‘would have no difficulty in dealing with the sheikh, 
forcibly if necessary, and they could even dismiss him and appoint another chief 
in his place.’109 At Isfahan, Preece, who had had experience of the Bakhtiyaris in 
the past, told Sardar As‘ad that the British would be firm in not allowing any 
interference with the Sheykh, especially if it caused complications for the APOC. 
In view of the warnings, Sardar As‘ad promised that the Iranian government 
would not take any action against the Sheykh.110 Furthermore, on 14 and 15 July 
1910, the Sheykh and Sardar-e As‘ad had a conversation by telegraph in which 
Sardar As‘ad expressed the usual cordial sentiments for the Sheykh.111 This was a 
sign that the two parties had reached an understanding, which was of course to 
their advantage, though not to that of the central government or Iran itself.  
    Up until 1913, Grey was prepared to advise Sheykh Khaz‘al to let the APOC 
bore for oil without conditions, and simultaneously to make a new agreement with 
him.112 Subsequently, in April 1913, there was an instruction to the agents of the 
APOC at Mohammerah, stating that: 
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    The best course to follow is for you to ask the sheikh for permission to bore 
oil in his territory, pointing out to him the various advantages of establishing 
this new industry in his province …… you will make the best bargain you 
can, either in the form of a percentage on profits (not in any case more than 3 
percent), or of rental on the land eventually occupied, or in any other form 
which circumstances may suggest, avoiding altogether any obligation to pay 
any cash sum.113 
 
This instruction showed that the APOC was being granted more and more rights 
by the British Foreign Office to make agreements with the Sheykh, which 
demonstrates the growing importance of oil in Mohammerah to British interests 
and policy. In June 1913, Cox considered that a new agreement would enable the 
British to obtain control over the oil in Arabistan.114 On 17 December 1914, 
accordingly, there was another land agreement between the Sheykh and the APOC, 
which concluded that the APOC would pay the Sheykh a rent of £7,200 in 
advance for ten years, and that the Sheykh agreed that the APOC could build 
railways and pipelines for the oil business.115 The year 1914 significantly saw the 
outbreak of the First World War, and Britain’s need for the protection of oil 
became an even more important issue, making control of Mohammerah a matter 
of grave concern in British policy.  
     
4. Britain’s protection of oil interests in Iran: the interests of other 
powers and the central government 
Britain’s oil interests were not simply an issue within Iran, but also 
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internationally. From the signing of the Oil Concession of 1901 to the outbreak of 
the First World War, the British endeavoured to prevent other foreign players from 
having an impact on the South-West of Iran. During this period, Russia, which 
was an old rival, Germany, a new rival, and foreign oil companies presented 
competition to Britain.  
 
a. Oil in the context of Anglo-Russian Relations 
One implication of the Oil Concession of 1901 to the British was the 
opportunity to block the Russian’s southwards movement to the Persian Gulf.116 
Britain and Russia had an understanding that Iran was a buffer state and they did 
not want to see any direct and serious clash of their interests in Iran. Generally 
northern Iran was under Russian influence while southern Iran, including the 
Persian Gulf coast, was Britain’s domain. Article 6 of the Concession made 
reference to the fact that Britain and Iran both wished to avoid reaction from 
Russia. The British were aware that their every move in Iran might exert an 
influence on Anglo-Russian relations, and during the process of negotiation for 
the Concession, the Iranian government sought to disarm Russian opposition by 
excluding the northern provinces of Khorasan, Astarabad, Azerbaijan, Gilan, and 
Mazandaran, from the scope of the Concession.117 The Article, therefore, stated 
that: 
 
Notwithstanding what is above set forth the privilege granted by these 
presents (sic) shall not extend to the Provinces of Azerbadjan, Ghilan, 
Mazendaran, Asdrabad and Khorassan but on the express condition that the 
Persian Imperial Government shall not grant to any other person the right of 
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constructing a pipe line to the southern rivers or to the South Coast of Persia. 
 
In terms of Anglo-Iranian relations, the article represented, on the one hand, 
British respect for Russian interests in the North of Iran, and, on the other hand, 
the fact that Iran had the responsibility to keep other powers out of the south. 
Although the article did not clearly mention Russia, the two signatory countries 
could not ignore it. In addition, Russia, in 1900, had just advanced to Iran a loan, 
which meant Russian influence was for a time superior to that of the British. The 
signing of the Oil Concession in 1901 was above all about oil, but it was a means 
for Britain to block Russia, and to obtain more advantages from Iran. 
    After the signing of the Oil Concession, an article in a Russian newspaper 
Novoe Vreya reported on British policy in Iran, suggesting that Iran should beware 
of Britain intentions. The article went as follows: 
 
The granting of a concession for working naphtha mines in South West 
Persia to the British capitalist Mr. D’Arci (sic) has awakened among the 
English a special interest in the territory of the Shah. …… Russia is at liberty 
to do as she pleases in Northern Persia, but in return we must place the 
Southern Provinces at the complete disposition of England. …… Possibly 
the English are desirous of avoiding so dismal a solution, and with this end in 
view are trying to acquire all possible concessions in South Persia. 
Nevertheless it may be hoped that the Shah and His immediate Advisers are 
fully aware of the danger which threatens them if the English (British) 
deprive them of the natural riches of the country, or indeed if Persia is thrown 
open in any considerable degree to Western enterprise.’118 
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This piece represents the concern of the Russian public about the possible advance 
of British interests and influence through the oil business. There were also reports 
that the Russian Legation in Tehran was attempting to force the Iranian 
government to allow the Russians into the management of the Concession and the 
oil industry,119 which caused serious concern to the British. It is clear that Russia 
attempted to set boundaries for British influence and prestige in the oil industry, 
and the Russian factor continued to be seen by the British a matter for 
consideration. As D’Arcy was not sure of receiving support from British 
capitalists, there was always the possibility that he might take the option of 
offering shares to foreigners, unless the British government provided support. 
Therefore, it was considered possible that the Concession might be in danger of 
coming under Russian control.120 Any Russian response to oil in Iran, either to 
the Iranian government or to D’Arcy, was an important British concern. 
    On 31 August 1907, the Anglo-Russian Convention was signed, which had 
implications for relations between the Iranians and the British as regards to oil. In 
the meantime, Russia had experienced defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 
as well as the upheaval of the Russian Revolution of 1905, which made the 
country weak. In 1906, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Isvolsky, therefore 
considered the idea of an amicable arrangement with Britain with Iran being a key 
issue. The British Foreign Office was told that Russia did not want to annex 
Iranian territory or to acquire a port on the Persian Gulf.121 And, as regards Iran, 
it seemed to the British Foreign Office that ‘the main object should be to put an 
end to the unfortunate rivalry of the two Powers, whom the Persian Government 
invariably endeavored to play off against one another, and we, of course, desired 
that an equal opportunity should be afforded to our commerce in Persian 
                                                 
119
 FO60/731, no. 102, November 9, 1903, Grant Duff to Foreign Office. 
120
 FO60/731, no. 113, December 16, 1903, Hardinge to Foreign Office. 
121
 FO416/25, no. 300, October 5, 1905, Lansdowne to Hardinge. 
 85
territory.’122 The British Foreign Office also clearly expressed its long term policy 
on Iran, namely that ‘His Majesty’s Government has consistently sought to 
maintain the continued national existence and the territorial integrity of Persia, 
and to develop her resources.’123  
    With regard to Iran in the 1907 Convention, the country’s integrity and 
independence was a common interest to both parties, as was expressed in five 
articles. In the first two articles, it was agreed that the British would not engage or 
allow any other kind of force such as a third power or a concessionary acquire 
advantages in Iran, ‘beyond a line starting from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through 
Isfahan, Yezd, Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the 
intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, directly or 
indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by 
the Russian Government.’ (Article I) By the same token, the Russians undertook 
to do the same, ‘beyond a line going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, 
Birjand, Kerman, and ending at Bunder Abbas, and not to oppose, directly or 
indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by 
the British Government.’ (Article II) In addition, the Article III stipulated that: 
 
    Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without previous arrangement 
with Great Britain, the grant of any Concessions whatever to British subjects 
in the regions of Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Articles I and 
II, Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards (to) the grant of 
Concessions to Russian subjects in the same regions of Persia. All 
Concessions existing at present in the regions indicated in Articles I and II 
are maintained. 
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In other words, the Oil Concession of 1901, which was by implication included in 
the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, was outside Russian influence. The 
Convention was perceived as a new factor influencing Anglo-Iranian relations in 
the South-West of Iran. For example, an M.P., Mr. J. D. Rees, suggested in 1908 
that use be made ‘of the facilities afforded by the Anglo-Russian Agreement 
respecting Persia for the advancement of British interests in the southern part of 
that country.’124 The privileged position of Britain, as expressed in the Oil 
Concession of 1901 was thus further confirmed by the 1907 Convention.  
 
b. The issue of a loan to the central government 
After the discovery of oil at Masjed-e Soleyman in 1908, the British 
considered increasing European staff in the oilfields in order to prevent delay and 
waste of money, and to facilitate negotiations.125 The result of this was the 
establishment of the APOC in April 1909, as already mentioned. An important 
issue between the APOC and the Iranian government was related to a loan to the 
latter by the APOC, which enabled Iran to maintain oil interests in the Company. 
There had been financial support for Iran from Russia since 1900, and since the 
signing of the Oil Concession of 1901 Russia had paid close attention to all of 
Britain’s actions in relation to oil. Although on this occasion the loan was 
proposed by the APOC, it was an issue between Britain and Russia as much as it 
was between Britain and Iran. This loan also had the advantage of securing for 
Britain influence at the Iranian centre at a time when it was so actively engaged on 
the margins.  
At the end of 1909, a rumour circulated that oil shares were to be sold by the 
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Iranian government. Although it was proven false, the Vice-Chairman of the 
APOC, E. W. Wallace, asked the British Foreign Office to stop the sale, or to form 
a syndicate to buy half the Iranian government’s rights and interests.126 A loan to 
Iran was then therefore proposed by the APOC in May 1910, with a view to 
securing the oil interests. Grey informed Marling in Tehran that Wallace was 
asking if the British government would advance £200,000 as a loan to be made by 
the APOC, but the British Foreign Office was not in favour of this proposal at all, 
expressing the view that ‘it did not appear probable that the Persian Government 
would require an external loan, …….’127  
At the same time the loan proposed by the APOC became involved in 1910 
with a renewed application by the Iranian government to Britain and Russia for an 
advance. Grey told the APOC that he was concerned about the Russian 
government’s reaction to the proposed loan.128 Even though the terms of the 1907 
Convention prevented Russia from interfering with the 1901 Concession, Russia 
took a serious stance on APOC actions. Grey also believed that ‘we cannot admit 
the hypothecation to any new loan of any source of revenue already pledged to the 
service of the debts owed by the Persian Government to the British or Russian 
Government, or to the British or Russian bank.’129 A loan made by a British firm 
at a time when Iran was in debt to the two powers was not therefore possible, and 
the British Foreign Office argued that ‘the conversion of the debts due to the 
Russian and British Banks shall precede any loan made to the Persian 
Government other than those which might be made by the Russian and British 
Governments, ……’130 Nevertheless, the Russian government expressed the view 
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that they did not oppose a British syndicate having discussions about a loan with 
the Iranian government. In the end, the APOC arranged a loan to Iran directly. On 
15 August the Iranian government accepted a loan of £500,000 from the APOC.131  
As the process of arranging the loan from the APOC was taking place, the 
British Chargé d’Affaires at St. Petersburg, Hugh O’Beirne, informed the Russian 
government that ‘the transaction was not strictly a loan, but was rather of the 
nature of a transfer of shares, the Persian Government merely making over to the 
oil company the shares which they held in that concern.’132 Although the Russian 
government had previously stated that they had no desire to oppose discussions 
between the APOC and the Iranian government towards an advance, and only 
wanted to be informed of the progress of the application,133 they later insisted that 
it was unquestionably desirable that the loan agreement should be postponed until 
completion of the negotiations respecting the conversion of debts to the Russian 
Bank, negotiations with which the Iranian government was reportedly about to 
proceed.134 
In addition, the British government wanted its Iranian counterpart to give the 
APOC security for the loan, which they proposed as ‘the surplus revenues of the 
southern customs and of the telegraphs available after prior claims in respect of 
the advances to which they are already pledged to have met.’135 However, the 
Iranian government objected to giving any security, and negotiations broke down, 
though they did resume on a number of occasions. On 3 September 1910, Wallace 
telegraphed the British Foreign Office reporting that: 
 
    The Persians appear to make two alternative proposals, …… £100,000 
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secured by certain Persian public revenues; or, £200,000 secured by the said 
revenues plus (the) Persian Government’s interest and share of (the) profits 
in the oil concession; while you would prefer a third alternative, …… 
£100,000 secured by the Persian Government’s interest and share of profits 
in the oil, and in a prospective mineral concession.136 
 
In Wallace’s opinion, the shareholders of the APOC would accept the third choice. 
On 3 October, Barclay told Grey that the Iranian government would accept a 
£100,000 loan, providing as security their interests in the APOC. On the same day, 
Wallace also confirmed that £100,000 had been accepted by the Iranian 
government.  
    Nevertheless, a new Iranian cabinet formed in July 1911, and by August it 
pointed out that the arrangements for the loan had still not been concluded.137 
With the change of the Iranian cabinet, the previous decision was repudiated. The 
APOC, hence, was attempting to reduce the amount of the loan. Greenway, the 
Manager of the APOC, said that the Iranian government ‘would expect an 
advance of £200,000 in respect of their oil interests and they may not be willing to 
accept £100,000, but if we make any advance at all I think it should be limited to 
the latter sum.’138 In addition, the APOC was concerned that the Iranians would 
sell their interest, stating that they (the APOC) should in case of need, and to 
prevent any alienation by the Iranians of their interests, be prepared either to 
purchase a half share in them, or to make an advance of £100,000 against the 
whole.139 However, in the meantime the APOC’s position changed in comparison 
to that of the previous year, because of the uncertainty of Iranian politics.140 The 
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APOC was waiting for signs of improvement before lending money, and when 
this did not happen, the proposal of the APOC to make a loan to the Iranian 
government was aborted in August 1911. 
In short, from 1910 the loan to the Iranian government was an issue that was 
relevant to various aspects of Anglo-Iranian relations. The APOC proposed the 
loan themselves, but encountered the problem that the resources of the Iranian 
government were committed to the repayment of the debts that it owed to Britain 
and Russia. Meanwhile, the loan also did not satisfy the Iranian government, 
which considered it insufficient. Finally doubts grew within the APOC because, in 
terms of Anglo-Iranian relations, Russia had to be consulted even though the main 
issue was simply a loan by a British firm rather than the government itself. This 
necessity derived from the intricacies of Iran’s financial problems, and its 
dependence on Russia in particular for financial support from 1900 onwards. The 
incident demonstrates that, at the point when the British were having negotiations 
with the Bakhtiyari Khans and Sheykh Khaz‘al over the oil, the Iranian 
government was, for financial reasons, not in a position to secure its oil interests. 
     
c. The German factor in the South-West of Iran 
    With regards to Germany, Britain’s rival in the South-West of Iran, there 
were varying opinions as to the extent it was a threat or not. In May 1908, M.P. 
Rees said that German activities must have the consent of the Iranian government 
especially as German influence was increasing in the South of Iran, and ‘equally, 
any arrangements affecting the neutral zone must, in virtue of the Anglo-Russian 
Convention, possess the acquiescence of Russia.’141 Rees considered Germany to 
be an immediate threat to British interests in the South-West of Iran. In September 
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1908, Grey telegraphed Marling regarding Germany’s intentions in the area. He 
summarized an article in a German newspaper, Berliner Tageblatt, of 28 August 
about extending German trade in the western region of Iran.142 London had 
already sensed Germany as a threat to Iran. In contrast, however, Barclay, the 
British Minister in Tehran, pointed out that: 
 
It is …… impossible for any concession …… to be obtained on behalf of 
German subjects ……. I have no doubt that in these districts the Russian 
Legation could, and would, block any application for such a 
concession, …….143  
 
Barclay was confident that Germany was not a threat in the South-West of Iran. 
Nevertheless, the British in the region did pay attention to the relationship 
between Sheykh Khaz‘al and the Germans. Cox mentioned that a German firm, 
Wonckhaus, had business dealings with Sheykh Khaz‘al in Mohammerah, and 
said that it was necessary for the British to subsidize the Sheykh.144 Cox in 
Bushehr, unlike Barclay in Tehran, clearly felt the advance of German influence. 
Grey asked Barclay to be careful not to clash with the Germans, and to consult the 
APOC ‘with regard to the rental for land and for the pipes, and also on the subject 
of an increased loan.’145 Due to growing German influence, the British made 
more efforts to maintain their influence in the South-West of Iran, especially with 
the Sheykh. 
In fact, in 1909 the Sheykh granted the Germans a lease of land close to the 
banks of the Karun river for eight years. In addition, in September 1913 
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Wonckahus also acquired a ten year lease of wharfs, and intended to erect 
buildings there later on. In 1914 Lorimer already acknowledged the German threat 
in Arabistan and other Iranian and Arab ports in the Gulf.146 A report from 
Bushehr argued that ‘the arrival of the Germans in strength will not only adversely 
affect our position in Arabistan, but will also undermine the influence and 
authority of the Sheykh of Mohammerah, inasmuch as it will be the policy of the 
Germans to refer matters of interest for arrangement between their legation in 
Tehran and the Persian Government.’147 In the meantime, there were negotiations 
for a new agreement in process between the APOC and the Sheykh in 1914, by 
which it can be seen that Germany was an immediate factor having an impact on 
British interests in Mohammerah. 
 
5. Oil and the British Admiralty  
    Although the British discovered oil in the South-West of Iran, its oil industry 
relied on other suppliers, about which they felt insecure. From 1912, the British 
became concerned about threats from outside commercial competition, such as the 
Royal Dutch-Shell group of companies (Shell henceforth).148 As Britain owned 
no oil, if Britain needed oil she had to buy it from foreign countries. Shell had 
influence in Mesopotamia after 1907, and its importance increased in the Ottoman 
Empire after 1912.149 Shell played a substantial role in oil industry globally, 
preceded by the Standard Oil Company of the United States.150 As the British 
Admiralty had considerable interest in the APOC, it therefore played a huge part 
in any negotiations. This section mainly concerns the impact of the relationship 
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between oil and the Admiralty on British diplomacy with regards to Iran.  
    On 13 September 1912, the British Foreign Office revealed to the Admiralty 
a message concerning an arrangement in Mesopotamia regarding working 
petroleum deposits in any part of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and Asia.151 The 
Foreign Office acknowledged that world oil supply seemed to be in the process of 
coming under the control of Shell, and competition between Shell and the APOC 
was therefore likely. Greenway, the Manager of the APOC, analysed the oil 
circumstances of the time in terms of the supply of oil for the British Admiralty 
and the possible development of the APOC. Firstly, concerning oil fuel supplies, 
Greenway, as manager of the APOC, mentioned that:  
 
    1. the British and/or Indian government should enter into a contract with the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company for the purchase of all the oil fuel we can 
produce, ……; 2. should enable the Company to raise the large amount of 
extra capital which it would be necessary to expend on further development, 
pipelines, refineries, and etc., in order to produce this large amount of oil 
fuel, ……; 3. the British government should use their utmost influence to 
secure … the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, …… .152 
 
In his opinion, once fuel for the Admiralty was supplied by the APOC, British oil 
interests should operate under its protection. Secondly, with regard to the 
development of the APOC, Greenway indicated that:  
 
ensuring for all time British control over the oil produced from the Persian 
oilfields, (would) in all probability mean not only the saving of a very large 
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sum in the cost of oil fuel to the British Navy, but also ensure that supplies 
from this important oilfield …… would not in time of war be subject to the 
restraints which might occur were this Company forced into a commercial 
alliance with a foreign Combine.153  
 
Greenway thus implied that the APOC would only provide oil to the British 
Admiralty, and had no wish to be in alliance with others. Furthermore, Greenway 
also claimed that the South-West of Iran possessed a large amount of oil, and that 
‘therefore it should, in view of the importance of ensuring supplies of oil fuel for 
naval purposes, at all costs be maintained under British control.’154 Greenway 
concluded that the supply and control of oil interests required government support, 
which could be a way to prevent a monopoly of oil by foreign powers and 
companies.  
    In the Admiralty, too, there were similar opinions to those of Greenway’s. In 
December 1912, the Admiralty telegraphed the Foreign Office, stating that British 
interests in the Iranian oil field were sufficiently strong, and the Admiralty was 
firm in recommending that diplomatic support should be given to the APOC in 
respect of their application for concessions in Mesopotamia. All legitimate 
influence should be used to prevent foreign control of any of the Iranian oil 
fields.155 A probable outcome of oil development, as argued by the India Office, 
was that if no financial support was forthcoming from the British government, the 
APOC would be absorbed by Shell. This result would, of course, be gravely 
prejudicial to British interests in southern Iran, and ultimately in the Persian Gulf 
as a whole. The only way forward was therefore to endeavour to provide all 
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possible support for the APOC.156 The Admiralty claimed that only government 
support could ensure the preservation of the commercial independence of the 
APOC,157 and Grey commented that the APOC must not feel it necessary  
 
to combine with the Shell Company. (This view) is shared very strongly by 
myself and by every one of my colleagues, and it is solely for this reason that 
we have been endeavouring to seek for some practicable means of 
maintaining the purely British character of the Company (the APOC).158 
 
From the views expressed above, it is clear that in the Foreign Office there was 
the will to support the Admiralty and the APOC, in which they were aided by the 
desire for APOC to have full British protection. The most important point was that 
it should all remain purely British in character, i.e. under sole British control. 
    On 20 May 1914, the British government entered into an arrangement with 
the APOC. This stated that ‘this Contract shall continue for a term of twenty years 
commencing from 1 July, 1914, …… And, the quantity of such oil fuel to be sold 
and delivered to the Admiralty in each year of the said term of twenty years shall 
be the quantity specified in a notice to be given by the Admiralty to the Company 
as to the year 1914-15 not later than 31 August, 1914, ……’159 After the 
Admiralty Agreement, Winston Churchill, who was appointed as the First Lord of 
the Admiralty in 1911, made a speech on 17 June 1914, in which he declared that 
‘The Admiralty must have power to control an oil-field somewhere …… What we 
want now is a proved proposition, a going concern, an immediate supply, and a 
definite prospect with potentialities of development over which we can ourselves 
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preside. These we find in Persia.’160 Subsequently, on 17 July, he expressed the 
opinion that ‘the Admiralty should become the independent owner and producer 
of its own supplies of liquid fuel. …… We (the British) must become the owners, 
or at any rate the controllers at the source, of at least a proportion of the supply of 
natural oil which we require.’161 His views on the subject of the Admiralty and oil 
were therefore as strong as those of Greenway. In Anglo-Iranian relations in 1914, 
oil had a broader dimension, which involved the British Admiralty. At the 
outbreak of World War I in August 1914, the result of the purchase of oil in the 
South-West of Iran had positive and global implications, which had up to then 
only been an issue relevant to Anglo-Iranian relations. 
    The purchase of Iranian oil by the British government gave Russia concerns, 
as reflected in its newspapers. In June 1914 a Russian newspaper, Novoe Vremya, 
published an article entitled ‘Anglo-Persian Naphtah,’ where it was claimed that:  
 
the greater part of the shares of the Anglo-Persian Company have been 
bought by the British Government for a sum of £2,000,000, and the company 
becomes an organ of British Government authority on Persian territory. …… 
the area of the concession is almost four times as large of (as) the whole of 
the United Kingdom, and is situated not only in the British sphere of 
influence as demarcated by the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, but also 
partly in the neutral zone.162  
 
Another Russian newspaper, Rech, also argued that ‘the purchase by His 
Majesty’s Government of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company shares, may …... give 
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rise to friction between (the) two countries (Britain and Russia).’163  
    Grey explained three points to the Russians, with a view to demonstrating 
that the purchase of the shares of the APOC shares did not contravene the 1907 
Convention:  
 
    The British Government did not acquire any rights that did not exist under 
the concession originally. Those rights remained exactly as they were before 
the Anglo-Russian Agreement about Persia was made; …… of course if it or 
anything else required in our opinion, special measures in the neutral zone, 
inconsistent with the Anglo-Russian Agreement or the independence and 
integrity of Persia, we should consult with Russian Government before 
taking them; The influence of the Admiralty (i.e. through the signing of the 
Admiralty Agreement with the APOC) in the oil concession would be used 
not to push development into the Russian sphere, ……164  
 
Grey’s three points revealed that the British had no intention of violating the 1907 
Convention in the Agreement between the Admiralty and the APOC. Nonetheless, 
Russian newspapers continued to target the privileges that the British government 
had gained for the APOC, criticizing the British on the grounds that they did not 
have a genuine intention to maintain their friendship with Russia. They said that 
‘The purchase of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company’s shares is contrary both to the 
spirit and to the letter of the 1907 Agreement, and is not likely to assist that 
strengthening of the entente (Triple Entente of Britain, Russia, and France) which 
is so necessary to both countries.’165 In fact, the Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Serge D. Sazonov, who had already heard of Grey’s explanation, 
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considered it adequate and was relieved. To him, it amounted to a definite 
assurance from Britain,166 though the Russian press continued to be anti-British. 
George Buchanan, British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, therefore, reported 
to Grey that there should be more reassuring replies, in order to satisfy Russian 
public opinion. Grey telegraphed Buchanan, saying that he could point out to the 
Russians that ‘the British government does not acquire any rights under the 
concession that were not possessed by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
already.’167 Nonetheless, Novoe Vremya continued to argue that, whether the 
British government had purchased the shares from the APOC or not, the 
foundations of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 had been altered. The 
newspaper stated that the purchase ‘has destroyed the neutral zone, has brought 
the sphere of British influence into direct touch with that under Russian influence, 
and has affected the integrity of Persia.’168  However, the 1907 Convention 
confirmed Britain’s right in the 1901 Concession that except in the five northern 
provinces of Iran the British were allowed to commence oil works in the Iranian 
territory. It can be understood that the Russian diplomats did not obviously oppose 
the British purchase of the APOC, as it did not violate the 1907 Convention. 
However, Buchanan and Grey failed to put the Russian public at ease and to show 
that with the purchase of shares in the APOC Britain had no desire to encroach on 
the Russian zone.   
 
Conclusion 
    In the period leading up to 1914, oil introduced new concerns within 
Anglo-Iranian relations in the South-West of Iran. When Iran was in its 
revolutionary period, the discovery of oil by Britain created another strategy, 
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making negotiations and agreements with the local powers. At the start, the 
drilling of oil in Iran did not seem promising to the British owing to limited funds 
and concerns about the quality of the oil. The major success in Masjed-e 
Soleyman in May 1908 eventually changed Britain’s position in the area. Due to 
oil, Britain’s concerns with the South-West of Iran significantly increased, and its 
policy towards Iran acquired new and different facets.  
    The discovery of oil had an impact on Anglo-Iranian relations in both the 
centre and margin of Iran. The British reached separate agreements with the 
Iranian government and with the local powers in south-west Iran, and indeed 
Britain considered the agreements with the local powers were as important as their 
concession from the Iranian government, despite the fact that the agreements were 
not acknowledged by the political centre. The signing of the Bakhtiyari 
Agreement of 1905 and the Mohammerah Agreement of 1909 were at the time 
significant events. It can be perceived that despite Britain’s policy of 
non-intervention in Iran’s political affairs, the British from the early twentieth 
century, attempted to cement their influence in marginal areas of the country. In 
addition, an unstable and weak Iranian central government made Britain focus on 
the security of its oil interests. At the same time, it is clear that Britain 
endeavoured to avoid disagreements between the local powers and the central 
government connected to its role. 
    The land issue was an important one. The British were granted the right to 
buy land for oil works in accordance with the Concession of 1901, and this 
granting was contrary to Iran’s policy of not selling lands to foreigners. 
Subsequent Iranian governments therefore denied that Britain had any such right, 
but then the British had not as yet purchased lands in the oil areas because they 
did not consider it in their interest. In Mohammerah, the 1903 farman of the 
Sheykh of Mohammerah stated that the Sheykh had the responsibility to protect 
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the land and could not sell it to foreigners. The Sheykh, indeed, did not give the 
British any right to his lands, even when they signed the 1909 Agreement at the 
time of the downfall of Mohammad ‘Ali Shah. In the Bakhtiyari territory, however, 
the situation was different. The Land Agreement of 1911 brought about changes. 
The APOC purchased certain lands in the Bakhtiyari territory in secret and the 
fact was deliberately kept secret from the central government for six months at 
least.  
The discovery of oil in Iran took place during the period when the Iranian 
central government had lost control in the provinces. The Bakhtiyari Khans and 
Sheykh Khaz‘al obviously were aware of the changing situation, and therefore the 
signing of the agreements with the British represented their intention of obtaining 
advantages for themselves. The British on the other hand used the agreements to 
secure their own oil interests. For instance, the relationship between Sheykh 
Khaz‘al and the British became more specific with the signing of the 1909 
Agreement, though it could be interpreted as a reiteration of assurances made by 
the British since 1902. In addition, although there were disputes between the 
British and the Bakhtiyari Khans, the Bakhtiyari Agreement of 1905 could be seen 
as an example of how oil drew the British and the Iranian tribe much closer.  
    Oil also complicated British policy with regard to the protection of its 
interests in Iran, especially in connection with foreign powers. In the signing of 
the Oil Concession in 1901, consideration of Russian interests was taken into 
account, and hence the northern part of Iran under Russian influence was not 
included. With regard to the loan proposed by the APOC in 1910, Russia’s 
concern obliged Britain to be careful to satisfy Russia that there were no 
additional implications. Germany, too, was a rival of Britain in Iran. German 
activities at Mohammerah caused the British concern regarding their existing 
supremacy in the South-West of Iran, and led to further assurances by the British 
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to Sheykh Khaz‘al. Furthermore, oil supply was an international issue, given the 
competition faced by the APOC, and the signing of the Admiralty Agreement in 
1914 represented Britain’s concern to secure its oil interests on the eve of war, as 
well as not to weaken its international status.  
    By 1914, with the start of World War I, oil had already exerted a significant 
impact on Anglo-Iranian relations. The British attempted to retain their traditional 
policy of non-intervention, but simultaneously were drawn more deeply into Iran 
by their interest in the oil producing areas, such as Mohammerah and the 
Bakhtiyari territory. The British actions of securing their oil interests in the 
South-West of Iran were not only encountering the Iranian local powers, but also 
other powers, such as Russia and Germany. The discovery of oil initiated changes 
within British policy in both Iran’s marginal areas and internationally.  
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Chapter III British Policy on the Constitutional 
Revolution in Iran and the Return of the Ex-Shah in 1911  
 
Introduction  
    This chapter examines British policy on the Constitutional Revolution of 
1906 in Iran and its aftermath up to the return of the ex-Shah in 1911. The 
Revolution began as an attempt to limit the Shah’s authority and eliminate foreign 
power influence in the country, especially that of Russia in the north. Generally 
the British had adopted a policy of non-intervention in Iranian affairs, in the sense 
of avoiding major political, financial or military involvement, since the nineteenth 
century, the major exceptions being the two wars in Afghanistan carried out in 
defence of India. From the end of the nineteenth century, their economic interests, 
which had hitherto been comparatively minor, now began to expand, especially 
with the opening of the opening up of the Karun river and the establishment of the 
Imperial Bank. The advent of oil in the early twentieth century was to bring about 
a momentous change. Another issue was the evolving crisis in Europe and the rise 
of Germany. It was at this time that the British and the Russians signed the 
Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, demarcating a Russian zone in the north, a 
British zone in the south-east and a neutral zone in between. The two powers 
endeavoured to maintain a policy of unanimity, towards, and Iran’s independence 
and integrity.  
However, the victory of the Iranian constitutionalists in 1906, and the 
establishment of a constitutional monarchy under Mohammad ‘Ali Shah in 1907, 
brought about a further major change in the political configuration of the country. 
Confronted with the growing weakness of central authority in the country and a 
major financial crisis, the Shah struggled to secure his authority and avoid chaos, 
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which brought about conflict with the constitutionalists, who considered 
absolutism to be the main source of all ills. Forced to abdicate in 1909, 
Mohammad ‘Ali made efforts to regain his throne from places in 1911. This 
chapter will examine period of the 1906 Revolution from the point of view 
Mohammad ‘Ali Shah’s actions and policies, and the British response to them.   
    The Constitutional Revolution of 1906 was facilitated by government 
weakness due to financial difficulties took place in Iran owing to its financial 
problems, exemplified by two large loads from Russia, as argued by Nikki Keddie. 
Britain attempted to reduce Iran’s dependence on Russia, but in the meantime 
refused to offer any financial assistance herself (on the grounds that the money 
was unlikely ever to be repaid) and also preferred to maintain good relations with 
Russia above all else. Financial pressure from Russia and unsuccessful financial 
reforms by the Prime Minister, Amin al-Soltan, and the Belgian customs 
administration resulted in a sense of grievance against the government amongst 
the Iranian people, and this financial crisis remained unresolved.1  With the 
establishment of a constitutional government in 1906, most modern research on 
the Revolution provides arguments, via the perspectives of the constitutionalists, 
on the victory of the constitutional government and the downfall of Mohammad 
‘Ali Shah, and the constitutionalist resistance to foreign influence from Britain, 
and Russia. However, Mohammad ‘Ali had declared himself in favour of the 
Constitution before he was crowned, and he was a signatory with his father, 
Mozaffar al-Din Shah to the rescript granting the constitution.2 The  British 
were not particularly in favour of Mohammad ‘Ali Shah, yet in their documents 
he appears as less negative towards the new political developments that he does in 
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studies by western and Iranian scholars.  
    It can therefore be seen that mostly Mohammad ‘Ali Shah has been viewed 
as a negative figure in academic studies. After all, a common understanding is that 
a constitution is a means for a country to reach a better and more, developed and 
civilized state. A case such as that of Mohammad ‘Ali Shah’s clash with the 
constitutionalists is therefore to some degree bound not to win him any praise. For 
instance, Norman Dwight Harris, in his Europe and the East, argues that Mozaffar 
al-Din Shah had the ‘honour of becoming the first constitutional ruler of his 
country,’ while Mohammad ‘Ali Shah ‘found his position intolerable and took 
steps to protect his own person and to break the power of the Medjliss.’3 Ferrier 
also comments that the two shahs, Mozaffar al-Din Shah and Mohammad ‘Ali 
Shah, were viewed differently, with former grudgingly accepted and the latter 
condemned. Mozaffar al-Din Shah was described as ‘mild’ and ‘ineffectual’, and 
Mohammad ‘Ali Shah was ‘cruel’ and ‘autocratic.’4 These arguments are clearly 
biased in favour of the Iranian constitutionalists. Ahmad Kasravi’s Persian 
language work, History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution,5  describes 
Mohammad ‘Ali Shah as greedy and self-serving, and unable to understand the 
meaning of a mass movement. ‘This man, with his narrow-mindedness and 
self-centeredness, was not the sort of person to be concerned with the state of 
country and people.’ Yet, Kasravi’s point of view on the constitutionalists was 
very positive. Despite the fact that the Majles opened with inexperience 
representatives and poor facilities, Kasravi concludes that it should have been able 
to develope gradually. Sahrab Yazdani, too, comments that Mohammad ‘Ali 
during his time as Crown Prince and Governor of Province of Azerbaijan, ‘at 
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Tabriz ruled with cruelty, so that city residents were under pressure from the 
incompetence of government officials.’6 It should be remembered, however, that 
there is no absolute criterion to state which political system, either a constitutional 
government or a monarchical government, is better. The Shah’s actions during the 
revolutionary period, and his return for the throne in 1911 should be explored 
from a more neutral position, and his role in the Constitutional Revolution 
deserves some rethinking. 
    British actions and views of the Shah also have to be considered in the 
context of their relations with Russia. These include their obligations under the 
1907 Convention, including the principle of both parties respecting Iran’s 
independence and integrity. This issue was to be complicated by the actions of 
both the Shah and the constitutionalists, and the problems they presented for both 
Britain and Russia. In addition, the British were faced with the problem that the 
more significant events of the Revolution generally took place in the Russian zone, 
where Britain had no right to intervene. However, to some extent this suited their 
non-intervention policy.  
With regard to the scholarly debate on the role of the British and their 
policies, Keddie’s article, ‘British Policy and the Iranian Opposition 1901-1907,’7 
argues that the British did not intervene in Iranian affairs at all, and the British did 
not encourage the Iranian revolutionaries or accept their requests for help. Ira 
Klein’s article, ‘British Intervention in the Persian Revolution, 1905-1909,’8 is of 
the opinion that the British supported constitutionalism with a view to 
overthrowing Qajar absolutism, a possible means of protecting its own interests. 
The 1907 Convention, on the principle of the independence and integrity of Iran, 
did not, though, end the Anglo-Russian struggle for power in the country. Klein 
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also asserts that neither Britain nor Russia completely followed a policy of 
non-intervention, and that both exerted a major influence on the course of the 
revolution. However, Klein did not see either any fundamental change to British’s 
non-intervention policy towards Iran, or in the reasons why the Russians did 
intervene. With regard to the role of Britain and Russia in Iran in the 
constitutional movement of 1908, Vanessa Martin’s ‘Hartwig and Russian Policy 
in Iran 1906-08’9 shows that Britain did not intend to intervene in Iranian affairs, 
while Russia seemed to have two policies, one of non-intervention, as advocated 
by the Russian Foreign Minister, Isvolsky and implemented by Hartwig, and the 
other advocated most probably by the Russian military, that of supporting the 
Shah by intervention through the Cossack Brigade, which was commanded by 
Colonel Liakhov. Martin also asserts that Grey’s policy towards Iran was 
consistently one of non-intervention. Houri Berberian in her research on the 
Armenians in the 1906 Revolution argues that both Britain and Russia supported 
the Shah,10 while Taqavi Mogaddam’s book considers that during the events of 
the Revolution Britain supported the revolutionaries and Russia supported the 
Shah.11  
Hence, this chapter attempts to examine Mohammad ‘Ali Shah’s actions in 
the revolutionary period, in order, firstly, to pursue a more impartial position on 
the Shah; and, secondly, to understand how the British perceived the role and 
policies of the Shah in the context of the Revolution, the 1907 Convention and the 
actions of their rival, Russia. It will thus explore what most concerned the British 
in terms of their interests in Iran, and their relations to the Russians It will also 
consider British reactions to the return of Mohammad ‘Ali in 1911 and how it 
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affected Anglo-Russian relations, not least over affairs in the Russian zone, 
bearing in mind that increasingly the British prioritised Anglo-Russian interests 
over their relations with Iran.  
  
1. Mohammad ‘Ali Shah and his unsettled constitutional 
government 
    In early 1906, Evelyn Grant Duff, the British Special Envoy to Iran, believed 
that the British government should support the Vali‘ahd, Crown Prince, 
Mohammad ‘Ali, once a revolution took place.12 Although Grant Duff’s view 
cannot be seen as a formal perspective of the British Foreign Office, there is, 
however, an implication that the British probably paid respect to the heir to the 
throne, and that Mozaffar al-Din Shah was in bad health. Supporting the Vali‘ahd 
was a way for the British to quell unrest and disorder in Iran by accepting the 
legitimacy of official heir to the throne. Meanwhile, the British government 
suggested that a joint loan with Russia should be approved for Mohammad ‘Ali 
immediately on the death of the Shah,13 for his journey to Tehran and for the 
payment of troops.14 Thus it can be seen from British documents that Mohammad 
‘Ali was viewed with good will by the British.  
On 30 July 1906, Mozaffar al-Din Shah granted five key concessions, 
including the establishment of Courts of Justice and of a Majles to the 
constitutional movement.15 Subsequently the Shah accepted the resignation of the 
Prime Minister, ‘Eyn al-Doweleh, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Moshir 
al-Dowleh, took on the post Prime Minister. On 4 August 1906, the Shah granted 
the establishment of a Majles.16 This was a sign of a settlement of the Iranian 
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disturbances, which had lasted for months. The first meeting of the Majles took 
place on 18 August 1906, and on 12 September, the Shah signed the regulations of 
the Majles. The opening of the Majles, on 7 October 1906, concluded the tasks of 
‘restoring financial equilibrium and eventually freeing the country from the 
burden of foreign debt,’17 and the constitutional movement thus had a significant 
victory.  
    In September 1906, Mohammad ‘Ali, then residing in Tabriz, showed his 
opposition to reform movements.18 His action towards the revolutionaries there 
did not necessarily denote opposition to reform. Instead, it was more likely to 
have been for the security of the city. Nevertheless, the Vali‘ahd did endorse the 
Constitution, along with his father, Mozaffar al-Din Shah. The people in Tabriz 
requested a formal telegraph from Tehran confirming the granting of the 
Constitution. The Vali‘ahd accepted it, and announced four articles stating that he 
guaranteed the right of refuge of the people, that the Majles would be confirmed 
and supported by the Vali‘ahd, that the Majles represented the prosperity and 
progress of the nation, and that when the people’s delegates had been elected they 
would set out for Tehran.19 By December 1906, Mozaffar al-Din Shah was 
seriously ill, and Mohammad ‘Ali was on his way to Tehran, and at the end of 
1906, he stated that he respected the Majles and the Constitution.20 On the first 
day of 1907, the Mozaffar al-Din Shah granted the Constitution, which stated that 
‘control of the finances, including loans, should be in the hands of the 
Assembly.’21 The Shah then passed away on 8 January 1907, and Mohammad 
‘Ali succeeded to the throne on 12 January.   
    The establishment of the Majles and the passing of the Constitution did not 
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mean, however, that Iran’s circumstances improved all respects. The Majles itself 
did not work efficiently, a point not lost on the Shah, and a cause of concern to 
him. The ministers attended the Majles irregularly, and the deputies failed to 
cooperate effectively.22 The members had no experience in solving problems, 
either in terms of administration or finance.23 In addition, the Majles was quite 
hostile to the Shah and to foreign powers. In February 1907, the Majles demanded 
an explicit declaration on the part of the Shah that Iran ‘enjoyed a Constitution 
and had entered the number of Constitutional States,’ as well as a formal 
recognition of the principle that no foreign subject could hold the position of a 
Persian Minister.24 Mohammad ‘Ali Shah accepted, but still the unrest in Iran 
lasted for months afterwards in some cities, such as Rasht, Tabriz, Shiraz, and 
Isfahan. There was alarming news that assassins were planning an attempt on the 
Shah’s life, too. The passing of the Constitution did not, therefore, seem to calm 
the situation in Iran. During 1907, relations between the Majles and the Shah did 
not go well. Firstly, Joseph Naus, the Minister of Customs, was dismissed by the 
Majles in February 1907. Naus, who had arrived in Iran in 1898, ran the customs 
administration and organised the taxation system. On the point of control of the 
finances by the Majles, the removal of Naus was viewed as a block to foreign 
pressure and a limitation on the Shah’s sovereignty, to which the Shah did not take 
kindly. Eventually, the Shah was compelled to agree to the dismissal of Naus.25 In 
June 1907, the Majles undertook to investigate Naus’s accounts, forcing him to 
return to Belgium. Eventually, Naus left Tehran on 30 May 1907, and this was a 
sign of a decline in the Shah’s authority. Nevertheless, on 19 August 1907, the 
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Shah confirmed his desire to cooperate with the Majles over reforms.26 However, 
the President of the Majles argued that: 
 
    We have many faults, but the people believe in us and will not allow us to be 
suppressed. We want to work with the Shah, and we will if he allows it. If he 
consents, we shall save the country together. If he refuses, he may be able to 
suppress us; but, if he does, it will be the end of him, of ourselves, and of 
Persia.27 
 
The Majles had its own difficulties. For example, the treasury was empty, there 
were few statesmen of proven experience, and taxes were being paid only 
irregularly. In addition, many of the members of the Majles actually had no idea 
how an assembly was supposed to function. 28  The Iranian cabinet also 
continually clashed with the Shah. Only Sa‘d al-Dowleh, who was in his post 
from September 1907, supported the Shah,29 and he was mistrusted by the Majles 
because of his close relations with the Shah and the Russians. During his forty day 
ministerial term, no ministers were close to him, and as a result, he was dismissed 
by the Majles on 3 October 1907,30 thus weakening the position of the Shah.  
The Shah swore to the Majles in November 1907 that he would ‘maintain the 
fundamental articles of the Constitution and rule conformably to the established 
laws.’31 Yet, by December 1907, the situation for the Shah remained not a 
hopeful one. The constitutionalists were crowded around the Majles, while the 
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Shah’s supporters were camped out in Meydan-e Tupkhaneh.32 The military force 
available to the Shah was the Cossack Brigade, which was led by a Russian 
officer, Colonel Vladmir Liakhov. The Shah was unable to improve relations 
between himself and the Majles,33 particularly because of his firm measures, such 
as arresting the Prime Minister, Naser al-Molk, which then caused the other 
Ministers to resign.34 The Shah pointed out to Marling that his opposition to the 
Constitution could hardly be possible because he himself had signed it, and had 
brought it to his father to sign. The Shah also consistently expressed the view to 
Marling that he approved of the Constitution, but not of the society in chaos and 
the incapable Majles. In the meantime, the people were not content with the new 
December cabinet, which included two or three members of dubious loyalty to the 
Constitution.35 Up to the end of December, the Shah consistently argued that he 
‘professed to be an earnest friend of the Constitution.’36 The Shah claimed again 
that he had no quarrel with Constitutional government, but only with the Majles, 
which, in his view, was itself continually guilty of unconstitutional acts.37 To the 
constitutionalists, opposing the Majles equaled opposing the Constitution, but to 
the Shah this was not the case.  
During the conflict between the Shah and the Majles abovementioned, it 
became obvious that the two parties had opposite opinions which could not be 
reconciled at all. The Majles wanted to eliminate the Shah’s power, and remove 
his favourites, while the Shah did not want to see disturbances in his country. The 
Shah did not actually denounce the Constitution, but he only saw that the Majles 
itself was in chaos. In May 1908, there were, for instance, wholesale resignations 
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owing to the fact that members were not in favour of the leadership of Nezam 
al-Saltaneh, who was a notable and supporter of the Shah, and who was viewed as 
a man with no concern for the Constitution. It was therefore believed that there 
was no way to cooperate with the Shah.38 On 9 June 1908, the Shah denounced 
the fact that the constitutionalists’ ‘selfish motives’ made the nation fragile, and 
that corruption continued in the Constitutional government. 39  The Cossack 
Brigade then bombarded the Majles on 23 June 1908, an event which showed that 
the Shah could not bear the political chaos, and which had become his only means 
of putting an end to the unrest and state of disorder in the country.  
At the end of June 1908, Mohammad ‘Ali Shah reiterated ‘that he had no 
designs against the Constitution; …… that he had no misunderstandings at all 
either with the Government or with the Medjliss, ……’40 In August, the Shah 
stated that an assembly would be formed.41 He also stated that he would fulfil his 
promise to avoid serious domestic problems, and complained that the 
constitutionalists were causing chaos in the country.42 On 29 September 1908, the 
Shah announced that ‘the Assembly was to be convoked on 14 November, and 
that new electoral regulations would be promulgated on the same date.’ 43 
However, on 8 November 1908, there was opposition from the Shah’s own 
courtiers, who presented a petition to him to abandon the Constitution.44 The 
Shah said he was reluctant, and that he was to issue the Electoral Law soon.45 The 
Shah told Barclay, the British Minister in Tehran, that he himself had not ordered 
the abrogation of the Constitution, claiming that: 
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personally he was in favour of an Assembly, but that it should not be one like 
the last, and that he was now endeavouring to devise a scheme for one which 
would be suitable.46  
 
The statement above shows that the Shah intended to open a new Majles which 
would be under his supervision.47 The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran, ‘Al‘a 
al-Saltaneh, endorsed the Shah’s words by saying that ‘the last one (the Majles) is 
not suited to the feelings of the public, and that so much liberty is unbecoming 
and will produce the anarchy and mischief which has already been witnessed.’48 
To the Shah, the function of a new Majles would be to provide ‘general 
supervision over the Ministers and Provincial Governors, and would “acquaint 
themselves with the Shah’s commands and the duties laid down for them”.’49 In 
this context, at least, the Shah’s power would be restored.50 These measures, were 
not, however, supported by the constitutionalists.  
    In early 1909, a force from Gilan, north-west Iran, led by Sepahdar 
Tonokaboni entered into direct conflict with the Shah’s authority,51 and the 
Bakhtiyari Khans joined the anti-government movement, collaborating with 
Sepahdar from Isfahan. On 16 March 1909, the Shah called a meeting of different 
classes in Tehran ‘to discuss the situation and to express their views as to the 
desirability in principle of reverting to the constitutional regime.’52 On 5 May 
1909, the Shah announced that:  
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    …… in order to introduce order into the Government Administration, the 
constitutional principle, which is the best foundation for the security of the 
people and for reorganizing the Government and State, has from this day, the 
5th May, 1909, been commanded by us to be instituted, (along with) …… the 
drawing up of laws in accordance with the necessities of the dear 
Fatherland …….53 
 
The Shah announced that the electoral law would shortly be published, and 
elections were fixed for 19 July.54 He was aware of his people’s desire for a 
Constitution, but in fact none of his actions could possibly meet the people’s 
wishes, namely to limit the Shah’s power. The Shah was defeated by the 
Bakhtiyari Khans and Sepahdar in early July, and finally abdicated on 17 July 
1909.  
In all the incidents from 1907 to 1909, it cannot be absolutely determined the 
Shah was against the Constitution, but it is reasonable to comment that he 
attempted to make changes in his own way after quarrels with the Iranian 
constitutionalists. Mohammad ‘Ali Shah’s attitude to the Constitution was one of 
struggle and resistance to control, rather than blind anti-constitutionalism. During 
his reign, his conflict was actually with the radical interpretation of the role of the 
Majles, and was strongly motivated by his desire to restore order in the country. 
     
2. British policy towards Iran in Mohammad ‘Ali Shah’s reign 
and the role of Russia 
    In principle, Britain preferred joint action with Russia in Iranian affairs, and 
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hoped that neither party would actually support either the Shah or the 
constitutionalists. However, while the British had adopted a policy of 
non-intervention in Iran for a long time, the Russians, on the contrary, took up a 
position of non-intervention in Iran only as a result of the country’s being 
weakened by the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and the revolution of 
1905. A consequent change to its foreign policy was reflected in the appointment 
of a new Minister in Tehran, Hartwig, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Isvolsky, who assured Britain in 1906 that Russia had no ambitions for further 
expansion in Iran.55 Russia, also, consented not to act in Iran without mutual 
consultation with Britain in advance.  
The two powers had agreed joint actions in Iran from 1907. The British 
Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Arthur Nicolson, was informed by Isvolsky that ‘an 
interchange of views was eminently desirable between the two Governments, so 
that they might come to a common understanding as to the best line to follow.’56 
The three main points of Russian policy to Iran as set out by Isvolsky were that: 
 
(1) They would abstain from all interference in Persian internal affairs; (2) 
Unless absolutely necessary, they would not adopt military measures, and 
would keep them, if adopted, within the narrowest limits possible; (3) They 
would act generally in close harmony with British Government, and would 
take no step without previously consulting that Government.57 
 
The most satisfactory statement could be seen as a gesture of Russian good-will, 
providing Britain with a guarantee of cooperation. However, Russia was in a more 
difficult position than Britain because disturbances in the North of Iran caused by 
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the revolutionary movements were taking place close to the Russo-Iranian border. 
In the meantime, Ottoman troops trespassed over the Iranian border in the 
Province of Azerbaijan, which is close to the Russian border as well, which 
caused more Russian troops to show up in the area. Thus even in early 1907 the 
Russian Legation was of the opinion that the popular movements in Iran would 
endanger their interests. The Russians were also concerned about the criticism of 
the Shah. In March 1907, the two powers had agreed that: 
 
(1) there are signs of a dangerous movement against the dynasty and 
Europeans, in spite of the apparent outward calm; (2) the anti-dynastic 
movement is manifested by persistent reports that the Shah wishes to dismiss 
the Assembly which is organizing a militia; (3) the anti-European movement 
aims at the removal of foreigners from the Persian service, and at preventing 
them from obtaining Concessions in Persia, but that it is not directed against 
individuals or foreign Legations; (4) Great Britain and Russia, while 
carefully avoiding any intervention in the internal affairs of Persia, 
nevertheless cannot permit their interests to be injured in any respect 
whatever, and that, in view of the tendencies of the Assembly, they would be 
justified in making a declaration to the Persian Government in the above 
sense.58 
 
Generally Russia itself claimed to be non-interventionalist,59 and would have 
welcomed harmonious relations between the Shah and the Majles. 60  The 
Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which was signed in August, with the 
principle of Iran’s independence and integrity, made Russia prefer a secure and 
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stable government, and it was otherwise indifferent as to which Shah reigned or 
what kind of government was established.61 At that point, therefore, the two 
powers followed their policy of non-intervention, in the hope that the Iranians 
would be able to solve their own problems.  
    Nevertheless, a policy of non-intervention became increasingly difficult to 
maintain. To the British, bast, or sanctuary, at the British Legation during the 
disturbances in Iran became an issue as regards their non-intervention policy. Bast 
at mosques and shrines was an Iranian tradition from the early Qajar period, but 
after the Iranian government limited this practice in the mid-nineteenth century, 
bastis, or refugees, gradually came to foreign legations. 62  However, when 
Iranians took bast in the British Legation after the disturbances of July 1906, the 
British ran into the problem of accusations of intervention for permitting their 
entry.  
In 1906, the Iranian government opposed British acceptance of the bastis 
while the British blamed the country’s government for not taking action to satisfy 
the people.63 The bastis argued that the Prime Minister, ‘Eyn al-Dowleh, should 
be dismissed, and that, in the absence of this, measure the bastis should not be 
forced to leave.64 By 30 July 1906, the number of bastis had reached 12,000. 
Grey again claimed that Britain did not intend to interfere in Iranian affairs, and 
persuaded the bastis to leave the British Legation once the change of Prime 
Minister had been enacted.65 On 2 August 1906, the British claimed that ‘though 
we have allowed the people to take refuge in the Legation (the British Legation), 
we cannot interfere between them and their Government.’66 Spring-Rice, the 
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British Minister in Tehran, argued too that the bastis would gain nothing by their 
action, and that Iran should be free to solve its problems without foreign 
interference.67 The British did not want Russia to think that they were interfering 
in Iranian affairs.68 With regard to the bast, Russia’s attitude was that ‘British 
prestige in Persia has immensely increased by the fact of the people having come 
to His Majesty’s Legation, …… ’69  
    The issue of bast at the British Legation arose again in 1908 when 
Mohammad ‘Ali Shah clashed with the constitutionalists. This took place after the 
signing of the 1907 Convention, and the British were hence doubly anxious to 
avoid any suspicion of intervention. Grey instructed Marling to discourage 
Iranians from coming to the British Legation.70 On 26 June 1908, three days after 
the bombardment of the Majles, the Shah wrote a letter to the British King 
complaining that the Legation had invited in mischief-makers, which was ‘a clear 
interference with the internal affairs of Persia.’71 The King argued that his consul 
in Tehran had done everything possible to discourage the Iranians from taking 
refuge at the Legation, but ‘the conduct of your troops in surrounding my 
Legation and arresting those who come out of it is an indignity which cannot be 
tolerate(d)’72 The Iranian government seized the people around the Legation and 
criticized British for intervention,73 while the British government blamed the 
ruthless action of the Cossack Brigade for compelling the bastis to come in the 
first place.  
    As the bast dragged on, the British Legation began to complain that the 
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bastis had no intention of leaving.74 Marling was worried that Hartwig might 
think that they were not sincerely trying to solve the bast problem, and his 
principal anxiety was that some of the bastis, who had political agendas, refused 
to leave.75 Marling was also upset that Hartwig would not accept any explanation 
on the bast issue.76 In July 1908, Grey again announced that the bastis would not 
obtain anything further and should leave,77 instructing Marling to inform the 
bastis that taking refuge for political ends would be resented by the British 
government.78  
    Meanwhile, Russia also had encountered a major problem, which was the 
bombardment of the Majles by the Russian commander, Liakhov. Colonel 
Liakhov was a Russian officer in charge of the Cossack Brigade, which had been 
established since 1879, and was in Mohammad ‘Ali Shah’s service from 
September 1907. He was regarded as being a person of significance by the British. 
The Cossack Brigade was established in Iran and received training from Russian 
officers, and its commander was responsible only to the Shah and the Prime 
Minister. Already in 1889, the Brigade had been considered superior to the rest of 
the Iranian army, 79  and by the time when the Shah had clashes with the 
constitutionalists in 1908, Liakhov became a key figure in relations between 
Britain and Russia.  
    The Cossack Brigade has been depicted by pro-constitutionalist historians as 
having played an inglorious role in the suppression of the Constitutional 
Revolution.80 In 1908, the Brigade surrounded the British Legation to prevent the 
Iranians from taking refuge there, and Britain argued that Liakhov should be held 
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responsible for the actions of the Cossack Brigade. Grey claimed that the Russian 
officer had caused damage to the policy of non-intervention.81 On 23 June 1908, 
the Cossack Brigade, commanded by Liakhov, bombarded the Majles, and the 
Shah announced martial law and gave Liakhov full powers over the police and 
military forces. On 1 July 1908, Grey also made a five-point request to the Shah, 
including ‘Cossacks and police to be withdrawn immediately from the approaches 
to the Legation’ and ‘a guarantee in writing for the property, lives, and persons of 
the “bastis” to be given, and to be signed by the Shah.’82 In addition, the British 
argued that Liakhov’s presence in the Brigade represented Russian intervention. 
Isvolsky did not share this view, asserting that: 
 
if the proceedings of the Persian Cossack Brigade, of which the British 
Legation complains were taken by order of the Russian Colonel, this 
occurred independently of the Imperial Government (the Russian 
Government) and the Russian Legation.83  
 
Isvolsky gave O’Beirne in St. Petersburg assurances that the ‘Russian Colonel, in 
carrying out (the) Shah’s recent measures and assuming military control of Tehran 
(if he had done so), acted without either the orders, knowledge, or approval of the 
Imperial Government (the Russian government).’84 There was much concern that 
Liakhov’s actions at that time were in violation of the 1907 Convention. 
According to a statement by Isvolsky, Liakhov had no direct relations with the 
Russian Government, and was in fact under the command of the Shah rather than 
the Russian government. Isvolsky pointed out that the Russian commander had 
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been in the service of the Shah for four years.85 In 1910, two travelers, J. M. 
Hone and Page L. Dickinson, made the comment that Russia’s intrigues in the 
Liakhov case had not yet been revealed, and gave an affirmative view that 
Liakhov brought security to Tehran.86 Stephanie Cronin argues that Liakhov was 
independent as regards the political climate between Britain, Russia, and Iran,87 
and Vanessa Martin, too, mentions that Liakhov considered himself to be 
responsible to the Shah.88 In any case, there is no direct source that suggests that 
Liakhov was given instructions by the Russian government in the June 
bombardment. The Liakhov case remains unclear in academic studies.  
    Except the two episodes abovementioned, the two European powers in fact 
endeavoured to maintain their friendship during the Iranian Revolution. The 
British, on the other hand, were concerned as to whether the Russians would 
change their position and policy with regard to Iran. When the Shah tried to 
suppress the Constitutionalists in late 1907, Grey wanted Isvolsky to instruct the 
Russian Minister in Tehran to cooperate with the British Minister there to 
encourage the Shah to be more positive towards the Majles.89 In September 1908, 
Marling, who favoured the reestablishment of the Majles, still had his doubts as to 
whether Hartwig had put pressure on the Shah on the matter of the Majles.90 
What is clear is that the two Ministers had no mutual understanding as regards one 
another’s actions, and, as Hartwig did not get along well with Marling, the 
Russians, in November 1908, replaced him with Evgueni Sablin, who was 
pro-British, in order to improve cooperation with the British.91 To the end of 
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Mohammad ‘Ali Shah, the two powers maintained their friendship, being neutral 
to Iran.  
The constitutionalists also sought assistance from foreign consulates, for 
example, Tabriz, in June and July 1908.92 The British considered that ‘it is not 
suitable to the dignity of the Persians to call in help from strangers, while they 
have power to help themselves.’93 In July 1908, some in Astarabad believed that 
the British would help them to reestablish the Constitution,94 and the British did 
nothing at all. Marling claimed that there would be no intervention from Britain in 
the present situation.95 In November, people in Astarabad complained that the 
British did not see their sufferings, and the British must help them to restore the 
Constitution.96 However, this was simply an Iranian hope. The British made no 
attempt to do anything owing to the principle of the non-intervention policy. Of 
course, Astarabad could not be an exception, because elsewhere in Iran would not 
receive Britain’s assistance. Nevertheless, till early 1909, there were still requests 
for British aid by Iranians.97 It can be seen that generally Britain did not intervene 
in Iranian affairs, especially after the discovery of oil in 1908, by which time the 
British paid much more attention to the South-West of Iran. With the 1907 
Convention, it was particularly unlikely that the British would take any political 
action in the Russian zone.  
Russia had a different experience in Iran. In early 1909, Russia experienced 
conflicts along the Ottoman-Iranian border, with first Ottoman troops trespassing 
into the area close to Ormiyeh, in the North-West of Iran, and then movements of 
Iranian revolutionaries in Azerbaijan, which caused chaos close to the 
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Russian-Iranian border. Russian troops were therefore dispatched into Iran to 
ensure the security of the border in April 1909. Mohammad ‘Ali Shah attempted 
to stop these Russian troop movements, but in vain.98 A British and Russian joint 
note claimed that the purpose of such a Russian action was to ensure the security 
of Russian subjects in Iran.99 A conflict between Sepahdar and the Shah later 
resulted in the increased entry of Russian troops near Tabriz and Qazvin,100 owing 
to the chaos in the area close to the Russian border, so Russia’s military actions 
eventually did affect the territorial integrity and independence of Iran.101 To the 
Russians, despite the principle of non-intervention and the 1907 Convention, the 
events of the time adjusted their policy.  
Around June 1909, the Bakhtiyari Khans and Sepahdar advanced on Tehran 
in pursuit of their conflict with the Shah. The British did not expect that the tribal 
leader, Sardar As‘ad, would decide to lead this movement, considering instead that 
it would result in difficulties for the restoration of order.102 Barclay asserted that, 
‘If it be the intention of Sirdar Assad merely to demonstrate (support) on behalf of 
the constitution and thereby save his face, we may regard this move on his part as 
simply a mischievous and ill-timed prank, ……’103 The British and the Russians 
had no wish for this initiative to take place, and on 2 July 1909, Isvolsky again 
assured O’Beirne that Russian troops in Iran were there to protect Russian 
subjects, rather than to intervene in the internal affairs of Iran. He reiterated that 
they would not provide any support for Mohammad Ali Shah,104 and the Shah’s 
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force, the Cossack Brigade, was indeed seriously defeated on 6 July.105 On 7 July 
1909, Sardar As‘ad’s request for help from the British received no reply,106 
obviously owing to Britain’s dislike of his movement. People in Rasht also 
complained that Russia’s troops were in Iranian territory even though they had 
claimed neutrality, and that the British turned a deaf to this circumstance.107 
However, the chaotic situation in northern Iran, the Russian zone, forced the 
Russians to intervene for protection of their prestige in the region, and of their 
subjects, and interests. 
The abdication of Mohammad ‘Ali Shah in July 1909 created a new situation 
which had never before arisen in the Qajar period of Iranian politics. It was new, 
too, to Britain and Russia. On 18 July, the Minister of War, Sepahdar, and the 
Minister of the Interior, Sardar As‘ad, announced that Mohammad ‘Ali Shah had 
been deposed, and that his successor, Soltan Ahmad, had been made Shah on 16 
July. The difference from previous Qajar rulers was that the new Shah was only 
12 years old, and was under the regency of ‘Azod al-Molk, the head of the Qajar 
tribe. 
During the Constitutional revolution of 1906, the succession to the throne 
and the nomination of a regent were stipulated in the Supplementary Fundamental 
Law of 1907: ‘Article 38: In case of the decease of the Sovereign, the Crown 
Prince can only undertake in person the functions of the Throne, provided that he 
has attained the age of eighteen years. If he has not reached this age, a Regent 
shall be chosen with the sanction and approval of the National Consultative 
Assembly and the Senate, until such time as the Crown Prince shall attain this 
age.’ 108  Britain and Russia both recognized the new Shah and the new 
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government.109 Their acceptance of the new regime was to secure a stable Iran. 
As regards foreign relations, on 31 July 1909 the Regent made the assurance to 
the diplomatic body of ‘the determination of the Shah’s Government to maintain 
and strengthen the friendly relations happily existing between Persia and the 
Powers.’110 This was a declaration of Iran’s goodwill towards foreign powers.  
 However, the Majles did not fulfil the Regent’s statement. An important 
task for the new Iranian government at the time was to remove all influential 
figures that were viewed as obstacles to the constitution. On the one hand, some 
of those who had supported the ex-Shah, such as Sheykh Fazallalah Nuri, were 
executed by the new government,111 and on the other, Russia was viewed with 
suspicion, given that it had assisted the ex-Shah during his reign. The presence 
since July 1909 of Russian troops at Qazvin, because of disturbances caused by 
the nationalist movement in the area, in the eyes of the constitutional government, 
posed the danger of the possible restoration of the ex-Shah, and was seen as a sign 
of the abiding possibility of foreign intervention.112 Since the ex-Shah had left 
Iran in September 1909, Russia became the main object of suspicion for the new 
governmnet, even though outwardly both Iran and the foreign powers showed 
goodwill towards each other.  
Both Britain and Russia pressed for economic and political concessions, 
which were declined by the Majles.113 A joint note was sent to Iran by Britain and 
Russia on 7 April 1910 (henceforth the April Note), which stated: ‘we have further 
the honour to inform you that England and Russia, while not hampering the rights 
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of nationals of other Powers to purely commercial enterprise in Persia, cannot 
admit in any case that concessions affecting their political or strategic interests in 
Persia should be given to the nationals of other foreign Powers.’114 Thus, the two 
powers attempted to prevent Iran from granting concessions to any other nation, 
and on 23 April 1910, Isvolsky said that Russia would oblige Iran to accept the 
April Note,115 as otherwise the withdrawal of Russian troops would be impossible, 
and further Russian troops would be dispatched to Tehran.116 The Iranian cabinet, 
regarding to the April Note, argued that, 
 
    In view of the difficulty of defining concessions which might injuriously 
affect their political or strategic interest, the two Powers expect that before 
granting any concessions for means of communications for telegraph or 
harbours to a foreign subject, the Persian Government will enter into an 
exchange of views with them in order that the political or strategic interests 
of the two Powers may be duly safeguarded. Any act in contravention of this 
principle would be regarded as contrary to the traditional friendship so 
happily existing between Persia and Russia and Great Britain.117 
 
This conciliatory response to what was in effect a serious intervention in Iran’s 
rights to grant concessions to whomsoever it chose, drew from Marling of the 
view that this reply demonstrated ‘the intention of the Persian Government to 
return an evasive and unsatisfactory reply to the two Governments (Britain and 
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Russia).’118 The two countries insisted on their own conditions, and the loan 
negotiations were broken off. 119  The Iranian government, a under the 
constitutional regime with an agenda to reduce foreign interference in the country, 
found itself in a position of considerable difficulty with regard to its relationship 
to Britain and Russia.  
     
3. The Protocol of 1909 and return of the ex-Shah 
    After his defeat in July 1909, the ex-Shah intended to seek bast at the 
Russian Legation in Tehran.120 Isvolsky claimed that he had no intention of 
supporting the ex-Shah, though he was suspected of doing so, and stated that he 
would of course recognize the new Iranian government, though if order was not 
maintained, Russia would take the necessary measures to protect her interests.121 
Although the Shah had been deposed, many messages from the provinces revealed 
support for him.122  
    When the ex-Shah took bast in the Russian Legation in Tehran, Britain and 
Russia began to plan his departure. Barclay and Sablin agreed that the ex-Shah’s 
departure should be escorted as far as Qazvin by an Iranian force under the Iranian 
government, and then an Anglo-Russian joint force would replace them as far as 
the coast (the Caspian Sea). The condition for this was that the ex-Shah must hand 
over his civil list and the crown jewels.123 Barclay was planning to propose an 
annual pension for the ex-Shah to be provided by the Iranian government, and 
needed Russia’s cooperation with this venture.124 Discussions on this issue, which 
lasted for two weeks, resulted in a preliminary agreement on the ex-Shah, who 
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should leave Iran on 17 August 1909,125 but this was delayed because he did not 
want to compromise and hand over his jewels and properties.126 Barclay told the 
ex-Shah that the Iranian government could confiscate all his estates without 
asking the two Legations, if he kept on refusing to compromise,127 and then told 
Grey that the pension for the ex-Shah should be reduced as much as possible in 
order to prevent him from hatching intrigues in Iran.128 In these discussions, 
Britain and Russia worked together to eliminate any possibility of the ex-Shah’s 
movements having an impact on Iranian politics afterwards. In the end, a protocol 
of 11 articles was formally signed on 9 September 1909 by Barclay, Sablin and 
the Iranian cabinet. The ex-Shah had to hand over to the Iranian government all 
his property, such as jewels and personal estates, and in return the Iranian 
government promised to give him an annual pension of 100,000 tomans. In 
addition, Article 8 stipulated that the ex-Shah was to leave Tehran within two days 
of the signing of this protocol, and Article 11 that if the ex-Shah left Russia to 
plan political agitation in Iran, the Iranian government had the right to stop his 
pension.129 The 1909 Protocol confirmed the attitude of Britain and Russia that 
they would not provide support to the ex-Shah in any case. Mohammad ‘Ali went 
first to Enzali, and then on to Odessa, in Russia.  
There were disturbances in Azerbaijan caused by royalists supporting the 
ex-Shah in 1909 and 1910, but these were not successful.130 One year after the 
departure of the ex-Shah, on 5 October 1910, it was said that he was in Paris, 
preparing to return to claim his throne. Sazonov, the Russian Minister for Foreign 
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Affairs, claimed that there was no support for the return of the ex-Shah.131 Grey 
was aware that Russia did not actually disapprove of the ex-Shah, and merely 
tried to ‘support whatever government proved to have the greatest hold on the 
country.’132 The plan for the return of the ex-Shah, which became known in late 
1910, did not, however, become a serious matter until July 1911. The British 
began by first expressing their intentions to warn the ex-Shah, along with the 
Russians, to desist from this course of action.133 Count Benckendorff, the Russian 
Ambassador in London, also considered that the Russian government should not 
support the ex-Shah as his return might lead to a civil war in Iran.134 The two 
powers both remained neutral in this incident, recognizing the existing 
government. Grey was of the opinion that the ‘Ex-Shah left Persia under British 
and Russian protection, and we both recognized the new Shah. I do not see how 
we or Russia can acquiesce in (the) return of ex-Shah.’135 Grey argued that ‘he 
(the ex-Shah) cannot be allowed to remain permanently in Persia …… We 
consider that the present Shah and the Regent, whom both Governments have 
recognized, should remain in power.’136 Grey was also of the opinion that the 
ex-Shah’s pension should be stopped.137  Neither Britain nor Russia wanted 
circumstances in Iran to deteriorate once more, though it was clear that the 
prospect of the return of the ex-Shah did indeed enjoy some support within Iran. 
Meanwhile, there was news that the ex-Shah had arrived in Gomish Tepeh, near 
Astarabad, in the Province of Golestan.138 Barclay had evidence that ‘in a number 
of the bigger towns there exists a decided feeling in favour of Mahomet Ali Mirza. 
Such feeling seems to be more due to despondency at the failure of the present 
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regime to preserve order than to any faith in the ex-Shah.’139  
As in both Mashhad and Tabriz there were rebels who supported the ex-Shah, 
the Russian consuls in these cities were instructed to be strictly neutral. The 
Russians claimed that they were in favour of the Constitutional regime of Iran, 
and had no desire to see any change.140 The Iranian Minister in London, Mehdi 
Khan, told Grey that, despite the complaints of the Iranian government, the two 
powers had done nothing to prevent the ex-Shah’s return. Iran pointed out that this 
was not what the two nations had agreed in the 1909 Protocol, in which Article 11 
stated that ‘His Britannic Majesty’s and the Russian Governments undertook to 
give serious injunctions to the ex-Shah to abstain, once and for all, from any 
political agitation against Persia.’141 In principle, in his view, the two powers had 
to do something to stop the ex-Shah due to the 1909 Protocol. However, the 
growing disturbances affected Russian interests, and Russia was becoming 
increasingly concerned to protect them. Britain could do nothing in the Russian 
zone, but tried by diplomatic efforts through communication with the Russian 
colleagues to exert some influence on events, always bearing in mind the need to 
maintain the 1907 Convention. On the other hand, the British were also concerned 
with their interests in the South of Iran. On the whole, the British needed to keep 
on good terms with Russia and did not want Russian hostility to them to be caused 
by the return of the ex-Shah. 
    On 5 August 1911, the British Consul in Mashhad said that the ex-Shah had a 
‘recruited a large body of bad characters, mostly Russian subjects.’142 On the one 
hand, the content of this telegram may well have been hearsay rather than reliable 
proof. On the other, it is possible that the Russian Consul in Mashhad considered 
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that the ex-Shah’s return would ease the chaos in the area, and believed that 
Tehran and St. Petersburg did not actually understand the reality of the situation in 
Mashhad.  
    Other Iranians also complained of Russian intervention. Mehdi Khan 
telegraphed Grey, saying that ‘it has become evident that a member of the Russian 
consulate-general in Tehran is actively taking up the cause of the 
ex-Shah …….’143 The Iranian government alleged that the ex-Shah had been on a 
Russian vessel at Gomish Tepeh,144 and on 13 August 1911, the government 
informed Barclay that a force belonging to the ex-Shah had been defeated near 
Balideh, fifty miles from Tehran.145 The ex-Shah was seriously defeated by the 
government troops at Firuzkuh, Province of Tehran, in August 1911, and thus did 
not return to his throne at this point.  
    In November 1911, it became known that the Russian Consul at Astarabad 
was assisting the ex-Shah.146  The Russian government denied the fact, and 
Barclay argued that there was no confirmation of this information. Then, the 
British wanted the Russians to join them in declaring that they did not consent to 
the return of the ex-Shah.147 On 10 December 1911, Anatoli Anatolievich Neratov, 
the Russian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated that Russian troops in Iran 
had no connection with the ex-Shah or his attempts to be restored to his throne.148 
Even when the ex-Shah’s force defeated government forces at Daughan on 14 
December 1911,149 Neratov claimed that under no circumstances would Russia 
recognize the ex-Shah.150 However, rumours that Russian consuls were recruiting 
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for the ex-Shah continued to circulate at the beginning of 1912, and Grey 
telegraphed the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan, 
saying that the ‘Russian consul-general at Meshed must be deliberately 
disobeying orders of his Government, …….’151 The Russian government denied 
this, adding that the ex-Shah’s supporters were Iranians.152  
    Movements in support of the ex-Shah caused serious clashes with Russian 
forces in Mashhad in March 1912,153 which resulted in the bombardment of the 
Mashhad shrine by the Russians on 31 March. 154  Percy M. Sykes, the 
Consul-General at Mashhad, was worried that the Russians were about to take 
over the city. In his view, the 1907 Convention would be affected.155 The local 
inhabitants considered that the Russians were not restoring order at all,156 while 
the Russians themselves blamed the tragedy on locals, such as mischief-makers 
and robbers, who entered Mashhad by force and ill-treated all the inhabitants.157 
There were thus contrasting perspectives on the situation. By 9 April 1912, the 
ex-Shah, who was alleged by the British to be in a Russian boat at Enzali waiting 
on events, still received support in Tabriz, Khorassan and Azerbaijan.158 Sykes 
considered that the Russians used the pretext of disorder to justify the 
bombardment.159 As a result the British became increasingly convinced that the 
Russians were strengthening their control in northern Iran using the ex-Shah as 
their instrument. In addition, the British were concerned that, as Mashhad was 
very close to Iranian-Afghan border, the Russians might try to expand their 
influence into Afghanistan, and thus India, as they had done in the 1830s. The 
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security of India remained important in British policy. Although the Mashhad 
incident only affected Anglo-Russian relations temporarily, it showed that the 
British remained seriously concerned about their interests in eastern Iran in 
relation to India. 
In the end, though, the ex-Shah, did not have the military strength to fight his 
way to Tehran in 1912, and instead retreated to Odessa till 1913. In February 1913 
Smith, the British Consul-General in Odessa, sent a telegraph stating that the 
ex-Shah was to spend the spring of 1913 in the South of France.160 It may be 
concluded that the ex-Shah realized that he did not have the strength to return to 
Iran, and there were rumours that he would go to Berlin, Nice, or Austria. In early 
1914, the ex-Shah went to Berlin for treatment of his diabetes,161 and by this time, 
his health was too weak for him to return to Iran. The end of his aspirations was a 
relief to the British, as the negative effect he had had on Anglo-Russian relations 
now faded.  
     
Conclusion 
    By 1911, Iran’s domestic politics had become a serious issue in international 
politics for Britain and Russia. From 1907 to 1911, Mohammad ‘Ali Shah 
endeavoured to save his authority and his country. To the Shah, the Majles with 
the Constitution did not mean the development and progress of Iran. Rather, it 
only produced chaos. His clashes with the Majles and his return to Iran in what 
been agreed by the 1907 Convention as the Russian zone presented a problem for 
British policy. The British could not intervene directly in the incidents taking 
place in the Russian zone, and so had to make considerable diplomatic efforts to 
maintain positive relations with the Russians in the face of their ambivalence 
                                                 
160
 FO416/55, 10679, March 7, 1913, Smith to Grey. 
161
 FO371/2072, no. 41, 6016, February 9, 1914, Buchanan to Grey. 
 134
towards the ex-Shah, and the possible damage his ambitions might cause to their 
interests.  
    Following the general trend of his attitude to constitutionalism, the Shah was 
unhappy with the unrest caused by the Constitutional movement and the 
incompetence of the Majles rather than the Constitution itself. From the 
perspective of the Shah, his acceptance of the Constitution was the logical result 
of his father having granted it in 1906. However, owing to the chaos emerging 
after the granting of the Constitution and the Majles, Mohammad ‘Ali Shah 
endeavoured to protect his own authority and to restore order in Iran. To the 
ex-Shah, his defeat in 1909 was not the end of his power, and to regain his throne 
was his utmost wish. However, the reign of Mohammad ‘Ali Shah was too short 
to establish a new political system. There were too many pressures that he had to 
deal with, and no opportunity for him to establish a constitutional government of 
Iran that reflected his view of a type of a constitutional monarchy in which there 
was some popular participation through the Majles, but the Shah retained overall 
control, thus ensuring the good order and strength of the country.  
British policy to Mohammad ‘Ali Shah generally remained to maintain 
non-intervention and goodwill. However, there were episodes then made the 
British under suspicion of the Shah. First of all, Mohammad ‘Ali Shah kept 
complaining that the acceptance of bastis at the British Legation in 1908 was a 
kind of intervention on the part of the British. The problem was that the British 
thought, on the one hand, that permitting bast was their duty, even though they 
tried to refuse more bastis. On the other hand, from the Shah’s perspective, the 
British did not provide any support for him. A further point was that, as regards 
the return of the ex-Shah, the 1909 Protocol took on the form of an essential 
principle. The British had recognized the new Shah and the new Iranian 
government, so it was not possible for them to provide support to the ex-Shah. 
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Obviously, the British were securing their interests in the South of Iran. If 
Mohammad ‘Ali Shah had the chance to stabilize the country, the British would 
provide their goodwill, and vice versa. Regarding the return of the ex-Shah, it was 
not Britain’s wish to see disturbances in Iran that might emerge from their 
supporting him.   
    The 1907 Convention could not bring complete harmony in the policy of the 
two powers. For example, the Russians did not agree with the British Legation 
accepting the bastis in 1908. The British argued that they were not intervening in 
the Iranian affairs by doing so. Then, in the case of Colonel Liakhov and the 
bombardment of the Majles in 1908, the British insisted that the Russian 
commander’s taking a leading role in the Iranian forces represented a form of 
Russian intervention. However, the Russians insisted that there was no connection 
with Liakhov and the Russian government. In addition, the British were also 
concerned that the Russians were providing support for the return of the ex-Shah 
in 1911. Russia consistently denied the fact. The two powers continued to claim 
that they were applying the principle of non-intervention to Iranian affairs, but 
owing to the complicated situation, an unclear vision emerged in their relations, 
and in fact they increasingly intervened to a considerable extent.  
    British policy during Iran’s revolutionary period demonstrated its different 
attitudes to different regions. As the British focused on their interests in the 
South-West of Iran due to the discovery of oil in 1908, Iranian affairs in the 
political centre became a secondary consideration. The Revolution and its 
aftermath generally affected Russian interests in northern Iran, where the British 
had no right to intervene. However, the return of the ex-Shah in the Russian zone 
from 1911 affected the agreements of the 1907 Convention and the 1909 Protocol, 
and produced a serious challenge to the policy of Anglo-Russian cooperation 
towards Iran. It is a testimony to the gravity of the situation in Europe that their 
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good relations were not broken.  
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Chapter IV British Policy and Railways in Iran 1903-1914 
 
Introduction 
    This chapter will mainly discuss schemes for railway construction in Iran 
devised by Britain from the early twentieth century to the outbreak of World War I. 
To the British, construction of railways in Iran was not solely an issue of 
economic advantage in Anglo-Iranian relations, but also a matter that related to 
Russia in the context of international politics. In addition, it was inexorably linked 
to the rising influence of Germany in the region, and the perceived threat of its 
railway schemes. By 1908, the discovery of oil in the South-West of Iran also 
began to have a serious impact on British attitudes to railways, as well as to the 
policy of the Iranian central government itself. Iran, meanwhile, aspired to build 
railways, but was hampered by its empty treasury, and impeded by great power 
rivalries.  
    In general, railways in the Middle East and India were both promoted by and 
invested in by the British from the mid-nineteenth century. India’s first railway 
was constructed with British investment in the 1840s.1 About 50 years later, in 
1900, trains ran through most Indian territory.2 Regarding the Middle East, after 
Britain occupied Egypt in the 1880s, it endeavoured to build on the existing 
railway system.3  
In Iran, an attempt to begin the construction of railways emerged in the 
second half of the nineteenth century with the Reuter Concession of 1872, signed 
by a British financier, Baron Reuter.4 In July 1873 a railway from the Caspian 
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port of Enzali to Tehran was commenced, but stopped owing the cancellation of 
the Concession. 5  In November 1879, Britain also planned a railway from 
Qandahar to Herat to improve communications with Iran, but this also resulted in 
nothing.6  
Obviously Britain’s intention for railways in the Middle East, Iran and India 
was to have a stronger transportation network connecting its broad trade routes 
from Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf and then to India. Meanwhile, 
Anglo-Russian rivalry extended to railways, and Britain did not want to see a 
Russian railway system developed in Iran for security reasons.7 Iran, of course, 
wanted to use the construction of railway to strengthen itself. Another alternative 
was American investment.8 However, Britain and Russia joined forces to prevent 
that happening. It can thus be seen that the two European powers were rivals on 
but had a understanding to exclude other powers from obtaining any advantage 
from Iran on the other. Therefore Iranian railways were altogether a complex issue 
for both Britain and Iran. 
    In the late nineteenth century, in consideration of a serious clash of economic 
interests in Iran with Britain and Germany, Russia induced Iran to agree to 
prohibition of railway building on 12 November 1890.9 The Agreement stipulated 
that ‘The Persian Government engages, for the space of ten years, beginning from 
the date of the signature of this agreement, neither to construct a railway in 
Persian territory, nor to permit nor grant a concession for the construction of 
railways to a company or other persons and after the expiration of the ten years 
the renewal of the prolongation shall be immediately discussed between the two 
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parties,’ and that ‘after the signature of this agreement all documents concerning 
railways previously signed by the two Governments become null and void.’10 
Nevertheless, Russia did not stop scheming over railways. About a decade later a 
rumour began to circulate that the Russians and the Iranians had renewed the 1890 
Agreement for another ten years.11 In November 1899, a group of Russian 
engineers arrived in Tabriz to carry out a survey for a proposed railway from 
Tabriz to Bushehr.12 Then, in a Russian loan to Iran in 1900, the two countries 
agreed that no other government could obtain railway concessions from Iran for 
ten years.13 By this renewal of the 1890 Agreement, Russia again dominated 
Iran’s railway development. 
There were three questions in Anglo-German relations from the late 
nineteenth century: the Baghdad railway; the German navy; and colonies.14 
According to Paul Kennedy, ‘The period 1895-1901 had been marked by Britain’s 
global embarrassment at the advances which the other powers (inter alia, 
Germany) were making in colonial, naval and economic terms.’15 In the early 
twentieth century, the Baghdad Railway, which was constructed by Germany, was 
designed to pass through the Ottoman Empire and reach the Ottoman-Iranian 
border and the Persian Gulf. Since 1898 the Germans had planned a road and 
railway concession from Baghdad to Tehran.16 In April 1900, the British were 
worried about a railway line planned by Germany from Istanbul to Baghdad and a 
possible line through Iranian territory connecting with Indian railways.17  A 
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British newspaper, The Times, argued that this line would have an international 
impact, indicating that the British were anxious about losing their security and 
prestige in the Persian Gulf.18 To Britain and Russia the Baghdad Railway 
appeared as a threat to their security and prestige in Iran. Nevertheless, in late 
1902, Germany was looking for cooperation with British capitalists for the 
Baghdad Railway, and one of the main issues was whether or not Kuwait should 
be the proposed terminus,19 particularly as the British intended to control all 
stations which were close to the Persian Gulf.20 They were even then determined 
to prevent any challenge by Germany to their own hegemony in the region. The 
Baghdad Railway Convention was signed in May 1903 by the Ottoman Empire. 
David Fraser, in 1909, commented that Germany was using this railway enterprise 
to entail huge profits, which was affecting Britain’s commercial preserves.21 
Charles Sarolea, in 1915, argued that German railways in Mesopotamia were dark 
clouds that ‘may burst into a political storm and cataclysm such as the world has 
not seen since Napoleonic times.’22 Edward Mead Earle also commented that ‘the 
political potentialities of the Bagdad Railway aroused the fear and opposition of 
the other European Powers.’23 Britain therefore had an ambivalent attitude to the 
Baghdad Railway – on the one hand it was willing to cooperate over it in order to 
creator wider connections for its own interests; on the other it wanted no German 
intrusion in its sphere of influence in Iran and the Persian Gulf.  
A number of articles have studied the question of railways in 
twentieth-century Iran. In ‘Russian Imperialism and Persian Railways,’24 Firuz 
                                                 
18
 The Times, Thursday, April 19, 1900, p. 10. 
19
 The Times, Wednesday, September 17, 1902, p. 3. 
20
 The Times, Friday, May 8, 1903, p. 3 
21
 David Fraser, The Short Cut to India: The Record of a Journey along the Route of the Baghdad 
Railway, Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1909, p. 319.  
22
 Charles Sarolea, The Anglo-German Problem, New York and London: The Knickerbocker Press, 
1915, p, 186. 
23
 Earle, Turkey, p. 131. 
24
 Firuz Kazemzadeh, ‘Russian Imperialism and Persian Railways,’ in Hugh McLean, Martin E. 
Malia, and George Fischer (eds), Russian Thought and Politics, Cambridge: Harvard University 
 141
Kazemzadeh paints a broad picture of Russian action in relation to railways in 
Iran from the late nineteenth century up to the outbreak of World War I. Owing to 
the continuous growth of Russo-Iranian trade, Iranian markets became more and 
more attractive to the Russians. In 1874, a line from Jolfa, on the Russo-Iranian 
border, to Tabriz, the principal city of Iranian Azerbaijan, was proposed. After the 
British obtained rights to the opening of the Karun river in the South-West of Iran 
in 1889, the Russians became anxious that soon Iran would also grant railway 
concessions to Britain. The Russians negotiated with Iran not to grant any railway 
concessions to any other nations before 1900, but they were aware that the 
prohibition could not last for another decade or generation. In addition, the new 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Isvolsky, in 1906 advocated an agreement with 
Germany, which resulted in the Potsdam Agreement in 1911 stipulating that the 
two countries agreed to construct a branch railway in Iran connecting to the 
Baghdad Railway, and promised mutual commercial freedom. According to 
Kazaemzadeh, Iran thus potentially benefited from the period of rapprochement 
between Russia and Germany.  
     In ‘The Trans-Persian Railway Project and Anglo-Russian Relations, 
1909-14,’25 D. W. Spring explores a scheme for a railway traversing Iran from 
north to south. By 1908, Isvolsky was aware that the veto on railway building in 
Iran established in 1890 was no longer practicable. Isvolsky therefore attempted to 
obtain Britain’s goodwill on railway building, as well as to discuss the question of 
the Baghdad Railway with the Germans. When the Russian project for a 
Trans-Persian Railway was proposed in 1910, Russia also withdrew its objection 
to a British scheme for a railway from Mohammerah to Khorramabad in 1911. 
This made it difficult for Grey to be intransigent on the Trans-Persian Railway. In 
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‘Public Opinions and Middle Eastern Railways: The Russo-German Negotiations 
of 1910-11,’26 Judith A. Head discusses Russian public opinion on the railway 
issue. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1910 was Sazonov, who on the 
one hand maintained the Entente with France and Britain, and on the other 
arranged a meeting with Germany on the railway issue, in November 1910. 
Sazonov intended to take public opinion into account when making a decision on 
foreign diplomacy. Some Russian newspapers opposed the Entente and advocated 
the obtaining of German friendship. At the same time Sazanov was aware that the 
growing influence of Germany meant that Russia had to negotiate with it on the 
issue of railways. In the course of negotiations between 1910 and 1911, a railway 
line, the Khanaqin-Tehran line, was agreed by the two states. The final agreement 
in August 1911 resulted in Russia gaining control of the Khanaqin-Tehran line, 
which quietened public opinion.  
These articles examine the episodes of the prohibition of railways in 1890, 
the Potsdam Agreement of 1911, and the Trans-Iranian Railway of 1912 
principally concentrating on the importance of the Russian and German factors. 
However, the roles of Britain and Iran have received less attention. British policy 
had begun to diverge considerably as between one region of Iran and another, and 
this factor influenced the railway issue. On the part of Iran, railways were seen a 
means to strengthen itself and relatively eliminate the influence of foreign powers. 
In the following sections, it will be seen that whilst the three foreign powers all 
attempted to proceed with their railway schemes to strengthen themselves and 
suppress the others’ prestige in Iran and in the Middle East, they also endeavoured 
to negotiate with each other in order to diminish any hostility between them. In 
this scenario, the needs and interests of Iran itself became increasingly less 
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significant in their policies.   
 
1. Schemes for railways in Iran: 1903-1910 
    This section will explore railway discussions and schemes in and relating to 
Iran as between Britain, Russia and Germany, and to some extent the Iranian view 
on such schemes. It will specifically look at the negotiations over the Baghdad 
Railway being built by Germany, which was perceived to varying degrees as a 
threat by Britain and Russia. These negotiations were still influenced by the 
1890-1910 embargo on railways imposed on Iran by Russia at the end of the 
nineteenth century.    
 
a. Iranian railways: discussions between Britain and Russia 
    In early April 1901, the British were concerned that the Russians were 
making a survey for a railway line from Jolfa, in Russian territory, to Tabriz, 
Tehran, and from there to Isfahan, Yazd, and on to a port in an unspecified 
location outside the Persian Gulf.27 The British realized that the Russians had not 
explicitly forfeited their right to construct railways in Iran during the period of the 
1890 prohibition, and the proposed line would seriously affect British trade.  
Therefore, the British Minister in Tehran, Spring-Rice reminded the Iranian 
government that Naser al-Din Shah had given Britain priority in the construction 
of any railway from the south to Tehran on 26 December 1881, and that he agreed 
then that no southern railway concession could be granted to other powers without 
consulting the British government.28 Amin al-Soltan acknowledged that such a 
promise had been made, but The Times revealed that an actual suggestion had 
been made by the Russians in September 1901 for the construction of a railway 
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from the Trans-Caspian Railway to Bandar Abbas, passing through Mashhad, and 
Sistan,29 which increased British concern. Whether or not this proposal was 
approved by the Iranian government, it can be seen that a Russian railway 
network connecting Mashhad, Bandar Abbas and Sistan would become a threat to 
Britain’s influence in eastern Iran close to Afghanistan, and India as well. In 1902, 
a Trans-Iranian railway was again proposed by Russia to secure a free exit point to 
the Indian Ocean for itself, with the added objective of diminishing the impact of 
the Baghdad Railway.30 Russia had still not relinquished its intention to reach 
India as will be demonstrated further below with regard to the Trans-Persian 
railway in 1912. 
Iran attempted to keep the balance of power between Britain and Russia over 
the railway issue. For example, a telegram from Mashhad in January 1903 
revealed that Mozaffar al-Din Shah ‘has granted to the Russian Bank concessions 
for railways from Sarakhs to Meshed and from Julfa to Tabreez.’31 In addition, in 
May 1904 the Iranian Minister in St. Petersburg, Moshir al-Molk, asserted that 
‘…… England should make use of the right secured to her, by the Shah’s promise, 
to allow her to construct railways in the South of Persia, if Russia constructed 
railways in the North.’32 Whether Iran granted a concession to Russia or not, the 
replies that Iran gave to Britain seem to indicate that it aimed to control the rivalry 
of the two powers by ensuring that it treated them equally in the granting of 
concessions.  
The Times, in the meantime, kept covering other Russian schemes for 
railways. For instance, an article published in St. Petersburg entitled ‘Railways 
across Persia’ revealed projects for a line constructed close to the northern 
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Russo-Iranian border from Kara Kliss, a station midway between Tiflis and Erivan 
to Mashhad. The purpose of a terminus at Mashhad was to expand Russia’s 
influence by ultimately reaching the Persian Gulf via a railway passing from 
Mashhad through Sistan.33 In December 1905, another Russian article in St. 
Petersburg, ‘Projected Railways from Russia towards India,’ proposed a line from 
the Russo-Iranian border at Jolfa through to Khorrasan, and then went southwards 
close to the border of India.34 The Russian interest in railways at this time was 
very clear, though the veto on Iranian railways had not been expired yet. The 
Times revealed the consequent concerns of British public opinion. 
    From 1908 onwards, Britain had a more proactive policy regarding railways. 
On 6 May 1908, Mr. Loraine in the British Legation pointed out the importance of 
railways, arguing that they could lead to long-term political influence for Britain, 
and strengthen the authority of the Iranian government.35 In Britain, the railway 
issue was connected to a new factor, namely oil, struck on 26 May 1908. In June 
1908, Marling argued that it was time to take into account the effect of oil.36 
Marling’s statement was a good representation of British concerns regarding 
south-western Iran. On the part of Britain, the railway development in Iran would 
be taken over by a third power, obviously meaning Germany, which was contrary 
to British strategic and economic needs.37 Railway lines could be advantageous to 
British trade in the South-West of Iran, especially as with the discovery of oil. In 
October, Grey proposed communicating with Isvolsky on the railway issue.38 In 
fact, Isvolsky was aware that the 1890 veto could not possibly be renewed, so 
obviously the German Baghdad Railway appeared as a threat to the Russians. 
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Russia had been considering an end to the veto since April 1908.39 In terms of 
British policy by 1908, railways in the south-west had become of intense concern 
because of their oil interests. With regard to Anglo-Russian relations, the two 
powers’ close relationship over Iranian railways was a means of excluding 
Germany from Iran.  
 
b. Britain, Russia and Germany - cooperation and division to 1910 
Germany had connections with Iran over railways because of the Baghdad 
Railway, and Britain was seriously concerned about this. Germany did not have 
close relations with Britain, and Russia, in the early twentieth century. Mowat 
argues that in 1900 Germany ignored Britain’s desire for an alliance.40 Martin 
considers that ‘There were several themes or threads within German activity in 
Persia: a diplomatic campaign on Persia’s behalf against Turkey; a German 
attempt to found a bank in Tehran; lastly a branch of the Baghdad Railway was 
also to play a part in the economic rehabilitation of Persia in order to create a 
future market and source of raw materials.’41 To the British, German expansion in 
Iran was decidedly ominous. In 1902, a Russian newspaper, Noveo Vremya, 
reported that a visit by Mozaffar al-Din Shah to Berlin was to a large extent 
focused on the railway issue. It said that the extension of the Baghdad Railway 
had brought Iran and Germany closer economically, and German assurances that 
their interests in Iran were solely commercial did not convince the Russians. 
Meanwhile, Britain, too, was concerned about the rise of German influence as a 
result of the Baghdad Railway and the increase in the German navy.42 Iran’s 
apparently friendly intentions towards Germany were thus viewed with 
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apprehension by Britain.  
In 1905 The Times reported that Germany proposed to build lines from 
south-western Iran, for example from Kermanshah to Khanaqin on the 
Ottoman-Iranian border, which would be not only an expansion of the Baghdad 
Railway, but also a means of expanding their own interests in Iran.43 German 
capitalists attempted to persuade the Iranian government to grant them railway 
concessions which would enable them to cross the country from the south-west to 
the north-east.44 Germany was targeting the area where Britain enjoyed influence 
and prestige. To the British, Khanaqin was a significant location as forty percent 
of British imports to Iran came via Khanaqin and Hamadan.45 Britain itself had a 
plan for the construction, control, and management of the Baghdad-to-Gulf 
section of the line, together with the branch line to Khanaqin,46 to secure its 
interests in that area.  
The relationship between Russia and Germany was not entirely one of 
conflict. Germany attempted to establish a Russo-German alliance at the end of 
1903 when it became apparent that France, Italy, Spain, and Britain were uniting 
in a series of agreements.47 However, the plan failed as Russia turned its foreign 
policy towards allying with Britain after its defeat in the Japanese-Russian War of 
1904.48 Russia had opposed the Baghdad Railway since the early twentieth 
century, fearing that the scheme would conflict with Russian interests in Iran.49 
The weakness of Russia after 1904 led to a more cautious foreign policy, 
especially with regard to Germany. This policy was adopted by the two Ministers 
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for Foreign Affairs from 1906, Isvolsky appointed in 1906 and Sazonov in 1910.50 
Isvolsky intended to have peaceable arrangements with each of Russia’s 
neighbours: with England over Central Asia, with Austria over the Balkans, and 
with Germany over Iran and the Baghdad Railway.51 Thus, Isvolsky approached 
Germany in October 1906 to assure the Germans that Russia and Britain had no 
hostility to them. In return, Germany guaranteed that it simply wished for open 
door trade with Iran.52   
    In the course of negotiations between Britain and Russia for rapprochement 
in 1906, Isvolsky was most anxious to avoid irritating Germany by assuring 
Berlin that Anglo-Russian negotiations would not touch upon the Baghdad 
Railway, and if otherwise, the German government would be consulted.53 He 
considered that ‘if Russia could settle her accounts with Germany at the same 
time as she did with England,’ its difficulties over foreign relations would be 
removed. Railways were a possible means to reach his goal.54 This did not mean 
that Russia took a friendly view of the Baghdad Railway, but it did mean that 
Russia attempted to diminish the loss of prestige caused by Germany building the 
Baghdad Railway. To the British, however, Russia seemed to intend to withdraw 
its objections to the Baghdad Railway, to show its goodwill to Germany.55 A 
memorandum by Isvolsky in February 1907 recorded the main terms of their 
changed policy towards Germany: ‘Russia agreed to make no opposition to the 
Baghdad Railway; if there were to be any connection between Iranian railways 
and the Baghdad Railway, no decision would be made without prior consultation 
between Russia and Germany; Germany had no political interests in Iran but only 
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commerce. Germany should recognize Russia’s special interests in the North of 
Iran, and would seek no concessions for a line there without a mutual 
agreement.’56 In the memorandum, the two countries each obtained what they 
wanted. Germany would not receive objection from Russia. And, obviously, 
Isvolsky was attempting to eliminate Germany’s intentions in Iran, and to secure 
Russia’s prestige there. The recognition of Russia’s special interests in the North 
of Iran by Germany was one of Isvolsky’s principle objectives. In June, Germany 
gave assurances that it would not seek concessions for railways, highways, or 
telegraphs in northern Iran if Russia were to commence a railway from Tehran to 
Khanaqin connecting with the Baghdad Railway.57 However, these discussions 
did not go further, possibly because of the signing of the Anglo-Russian 
Convention in August 1907, which was implicitly to counter the rise of Germany.  
In June 1908, a new phenomenon appeared in a mutual understanding 
between Britain and Russia on the railway line from Jolfa to Mohammerah. The 
understanding was certainly a means to block Germany encroaching into Iran by 
the Baghdad Railway. Neither Russia nor Britain completely trusted Germany. 
Grey said in August 1908 that the extension of the Baghdad Railway amounted to 
a foreign undertaking in the direction of the Indian border,58 and this proposed 
new line would, on commercial grounds, be the most effective means of a German 
commercial advance in the South of Iran.59 Meanwhile, in December 1909, 
Isvolsky continued to maintain good will towards Germany on the railway issue. 
He intended to make an agreement with the German government respecting the 
section of the line from Baghdad to the Persian Gulf.60 On the other hand, 
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Isvolsky was still worried about German activities in Iran, such as a proposed 
German loan to the country, and the possibility of Iran granting a concession for 
the Baghdad-Khanaqin railway.61  
The relations between the three powers was thus of ostensible goodwill and 
underlying suspicion owing to the emerging threat of the Baghdad Railway. 
Although the three powers were seemed to be in harmony in negotiations over the 
railway issue, essentially they were still in a state of rivalry. In fact, they had no 
wish to see any serious clash over the railway issue, and thus managed to maintain 
ostensibly friendly relations. 
     
c. Expiry of the 1890 Agreement and Britain and Germany in 1910  
Although Britain questioned German intentions regarding Iran, like Russia, it 
did not wish to be in conflict with Germany. Grey tried to reassure the Germans 
that the British purpose was simply to prevent any railway rights which would 
endanger Britain’s political interests in Iran from being undermined by the Iranian 
government. In addition, Grey assured Germany that Britain had no intention of 
excluding investments in Iranian railways by foreign powers.62  
On 21 March 1910, the German Ambassador in London, Count Metternich, 
told Grey that he had heard a rumour that there were conditions for a proposed 
loan to Iran by Britain and Russia, such as the prohibition of the building of a 
railway in Iran without Anglo-Russian consent; that concessions in Iran should be 
granted only to Russian subjects in the Russian sphere, and only to British 
subjects in the British sphere; and that Iranians were to receive concessions only if 
they could prove that they had no foreign capital behind them.63 The German 
view was in accordance with the section on Iran in the Anglo-Russian Convention 
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of 1907, which stated that the British and Russian governments have ‘mutually 
engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desired 
the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful development, as 
well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the trade and industry 
of all other nationals.’64 In Count Metternich’s view, these conditions violated the 
wording of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, and also limited freedom of 
trade for any other powers. However, the actual document that Grey gave Count 
Metternich on 22 March 1910 stated the following: ‘Russia and Britain reserved 
the prior right to build railways in their respective spheres of influence. The 
Russians and the British did not claim any exclusive rights to build in their own 
zones, but wanted to control any lines of strategic or political importance; The two 
European powers’ English and Russian Legations at Tehran had to agree about the 
use of the money lent (to the Iranian government). Its expenditure was to be 
controlled by the committee of French advisers, although if Germany objected to 
French nationals, advisers of another nationality could be substituted.’65 In fact, 
Britain and Russia were willing to accept railway building that had no political 
purpose, and Germany would supposedly be able to participate in certain Iranian 
affairs on that basis. In this way, Grey countered the German argument by 
informing Count Metternich that ‘we quite recognized the general principle of 
commercial equality for third Powers in Persia.’66 However, even the conditions 
that Grey gave Metternich can be seen to represent a more entrenched protection 
for British and Russian interests that the 1907 Convention. Despite Grey’s efforts, 
this point was not lost on the Germans.  
The ban on the building of railways in Iran expired in April 1910. After the 
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expiry of the 1890 railway agreement then, three European powers and Iran all 
entered in a new stage of meetings and negotiations. It could be seen that Britain, 
Russia and Germany all had plans regarding railways. Germany at that time 
argued that they ‘had a perfect right to obtain concessions for railways or anything 
else in Persia ……’67 In other words the Germans believed that they now had an 
opportunity to acquire the same rights as Britain and Russia in the railway issue. 
In the meantime, the negotiations between Britain and Germany over the Baghdad 
Railway collapsed because Britain insisted on obtaining complete control over the 
part of the railroad from Baghdad to the Persian Gulf, to which Germany did not 
consent.68 Thereafter, partly due to these events, Britain adopted a different 
attitude to Germany, and in April 1910 the India Office proposed schemes for 
southern railways for the security of British interests in the South of Iran. They 
wanted to preclude possible German enterprise from obtaining a railway 
concession through the neutral zone, all concessions within the British sphere 
should be secured, not necessarily for construction, but merely to prevent outside 
interference in the British sphere.69  This demonstrates that it was Britain’s 
intention to block all German proposals for railways. 
    Meanwhile, the Germans endeavoured to negotiate with the two other 
powers over their political intentions, repeating to Russia that they had no 
intention of obtaining railway concessions from Iran,70 and giving assurances to 
Britain that they had no political intentions with regard to Iran but were simply 
requesting an open door policy for commerce.71 The proof of this was that no 
German loans had been given to the Iranian government, and that no concessions 
had been granted to Germany by the Iranian government. The Iranian Minister in 
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London, Mirza Mehdi Khan, stated that the Iranian government had not made any 
offers to Germany.72 Therefore, after the expiry of the railway agreement in 1910, 
Britain took a strong stand against increased German influence in Iran through the 
railway issue. 
 
2. The Potsdam Agreement of 1911 and British railway projects in 
south-western Iran 
     As demonstrated above the British did not display a cooperative attitude to 
German plans in Iran, which the Germans noted. An officer in the German 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Herr von Stumm, complained that the British were 
delaying settling outstanding issues between Germany and Britain.73 In response, 
Grey argued that, ‘we have had no indication from the German Government of a 
desire to come to an agreement of sort (over the Baghdad railway project).’74 
This was hardly an invitation to discuss such an agreement. By contrast, Germany 
and Russia began meetings on the railway issue from November 1910, and these 
led to the Potsdam Agreement of 1911.   
 
a. The Potsdam Agreement of 1911 and its assessment 
    The Potsdam Agreement of 1911 has received much attention in academic 
studies. Dominic Lieven argues that the Potsdam Agreement seemed to indicate 
an emergence of a rapprochement between the two states.75 J. B. Wolf also 
believes that to Sazonov, ‘to make an agreement with Germany was the expedient 
thing to do, and at the same time it fitted nicely with Sasonov’s general policy, for 
he belonged to that section of the Russian court whose sympathies were with 
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Germany rather than France, and a detente with Germany would satisfy their idea 
of proper policy.’76 Maybelle Kennedy Chapman asserts that, without consulting 
the Entente states, Britain and France, on the agreement, Russia left them to make 
arrangements with Germany alone.77 Earle argues that ‘Russia had a great deal to 
gain and little to lose by the Potsdam Agreement. Whether Russia liked it or not, 
the Baghdad Railway had become a going concern, and there was every indication 
that another decade would see its completion. When finished, the Baghdad system, 
together with projected Persian lines, would provide Russian trade with direct 
communications with the Indies (via Baghdad and the Persian Gulf) and with the 
Mediterranean (via Mosul, Aleppo, and the Syrian coast).’ 78  Kazemzadeh 
comments that ‘the ostensible willingness of the Russian Foreign Minister to 
accept German demands in regard to the Khaneqin-Tehran line stuck them 
(Britain) as foolish and harmful.’79 Derek Spring comments that ‘the Potsdam 
agreement was not a brilliant success for Sazonov.’80 These scholars therefore 
tend to the view that generally Russia allowed itself to draw too close to Germany, 
which resulted, to their loss, in the Potsdam Agreement, and their distancing from 
Britain, the 1907 Convention, and the Triple Entente. However, the question of 
whether the Potsdam Agreement was a sign of an end to the Entente and the 1907 
Convention as far as the Russians were concerned needs exploring. In terms of 
Russia’s overall policy at that time, it was unlikely that the Russians would wish 
to see an expanding Germany.  
A confirmed meeting in November 1910 between Russia and Germany 
affirmed that the two powers maintained their goal to meet their interests on 
railways and to cease any other disputes in their foreign relations. In August 1910, 
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the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Friedrich von Pourtalès, expressed a 
wish for rapprochement with Russia, informing Sazonov that Iran was a subject 
on which decisions were urgently required.81 The German Foreign Minister, 
Alfred von Kiderlen-Wachter, believed that agreement with Russia was possible if 
Germany assured Russia that the Baghdad Railway was a purely economic 
venture, and that if agreement was reached it might in turn end Russian 
cooperation with France and Britain.82  On 10 October 1910, Sazonov told 
O’Beirne in St. Petersburg that a meeting of the Russian and German Emperors at 
Potsdam in Germany would take place in the following month, and the main 
concern was a railway line from Khanaqin to Tehran connecting the Baghdad 
Railway to the proposed Iranian railway network. The point which concerned 
Sazonov was that Germany might seek concessions in the Russian zone in Iran, 
especially in relation to railways.83 Sazonov also believed that ‘Germany could 
not recognize the right of Russia and England to any economic privileges in 
Persia, based on an agreement (Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907) between 
themselves and that country: Germany considered that this agreement, to which 
she was not a party, violated the principle of the open door and was injurious to 
her economic interests.’84 Thus, to some extent, Russia did not trust Germany.  
On the part of Britain, Grey asked Russia not to discuss railways in the 
neutral zone of Iran with Germany. Sazonov promised that he would refuse to 
discuss this in the forthcoming meeting,85 telling O’Beirne that any discussions 
regarding German railways in the Russian sphere would be put on hold. In this 
way, the basic principle of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, to exclude 
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other powers from Iran, was secured before the Russo-German meeting of 
November.  
The first discussion between Russian and Germany took place on 8 
November 1910. During this meeting, the German Chancellor, Theobald von 
Bethmann-Hollweg, agreed not to build any railway lines in the Ottoman Empire 
to points on the Iranian border north of Khanaqin,86 thereby protecting the 
interests of Russia, but not those of Britain. Sazonov was also aware that it was 
necessary to maintain Russian political prestige in Iran untouched by Germany, 
and to obtain Germany’s recognition of it.87  The next day, Novoe Vremya 
published an interview with Sazonov, who, in his role as the newly-appointed 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared that in fact Germany had no special 
intentions regarding Iran, and that it recognized Russia’s interests in the north of 
the country.88 Britain was in effect left dependent on Russian goodwill, which 
might, of course, later conflict with Russian interests. Buchanan, the British 
Ambassador in St. Petersburg, revealed that the British government trusted Russia 
not to ‘give any engagement to effect a junction of the Bagdad Railway with the 
future North Persian systems until some satisfactory settlement with regard to the 
Gulf section of the Bagdad Railway had been reached by the British and German 
Governments.’89 In January 1911, Grey informed Benckendorff, the Russian 
Ambassador in London, that ‘it was extremely important that, should Russia 
connect Khanekin with a point in Northern Persia, whatever Germany’s 
participation may be, the control and management of this branch line in our 
Persian sphere of interest should remain solely in Russian hands to the exclusion 
of every kind of German interference.’90 In July 1911, Sazonov said that Russia 
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intended ‘to control the Tehran-Khanaqin line even if Russia did not build it, and 
to keep north Persia as a preserve for Russia. But Germany wanted some 
assurance that the Tehran-Khanaqin railway would be built in return for 
recognizing Russian predominance in the north.’91 Sazonov thus demonstrated 
that he was fully concerned for Russian interests, but not particularly for those of 
Britain. Although Sazonov assured the British that the Anglo-Russian Convention 
of 1907 would be observed, the Potsdam Meeting endeavoured at the same time to 
at least make Russian interests in northern Iran more secure. 
Eventually, after nine months of delays and negotiations, the Potsdam 
Agreement was signed in St. Petersburg on 19 August 1911 by the German 
Ambassador, Count de Pourtalès, and the Acting Russian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Neratov (Sazonov was ill then). The preamble announced that Russia had 
special interests in Iran, while Germany was pursuing commercial objectives there. 
In general terms, the points of the Agreement were as follows: 
1. Germany agreed not to seek railway, road, or telegraph concessions for its 
nationals or on behalf of foreigners to the north of a line passing Isfahan, Yazd 
and Khakh and then the Afghan frontier; 
2. Russia agreed to build a railway from Tehran to Khanaqin to be connected to 
the Sadijeh-Khanaqin line, a branch of the Baghdad Railway. The line was to 
be built by Russia within two years after the completion of the 
Sadijeh-Khanaqin line. The two countries would have the benefit of 
international traffic by these lines. If Russia could not build the 
Tehran-Khaniqin line within two years after the completion of the 
Sadijeh-Khanaqin branch, Russia should forfeit the construction; 
3. Russia had no right to interrupt the construction of the Baghdad Railway or 
prevent capital from being invested in this enterprise; 
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4. Russia reserved the right to let any foreign financial group build the 
Tehran-Khanaqin line; 
5. Russia had the right to commence the railway works as it wished.92 
Despite Sazonov’s view that the Agreement was restricted to the northern zone of 
Iran, and thus in conformity with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, Article 
1 and Article 3 in particular demonstrate Russian concerns for its interests over 
those of Britain in that they disregard Britain’s concerns in the south and over the 
Baghdad Railway. In effect that abovementioned, scholars are to some extent 
correct in arguing that Russia at this point was drawing away from Britain. In 
terms of the issue of Iranian railways, the Potsdam Agreement of 1911 had a 
potentially beneficial outcome for both Russia and Germany. In addition, Russia 
would cement its prestige in the North of Iran through the construction of the 
proposed Khanaqin-Tehran line, while Germany staved off pressure from Russia 
on the Baghdad Railway.  
     Russia denied that the Agreement had destroyed its relations with the 
Entente. In his memoir, Sazonov expressed his view on the Potsdam Meeting that 
his purpose was to ‘postpone their (German interest) fulfillment for about ten 
years. I felt sure that by that time, we should have succeeded in attracting foreign 
capital to our scheme of railway construction; we should thus stave off the danger 
of Germany seizing and concentrating in her own hands the whole of the carrying 
trade in North-west Persia.’93 Sazonov also insisted that Russia did not consent to 
Germany’s extending the Baghdad Railway to the Persian Gulf, and not give any 
other advantage either. 94  By the Potsdam Meeting of 1911, thus, Russia’s 
influence in northern Iran would not be disturbed.95 Therefore the Russians 
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themselves did not share the view that the Agreement weakened them in the face 
of Germany. 
 
b. British railway projects in south-western Iran 
    From a British point of view, Anglo-German relations had seen no 
improvement at all for years owing to naval competition and the Baghdad Railway. 
In 1911 the two states were on the brink of war over the Agadir Affair in 
Morocco.96 With the emergence of the details of the Potsdam meetings, British 
consuls in southern Iran were not slow to express their opinions. Cox in Bushehr, 
for example, argued that Russia had encouraged Germany to undertake an 
enterprise in the neutral zone which could weaken Britain’s privileged position in 
that area.97 After the Potsdam Meeting of 1911, however, Iran saw Germany as a 
friend of their opponent, Russia,98 and in December 1910, an Iranian newspaper 
Iran-e No criticized Germany for settling the Iranian question with Russia in a 
friendly way.99 During that time, railway schemes put forward by Britain to be 
built in the South-West of Iran were approved by the Iranian government. This 
section looks at Britain’s actions and Iran’s attitude over Potsdam.  
    In 1911, the British were negotiating with the Iranians over certain railway 
lines, the proposed Mohammerah-Khorramabad line, for example. The Iranian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mohtasham al-Saltaneh, telegraphed Grey to the 
effect that Iran was keen to safeguard its political and economic interests, and that 
therefore a railway built for commercial purposes should be considered.100 With 
regard to proposed British railway lines in the neutral zone, Russia had no right to 
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object, owing to Article 3 of the 1907 Convention, which stipulated that ‘Russia, 
on her part, engages not to oppose, without previous arrangement with Great 
Britain, the grant of any Concessions whatever to British subjects in the regions of 
Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Articles I and II (which referred to 
the neutral zone). Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards the 
grant of Concessions to Russian subjects in the same regions of Persia. …….’ 
     A primary interest for Britain was her oil interests and the need to protect 
them. In 1909, as discussed, Britain had already reached an agreement to this 
purpose with the Sheykh of Mohammerah for laying oil pipelines and 
constructing refineries in his territory. Schemes of railways in Mohammerah and 
its neighbourhood were seen as a means to both protect and extend oil interests. 
At the same time the Iranian government itself was becoming increasingly 
interested in railways. In April 1911, the Iranian Regent, Naser al-Molk, told 
Britain that Iran viewed railways as a priority, and that ‘it was important that 
Persia should make a beginning in railway development without delay, and here 
was a favourable opportunity for coming to terms for the construction of a railway 
of primary importance to the country.’101 The Regent was aware of opportunities 
for constructing railways as a result of the expiry of the 1890 prohibition. In 
addition, the meetings between Germany and Russia influenced the Regent in 
seeking opportunities for Iranian railways to be constructed rather than only 
schemed over. Iran accepted the British proposal for railways, but made it clear 
that Iran’s preferred policy for dealing with the powers was to make Britain and 
Russia join up with a third power, for example France, to reduce any possible 
disputes. This was also a sign that the country was attempting to negotiate with 
Britain on the subject of railways, rather than simply acquiesce.  
The APOC also took part in discussions on Iranian railway affairs. On 15 
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June 1911, the APOC applied to the Iranian government for a concession in the 
southern zone in the name of a newly formed company, the Persian Railway 
Syndicate.102 It proposed to build three lines, from Mohammerah to Khorramabad, 
from Bander Abbas to Kerman, and from Bandar Abbas to Shiraz. The Indian 
government, yet, was of the view that a line between Bandar Abbas and 
Mohammerah should also be pursued, given that it was possible that the line from 
Bandar Abbas to Shiraz might lead to the Baghdad Railway being extended in the 
direction of Shiraz.103 The British proposed line from Bandar Abbas to Shiraz 
would ensure that Germany had no opportunity to strengthen their influence in the 
South of Iran by the means of railways. The British Foreign Office, thinking 
strategically, replied to the APOC that it was a good idea to add a line between 
Bandar Abbas and Mohammerah.104 The Foreign Office considered that Germany 
might well attempt to enter Iranian territory, in which case such a railway line 
would block Germany from infiltrating the south-west of the country. On 15 July 
1911, the Persian Railways Syndicate made a new proposal for four railway lines: 
from Mohammerah to Khorramabad or Borujerd, from Bander Abbas to Kerman, 
from Bandar Abbas to Shiraz, and from Bandar Abbas to Mohammerah. However, 
there were also three proposals of extensions going into the Russian zone. Grey 
informed Greenway, the Manager of the APOC, that they could not authorize this 
without consulting the Russian government in advance.105 The APOC and the 
Persian Railway Syndicate thus attempted to expand Britain’s railway network in 
Iran into the Russian zone, but were thwarted by Grey, who still prioritized good 
relations with the Russians over the advantages of railway schemes. 
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A survey of the railways in the South-West of Iran was proposed by 
Lieutenant Wilson in October 1910, and his report was published in July 1911. 
Wilson considered that the Baghdad Railway in Mesopotamia would alienate 
Mesopotamia from the principal seats of British commercial and political 
influence in the Middle East. It was therefore imperative for Britain to build a 
railway from Mohammerah to Dezful and to reserve the right to extend it to 
Khorramabad. The Persian Railways Syndicate was the main body responsible for 
communicating with the Iranian government. A formal contract between the 
Iranian government and the Persian Railways Syndicate was signed on 7 
September 1911. The Iranian government granted the Syndicate the exclusive 
rights to the survey, construction and working of the railways in southern Iran. All 
the plans of the Syndicate should be completely acceptable to the Iranian 
government, which had right to criticise and make objections.106 In this way, the 
British and the Iranians settled the railway issue in southern Iran for the time 
being.  
The contract also demonstrated that Iran felt free to grant concessions solely 
in consideration of its own interests once the veto agreement with Russia had 
ended in April 1910.107 Furthermore, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 still 
had an impact on negotiations in this episode, given that neither Britain nor Iran 
violated the stipulations of the 1907 Convention. Some studies argue that between 
1911 and 1914 there was détente between Britain and Germany, which resulted in 
the signing of the Anglo-German Convention in 1914 for the Baghdad Railway,108 
but this view does not give an adequate explanation of the situation in 1911. To 
the British at that point, the Mohammerah-Khorramabad line could enable British 
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trade to go directly northwards from the Persian Gulf,109 and counter German 
advance to Iran by the Baghdad Railway. 
     
3. The period of railway scheme competition in Iran: 1910-1914 
    By the outbreak of the war, there were two issues in process: the 
Trans-Persian Railway scheme which emerged in 1910, and the fact that certain 
matters related to Trans-Persian railways, such as alignments, had not been settled 
by the start of World War I; secondly, a proposal for a British line, the 
Mohammerah-Khorrambad line, devised in rivalry with a proposed Russian line, 
the Jolfa-Tabriz line. 
 
a. The Trans-Persian Railway scheme and the Societé d’Études 
    A new approach to railways through Iran had come from Hartwig, the 
Russian Minister in Tehran, in May 1908, who considered they would benefit 
Russian trade and their military strategic position. Isvolsky agreed that railways in 
Iran would be useful in relation to Russia’s political and economic interests.110 
From 1910 onwards, then, a Trans-Persian railway scheme was formally being 
developed by a Russian private initiative, with a view to linking Europe and India. 
In July 1910, Isvolsky made it clear to Nicolson, the British Ambassador in St. 
Petersburg, that the Trans-Persian Railway was a necessary competitor to the 
Baghdad Railway. 111  Isvolsky did not provide a clear idea of how the 
Trans-Persian Railway would compete with the Baghdad Railway, but it may be 
inferred that he intended to have a railway passing through Iran which would 
strengthen Russian influence and block Germany from penetrating the country via 
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the Baghdad Railway. Generally, the Russians’ expression to the Trans-Persian 
Railway was that ‘Anglo-Russian friendship will be a real thing only when 
England and Russia unite for a struggle with Germany, not only on military but on 
economic grounds. …… The road (railway) which we propose connecting not 
only England but all of Europe with India and the Far East kills at its start the 
proposed move of Germany both against England and Russia.’112 Sazonov had in 
mind the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which ‘would never yield the full 
value of which it was capable until it was completed by the adoption of the 
trans-Persian railway scheme, which would reduce the Baghdad line to a position 
of entire insignificance.’113 
Even though the Russian scheme was supposed to ensure the security of 
Anglo-Russian relations, there were opposing voices amongst the British. For 
example, Bushehr believed that the cooperation between Britain and Russia over 
the Trans-Persian Railway project could not guarantee keeping Germany out of 
Iran.114 Probably with the aim of securing Anglo-Russian relations through the 
approval of the Russian scheme, Grey instructed Buchanan in May 1911 to inform 
the Russian government that the British government in principle approved of the 
Trans-Persian Railway scheme. Before a confirmed route for the scheme emerged, 
though, Grey set a few conditions, such as that: ‘the line should enter the British 
sphere at Bandar Abbas rather than at Kerman; and Russia should support 
demands made by Britain to the Iranian Government for concessions for the 
following branch lines to be connected with the proposed Trans-Persian Railway: 
(a.) From Mohammerah to Khorramabad, (b.) From Bandar Abbas to Kerman, 
and (c.) From Bandar Abbas, via Shiraz, to Ahvaz.’115 Grey intended to expand 
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British railways in Iran connecting with the Indian railway system, and to build a 
more developed network of railways in the South-West of Iran. Louis Mallet from 
the British Foreign Office explained that Grey’s view of the scheme would be of 
benefit to British trade in Iran.116  In addition, regarding Grey’s conditions, 
Buchanan in St. Petersburg explained to Neratov, the Russian Acting Foreign 
Minister, that their concern was the security of Indian interests, which still 
retained its importance in British policy. Although the Trans-Persian Railway to 
some extent represented British and Russian cooperation against Germany, Britain 
still endeavoured to diminish Russia’s pressure on India.  
    From January 1911 onwards, an international body, the Societé Internationale 
d’Études du Chemin de Fer Transpersan, (henceforth the Societé d’Études), which 
consisted of a joint British, Russian, and French group, began to deal with all 
matters relevant to the Trans-Persian Railway scheme. The objectives of the 
Societé d’Études for the Trans-Persian Railway were: ‘to obtain a concession 
from the Iranian Government for a line connecting the Russian railway at the 
Russo-Iranian frontier with the Indian railway at the Irano-Baluchistan frontier; 
and to carry on negotiations with Russia and Britain with the object of finally 
determining the alignment.’117 The British government did not oppose the scheme 
in principle, and neither did it oppose the Societé d’Études.118 In addition, in 
March 1912 the Persian Railways Syndicate considered cooperating with the 
Societé d’Études.119 The British group in the Societé d’Études also asked the 
Persian Railways Syndicate to cooperate, on condition that both British and 
Russian interests should be given prior consideration. In addition, the APOC 
wanted the Syndicate to cooperate with the Russian government, in order to 
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secure the continuation of the Mohammerah line into the Russian zone.120 In 
April 1912, the Societé d’Études believed that it should make a loan to Iran for the 
construction of railways. The British government supported this undertaking, and 
favoured the Societé d’Études freedom of action to deal with certain issues.121 
The Russian government was satisfied that the link between the loan and the 
Trans-Persian Railway scheme would facilitate the settlement of the concessions 
and the Iranian government’s assent to railway surveys.122   
The route of the Trans-Persian Railway was formally discussed in early 1913. 
It was supposed to reach the coast at Bandar Abbas by either the main line or a 
branch.123 In February 1913, Buchanan communicated with Sazonov on the 
subject with the British government insisting that ‘the main line must pass through 
Isfahan and Shiraz, and if continued to the British sphere reach that sphere at 
Bander Abbas.’ Sazonov preferred the line to pass through Yazd, a more eastern 
town, than Isfahan.124 Evidently Sazonov wished the line of the Trans-Persian 
Railway to reach the British zone in the South-East of Iran, and which was not a 
result that Britain had expected. Grey still insisted that a line should enter the 
British zone at Bandar Abbas,125 which would easily block German entrance into 
Iran. 126  In April 1913, the Indian government took the position that the 
connection of Europe and India via the Trans-Persian Railway was a risk to the 
British zone in Baluchistan. 127  In July 1914, the Indian government even 
expressed the view that it would be advisable for the British government to 
withdraw its support of the Societé d’Études.128 The Russians, however, lobbied 
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for the Yazd-Kerman-Charbar alignment, while the British favoured that of 
Isfahan-Shiraz-Bandar Abbas,129 but there was no final decision at the outbreak 
of the First World War.  
On the whole, both Britain and Russia were concerned about the Baghdad 
Railway, and the routes that each proposed were calculated to diminish its impact 
from the point of view of their own interests. Although the main bodies in charge 
of the plan were the Societé d’Études and the Persian Railway Syndicate, it was 
clear that the overall interests of the British and Russian governments and the 
general atmosphere of international relations were the decisive factors. 
     
b. The signing of British and Russian railway concessions with the Iranian 
government 1910-14. 
   The British and Russians had conflicting interests in applying for railway 
concessions from the Iranian government, and the main bone of contention was 
two specific lines, namely the Jolfa-Tabriz line and the 
Mohammerah-Khorramabad line. In May 1910, Isvolsky had been informed that 
an agent of the Deutsche Bank of Germany had secured a railway concession in 
northern Iran.130 Russia’s response was to apply for a concession for a line from 
Jolfa to Tabriz. On 4 April 1911, an application for the Jolfa line concession was 
made to the Iranian government.131 At the time of this application, the British 
were also applying for a concession for the Mohammerah-Khorramabad line, 
which appeared in the proposal of the Persian Railways Syndicate in April 1911. 
On 1 April 1911, Barclay announced to the Iranian Foreign Minister, Vusuq 
al-Dowleh, that Britain would shortly present an application for a 
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Mohammerah-Khorramabad Railway option, 132  and in May Grey instructed 
Barclay to assure the Iranian government that Britain would appreciate it if the 
Iranian government did not grant any concessions to other powers in the neutral 
zone.133  
    In June 1912, negotiations over the Mohammerah-Khorramabad line 
between the Iranian government and the Persian Railways Syndicate began.134 
Meanwhile, the Russian Minister in Tehran, Stanislaw Alfonsovich 
Poklewsky-Koziell, expressed his approval of the Mohammerah-Khorramabad 
line, and was instructed by his government to obtain a concession for the 
Jolfa-Tabriz line with an extension to Lake Ormiyeh.135 Russia actively showed 
its goodwill to Britain, probably in the belief that the two railways could impede 
the expansion of the Baghdad Railway into Iran. The new British Minister in 
Tehran, Sir Walter Townley, was assured in August 1912 by the Iranian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs that the Mohammerah-Khorramabad line would benefit from 
the same advantages as the Jolfa-Tabriz line.136 In September, Grey announced to 
the Russians that Britain would shortly press for the granting of a concession for 
the Mohammerah-Khorramabad Railway, and Sazonov did not object. The 
Russians also began negotiations for the Jolfa-Tabriz line, which was then to lead 
to Ormiyeh.137 On 24 October 1912, the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
‘Al‘a al-Saltaneh, told Townley that his approval of the concession for the 
Mohammerah-Khorramabad line ‘would be given at the same time as that to 
Russia for the Julfa-Tabriz line.’138 Townley therefore expected in November 
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1912 that both governments would receive grants for concessions soon.139 The 
only problem was that ‘in the present political uncertainty (of Iran) it is very hard 
to get anyone to take decided action.’140  
Townley’s worry was right. The Iranian constitutional government with the  
Bakhtiyari khan, Samsam al-Saltaneh, as Prime Minister, was unpopular owing to 
resistance by local tribes in the South of Iran to the dominance of the Bakhtiyari 
khans.141 Townley warned the government that ‘a most serious situation might be 
created were a conflict to break out in Arabistan.’142  It might consequently 
largely hamper British trade, and also might have a significant effect upon the 
general situation in Iran. Protection of British interests was Townley’s main 
concern caused by the deteriorating Iranian domestic political situation. The 
Bakhtiyari government has received much criticism from scholars on this account. 
Garthwaite argues that the Khans were self-aggrandising,143 and Yapp comments 
that the Bakhtiyari Khans ‘paid themselves money to provide non-existent road 
guards.’ 144  These negative impressions were perhaps related to the Khans’ 
inability to control disputes with other tribes in the provinces,145 and especially 
their battles with Sheykh Khaz‘al from 1910, which may be put down to the 
desire of the Khans to impose their authority on Mohammerah and the Arab 
provinces,146 with which Britain also had close connections. There was no clear 
indication of where Iranian politics were leading, and Britain feared for the 
security of its interests in the area.  
On 27 January 1913, Townley telegraphed Grey again to say that the Iranian 
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government was prepared to grant the concession for the 
Mohammerah-Khorramabad line.147 The Jolfa-Tabriz concession was, however, 
signed on 6 February 1913, with a thirty-mile branch line to Ormiyeh.148 (Map 3) 
The signing took place after a change in the Iranian Cabinet in January 1913 after 
the resignation of Samsam al-Saltaneh,149 and the decision of Iran to agree to the 
Jolfa-Tabriz line was influenced by the need to seek the withdrawal of Russian 
troops in Qazvin and in Azerbaijan.150 The Jolfa-Tabriz concession was for 
seventy-five years, with the option of purchase by the Iranian government after 
thirty-five years.151 Although the concession for the Moammerah-Khorramabad 
line was signed on 10 February 1913, the British did not receive equal treatment 
with the Russians. This incident shows that Iran had difficulties of its own in 
treating the two powers evenly, owing to both domestic and foreign pressures.  
    The result of the railway concessions episode was a loss of prestige for 
Britain in Iran. However, Britain and Germany signed an agreement on the 
Baghdad Railway in 1914. In terms of Anglo-Iranian relations, despite the 
contract between the Persian Railways Syndicate and the Iranian government in 
1911, the two states were unable to reach any firm agreement at all on railways, 
owing largely to the Russian factor. Of course the unstable situation in the Iranian 
government made the development of Iranian railways insecure. Because of the 
outbreak of World War I, all the schemes for Iranian railways stopped for the time 
being.152  
     
Conclusion  
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Due to the rivalry between the major powers, even the impact of the Baghdad 
Railway project in the early twentieth century, the Potsdam Agreement of 1911, 
the contract between the Persian Railways Syndicate and the Iranian government 
in 1911, and the Trans-Persian Railway scheme in 1912, did not produce any 
specific progress on the Iranian railway issue by 1914. 
At the turn of the nineteenth century, generally, the failure to build railways 
was caused by commercial rivalry between Russia and Britain. However, Russia 
played a stronger role in the impasse than Britain by way of its 1890 veto on 
Iranian railway building, which, among other effects, had a long-term impact in 
blocking British trade and interests from stretching from southern into northern 
Iran. In comparison with the two powers, Iran itself was weak owing to its poor 
financial state, which prevented it from constructing railways itself in its own 
interests. With the expiry of the veto in 1910, Iran, Britain and Russia all had an 
opportunity to look for a chance to develop railways, and the contract with the 
Persian Railways Syndicate of Britain was an example of these attempts.  
    In terms of British policy in Iran, the issue of railways in the South-West of 
Iran, especially with the new oil interest, considerably gained in significance. This 
in turn affected Britain’s changing view of the centre of Iran, as compared to the 
marginal south-west in particular. Britain’s non-intervention policy gradually 
related only to affairs taking place in Tehran, and considerable intervention took 
place in the South-West of Iran. As Russia and Germany reached an understanding 
in the Potsdam Agreement in 1911, the British, at the same time, took steps to 
obtain a railway contract from the Iranian government, which focused on railways 
in the South-West of Iran. Despite the Russian assurance that the 1907 Convention 
would not be violated, Britain did not fully trust the Russians, nor feel that their 
rivalry had ceased.  
With regard to Iran, there was not a proper opportunity for the country to 
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develop railways. Under pressure from Britain and Russia, and Germany as well, 
all Iran could do was endeavour to maintain a balance of power. It was not only 
the insecure political climate after 1906 which made Iran more unstable. In terms 
of the granting of railway concessions to the British and Russian governments, the 
fact that Iran gave the British the final decision on their concession in 1913 three 
days later than the Russians was the result not only of changes in the Iranian 
cabinet, but also of the pressure exerted on Iran by the Russian troops in Qazvin 
and in Azerbaijan. The decision therefore had an impact on British prestige. 
Germany, too, was an influence in the Iranian railway question. Although the 
German Baghdad Railway scheme had not actually included a planned route into 
Iran, Britain and Russia were both concerned over the possibility of the railway 
leading to a major German impact on Iran. Negotiations between Britain and 
Germany bore no fruit, but Russia did in 1911 sign the Potsdam Agreement with 
Germany, which guaranteed that the latter had no intention of constructing 
railways in Iran, and accepted a line from the Ottoman-Iranian border to Tehran 
built by Russia. Russia did not intend to damage the interests of the Entente, even 
if it was determined to advance its own interests in particular; it did not leave 
behind the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, even if it used it to its advantage; 
and Russia certainly did not want to give Germany any advantage. Russia 
intended to contain Germany’s influence to Iran in general, and in relation to 
Russia’s prestige in northern Iran in particular. Nevertheless the Potsdam 
Agreement represented, to some extent, some conciliation of Germany at the 
expense of British interests. From the point of view of Germany, it should be 
noted that, despite the Potsdam Agreement, there was an element of pragmatism 
in the German attitude to an area where Britain and Russia were so entrenched.  
    The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 remained important too. The 
Convention provided an opportunity for cooperation between Britain and Russia 
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in terms of Iranian affairs, such as the railways issue. Each, however, could 
interpret the Convention to their own advantage. Britain used the articles of the 
1907 Convention to guarantee that their railway scheme applications in the 
South-West of Iran and the neutral zone, would not be opposed by the Russians. 
Russia in the Potsdam Agreement of 1911 used the concept of the Russian zone to 
secure its interests there whilst advancing its connections with Germany against 
the wishes of the British. However, the Convention did not resolve all their mutual 
differences. The negotiations for the lines of the Trans-Persian Railway in 1912 
between the British and the Russians could not be settled then due to Britain’s 
opposition to the lines passing through the British zone. The Anglo-Russian 
Convention of 1907, therefore became less a means of ensuring Britain and 
Russia would not come to conflict in Iran at the time of a possible war in Europe, 
than a means whereby they negotiated over their mutual interests, and their 
particular concerns in their own zones, at the expense of Iran.  
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Chapter V Disputes over the Ottoman-Iranian Border 
and the Involvement of Britain 1905-1914 
 
Introduction 
    The Ottoman-Iranian border was a subject of controversy from the sixteenth 
century, and several treaties failed to settle the issue of a definite border. From the 
nineteenth century Britain, and Russia, also became involved in ongoing 
discussions. A serious dispute arose in 1905 only ended with a border line being 
delimited at the outbreak of the First World War after countless negotiations. 
Britain was concerned to settle the issue owing to its interests in the south-west of 
Iran, i.e. oil. In the process, the Ottoman-Iranian issue became a multiple country 
issue, involving the Ottoman Empire, Iran, and Britain, and Russia as well. It was 
complicated by the long historical legacy of border disputes and in turn created 
further problems for the later twentieth century both in relations between Iran and 
Iraq, and questions of broad international politics relating to oil.  
    On the Ottoman-Iranian border lived numerous tribes which moved across 
from one area to another.1 The two governments were well aware that loyalty 
from tribes could not be taken for granted.2 An approximate demarcation of the 
Ottoman-Iranian border was agreed in the Treaty of Zohab in 1639, which 
covered a broad zone stretching from Armenia and Azerbaijan in the north, 
including the western Zagros mountains, and reaching the Persian Gulf coast near 
Mohammerah in the south.3 (Map 4) The two countries, however, remained in 
                                                 
1
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dispute over the border, and exercised haphazard jurisdiction in the area.4 Then, 
in the eighteenth century, foreign factors became intertwined in the dispute. In 
1723, Russia, which was looking to expand its influence in the Caucasus, 
collaborated with Tahmasp, the son of the last Safavid ruler, Shah Soltan Hosein, 
in preventing the Ottomans from occupying the Caucasus and the Caspian area. In 
return for this assistance, Iran was obliged to cede Darband, Baku and the 
provinces of Gilan, Mazandaran and the southern Caspian shores to Russia.5 In 
1724, however, the Ottoman Empire and Russia went on to negotiate a treaty that 
allowed the Ottoman Empire to extend its area of control into parts of Iran, such 
as Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kurdistan, and including the important Iranian cities 
of Kermanshah, Hamadan and Tabriz.6 In the following decades, though Nader 
Khan (later Shah), a powerful Iranian military commander, regained most of the 
abovementioned territory from the Russians and the Ottomans, including Georgia 
in 1735.7 The Ottoman-Iranian border was then settled approximately according 
to its previous boundaries by the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin in 1746, which generally 
retained the same stipulations as the 1639 Treaty.8 The Qajars, a new Iranian 
dynasty established at the turn of the eighteenth century, inherited the dispute with 
the Ottomans.9 Between 1821 and 1823 there was a war between Iran and the 
Ottoman Empire which was eventually won by Iran. Hostilities were ended by the 
Treaty of Erzerum of 1823, which maintained the territorial status quo as 
established by the 1746 Treaty.10  
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    In the first half of the nineteenth century, Britain became involved in the 
issue, within the context of the rivalry between Britain and Russia in which Iran 
played the role of buffer state. Britain considered that further clashes between Iran 
and the Ottoman Empire in south-western Iran, in areas such as Mohammerah, 
would weaken the security of its commercial and strategic interests in the area and 
in the Persian Gulf as a whole.  It further considered that its commercial interests 
from the eastern Mediterranean to Mesopotamia, including the Tigris and the 
Shatt al-Arab, would be affected.11 In 1834 Britain and Russia agreed with regard 
to the integrity of Iran that it would be beneficial for the two powers to act ‘with 
regard to the affairs of Persia, in the same spirit’, and be ‘equally animated by a 
sincere desire to maintain, not only the internal tranquility, but also the 
independence and integrity of Persia.’12 This was put into practice after the 
Ottoman foray into Mohammerah in 1837, which led the two powers to establish a 
joint Anglo-Russian border commission in 1843. Thereafter further negotiations 
led to the (Second) Treaty of Erzerum in 1847, (Map 5) which focused on the 
western and southern sections of the border, such as Zohab, Soleymanieh, 
Mohammerah and the Shatt al-Arab. In Article 2, Iran was granted the 
mountainous eastern part of Zohab, while the Ottoman Empire had the western 
part and the lands on the plain. In addition, Iran gave up the province of 
Soleymanieh, though it maintained control over Mohammerah and the eastern 
bank of the Shatt al-Arab.13 Article 4, on the other hand, granted Britain and 
Russia the right to influence subsequent developments stipulating that the 
Ottoman Empire and Iran had to settle all disputes with ‘the acceptance of the 
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friendly suggestions of the two great mediating States.’14 The Treaty of Erzerum 
of 1847, therefore, provided Britain and Russia with the right to be involved in the 
Ottoman-Iranian border issue.  
Yet, many local inhabitants were forced to move owing to the border 
demarcation, and consequently complained.15 A further irony lay in a British 
commissioner’s observation was that the border had actually not been specified, 
which necessitated more discussion regarding the exact spot where Ottoman 
territory ended and Iranian began.16 The mediation was in tune with Britain’s aim 
of protecting its commercial and strategic interests in the area, and of keeping to a 
minimum any disturbances that might be caused by Ottoman-Iranian rivalry. And 
in 1848, an Explanatory Note (the 1848 Note henceforth) was added, in the name 
of the Ottoman Empire. The most important part of the 1848 Note was the 
following:  
 
The undersigned Representatives are further in agreement with the Ottoman 
Minister in the view that, in ceding to Persia in the region in question the city, 
port and anchorage of Muhammara (Mohammerah) and the island of Khizr 
(Abadan Island), the Sublime Porte (The Ottoman Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs) is not ceding any other territory or any other ports there may be in 
this region. The undersigned Representatives further declare that Persia will 
not be entitled on any pretext whatsoever to put forward claims in regard to 
the regions situate on the eastern bank of the Shatt-al-Arab, or to the territory 
on the left bank belonging to Turkey, even where Persian tribes or parts of 
                                                 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Keneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt (ed), British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Report and 
Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part I, Volume 18, University Prince of 
America, 1985, p. 427.  
16
 Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, ‘Fragile Frontiers: The Diminishing Domains of Qajar Iran,’ 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 (May, 1997), p. 215. 
 178
such tribes are established on the said bank or in the said territory.17 
 
The implication here was that the Ottoman Empire was in full control of the 
whole river, except for Mohammerah and Abadan Island.18 As far as the Iranians 
were concerned, the 1848 Note was in direct violation of the Erzerum Treaty of 
1847, as it allowed the Ottoman Empire to obtain the upper eastern part of the 
Shatt al-Arab from Iran.19 The 1848 Note then was signed by the Iranian envoy, 
Mirza Mohammad ‘Ali Khan, but the Iranian government considered that he had 
no authority to do so,20 given that Iran had in fact not concurred with the 1848 
Note. 
    Another serious ongoing dispute took place at Qutur. The Ottoman 
commissioner, Dervish Pasha, seized Qutur four or five days after the signing of 
the 1847 Treaty, and put up pillars with inscriptions claiming that that the cities of 
Khoi, Tabriz and Ormiyeh were the possessions of the Ottoman Empire.21 
Dervish Pasha’s map left an important source for the Ottomans on which to base 
their arguments on the border issue later. The importance of the Qutur area lay in 
its location, which was close to the city of Khoi and also afforded easy access to 
Tabriz and Ormiyeh. 22  The Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Moshir 
al-Dowleh, argued that seizing of Qutur contravened the 1847 Treaty.23 In April 
1865, the British and the Russians agreed that:  
 
the maps should be placed in the hands of the Turkish and Persian 
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Governments, with an expression of opinion, on the part of the two 
mediating Powers; the line of the boundary must be found within the limits 
traced on the map; and the two Mahomedan Powers should themselves mark 
out the line of boundary, and, in the event of any difference arising between 
them, in regard to any particular locality, that the points in dispute should be 
referred to the Governments of Great Britain and Russia.24  
 
The two powers thus left the final decision to Iran and the Ottoman Empire, but 
again secured their own prestige and interest. In August 1869, a further agreement 
was concluded by Britain and Russia, stating that, pending the settlement of the 
disputed boundary, the status quo of the border should be maintained, and that no 
new buildings should be erected in the disputed territories.25 Iran, on the other 
hand, believed that as the map enshrined a similar solution to that of the 
mid-1840s, it embodied the best solution for the border.26 On the whole, Iran had 
been accommodating as regards the border in the mid-nineteenth century. 
    The Qutur issue was to come up again later on. In 1875 Iran and the Ottoman 
Empire tried to alleviate problems over the border through an agreement 
according to which the Iranians renounced their claim to Qutur, and the Ottomans 
abandoned theirs to the area around Mohammerah.27 This solution was not, 
however, favoured by Russia. Disturbances in the Balkans in 1877, and the 
Ottoman Empire’s rejection of the proposed settlement for the area, caused Russia 
to declare war on the Ottomans.28 Iran, under Russian influence, placed small 
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detachments of troops on the Ottoman-Iranian border, in order to divert Ottoman 
troops.29 After the end of the war in 1878, the Treaty of San Stefano was signed 
in March of the same year. In Article XVIII, it touched on the Ottoman-Iranian 
border issue, stating for example that ‘the Sublime Porte will take into serious 
consideration the opinion pronounced by the Commissioners of the mediating 
Powers on the subject of the possession of the town of Khotour, and undertakes to 
have the labours of the definitive demarcation of the Turco-Russian frontier 
executed.’30 The Article warned the Ottomans over asserting their claims on 
possession of Qutur. In July 1878, the whole of the Treaty of San Stefano was 
revised, and renamed the Treaty of Berlin. Article LX of this Treaty, stipulated 
that ‘the Sublime Porte cedes to Persia the town and territory of Qutur, as fixed by 
the mixed Anglo-Russian Commission for the delimitation of the frontiers of 
Turkey and of Persia.’31 Article LX of the Treaty of Berlin stipulated the cession 
of the Qutur area to Iran by the Ottoman Empire, but it is true that the latter had to 
accept Article LX against its wishes.32 The episode did not mean that Russia was 
on the side of Iran, but simply that the deteriorated relations between the 
European powers and the Ottoman Empire had an impact on the border issue.  
    The above provides a background to the Ottoman-Iranian border issue before 
the twentieth century. Iran made efforts to negotiate with the Ottomans but 
generally the latter were more aggressive on the subject. Iran at the time was 
under a new dynasty, which had lost battles with Russia in the early nineteenth 
century, and perhaps the central administration was not strong enough to deal with 
their arguments with the Ottomans. The Ottomans, on the other hand, looked for 
any opportunity for expansion.  
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    Modern Iranian-Iraqi relations over the Shatt al-Arab have led scholars to 
study the history of the Ottoman-Iranian border disputes from this perspective. In 
his article ‘The Shatt Al-‘Arab Boundary Dispute,’33 Alexander Melamid looks at 
the issue from an economic point of view and as a background to oil development. 
He points out that in 1826, the British wanted to develop their steamboat transport 
along the Tigris, and so pressed both Iranian and Ottoman governments to 
establish a clearly defined boundary. When oil was struck successfully in Iran in 
1908, the shipping of both oil and equipment increased at the mouth of the Karun 
river and the Shatt al-‘Arab outside Mohammerah, which led to the need for the 
Iranian and Ottoman governments to again define their border in order to secure 
their own oil interests. Vahé J. Sevian, in ‘The Evolution of the Boundary between 
Iraq and Iran,’34 argues that one reason for the importance of the Shatt al-Arab in 
the twentieth century was the discovery of oil in the sea bed of the Persian Gulf, 
which brought with it the extension into the Gulf of the sea border between Iran 
and the Ottoman Empire. Lawrence G. Potter, in his ‘The Evolution of the 
Iran-Iraq Border,’35 looks at the background of the border issue between Iraq and 
Iran from the Ottoman period up to 1914, before the creation of Iraq in 1920. 
Potter argues that the Treaty of Erzerum of 1847 was the first European-style 
treaty between the two Islamic states in which Britain and Russia intervened. Till 
1913, by the Istanbul Protocol of 1913, Ottoman sovereignty over the Shatt-e 
al-Arab was confirmed. The Ottomans also obtained some of the Zohab region to 
the west of Kermanshah, holding rich oil fields.  
There are also several studies on the Ottoman-Iranian border in articles by 
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Richard Schofield. In ‘The Evolution of the Shatt Al-’Arab International 
Boundary in International Law,’36 Schofield gives a short description of the 
events of the period between 1847 and 1911. In regard to the said period, 
Schofield argues that the 1847 Treaty was a success for the British as far as the 
South-West of Iran was concerned. After the establishment of navigation of the 
Karun river from Mohammerah to Ahvaz, effective Iranian control of the area 
increased owing to Britain’s administrative and technical assistance. In his 
‘Interpreting a Vague River Boundary Delimitation: The 1847 Erzerum Treaty and 
the Shatt al-Arab before 1913,’37 Schofield claims that Britain’s mediation line of 
1850 running along the middle of the Shatt al-Arab was also an interpretation of 
the 1847 Erzerum Treaty, but in the early twentieth century the British Foreign 
Office had to take other factors, such as recognition of the interests of local people 
on the border into consideration. In ‘Narrowing the Frontier: Mid-Nineteenth 
Century Efforts to Delimit and Map the Perso-Ottoman Border,’38 Schofield 
argues that a change of demarcation of the traditional Ottoman-Iranian border 
from a zone to a mappable line appeared with the mediation of Britain and Russia 
from 1843 to 1876. The most important result was a map in 1869 by Britain and 
Russia that ‘executed on a scale of one inch to a mile, covering the entire length 
of the borderlands between the 30th and 40th degrees of latitude from the Persian 
Gulf in the south to the high drainage divides of the Caucasus mountains in the 
north.’ Although there were disputes lasting for a few more years, this map was a 
significant proof for the delimitation of the Ottoman-Iranian border.  
Sabri Ateş’s book, The Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands: Making a Boundary, 
1843-1914,39 with Turkish documents, displayed a broad history of the border 
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dispute between the two Islamic powers. The author argues that, when the 
Ottomans and Iranians had a further dispute over their border in the early 
twentieth century, the dispute was not constant as the two Islamic countries were 
always conscious of their mutual opponent, Russia. When the Iranians feared a 
threat from Russia crossing the border, they needed the Ottomans as an ally. 
However, the author also emphasizes that the local inhabitants who did not favour 
Iran’s revolutionary movement sought the assistance of the Ottomans, which gave 
the Ottomans an advantage. Burcu Kurt, also using Ottoman documents, discusses 
disputes between the Ottomans and Iranians over the Shatt al-Arab in ‘Contesting 
Foreign Policy: Disagreement between the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Ministry of War on the Shatt al-Arab Dispute with Iran, 1912-1913.’40 
Kurt argues that the Ottomans altered their policy on the Ottoman-Iranian border 
between 1912 and 1913 as a result of changes within the Ottoman polity. The 
Ottomans were insisting, contrary to British demands, on obtaining the Shatt-e 
al-Arab and its neighbourhoods in 1912, but after a coup in 1913, the new and 
weak government agreed to resolve the Shatt-e al-Arab question in accordance 
with British policy. 
Given their purpose of providing nineteenth century background to a later 
twentieth century dispute over the Shatt al-Arab, these studies do not look in 
detail at what took place in the early twentieth century. Although Ateş’s study 
covers the period that this chapter is going to explore, it does not see the border 
issue in the context of Anglo-Iranian relations. This chapter, then, will look at the 
series of disputes over the Ottoman-Iranian border in the early twentieth century 
up to the start of World War I, also examining the influence of Britain and the 
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broader dimension of Anglo-Iranian relations.  
     
1. Ottoman occupation and negotiations in the early twentieth 
century 
a. The Ottoman occupation of the border in 1905-1906 
    In September 1905, Ottoman troops occupied villages and towns belonging 
to Iran along the Ottoman-Iranian border, from Bayazid south to Vazneh.41 In 
October, Ottoman troops occupied Lahidjan (Lajan) and Vazneh, in Savojbolagh. 
This was due to an ongoing dispute in which the Ottomans had argued many times 
that troops sent by the Iranian government to Lajan were considered to be a 
military threat to the border. Iran, on the other hand, replied that the troops were 
there to collect revenue and maintain security, rather than for any aggressive 
action. On the other hand, Russia was weakened by its defeat in the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and the 1905 Revolution. The disturbance on the 
Ottoman-Iranian border was close to the Russian border, but the Russians were 
not strong enough to deal with the question. Meanwhile, Britain and Russia were 
also involved in the process of negotiations to contain Germany in Europe. It 
could be understood that in 1905 the Ottomans used the chance to transgress the 
border.42  
    On 10 October 1905, the British Consul-General in Tabriz, A. C. Wratislaw, 
claimed that the areas that the Ottomans had occupied were part of the dominion 
of Iran, even though the border had never been properly demarcated.43 On 12 
October 1905, the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Moshir al-Dowleh, asked 
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the British to assist the Iranian Ambassador in Istanbul, Arf‘a al-Dowleh, with this 
matter. 44  However, there was no result. In December 1905, the Ottoman 
government proposed a mixed commission to examine the issue, and the Ottoman 
Sultan stated that their troops were not to be withdrawn until the mixed 
commission had arrived at a decision.45 Three days later the Iranian government 
replied firmly that according to:  
 
Article III of the last Treaty of Erzeroum (1847) the two parties agreed to 
abstain from claiming this territory, and at the time this Treaty was concluded 
Vazne, Lahijan, Serdesht, and other places were in (under) Persian 
occupation, as was clearly established when the Commissioners of the Four 
Powers visited the locality.46  
 
The places mentioned in this statement were in fact not explicitly mentioned in 
the 1847 Treaty but it was implied that they belonged to Iran in Article II, which 
stated that Iran obtained the lands of the eastern part of the province of Zohab 
from the Ottoman Empire. Arf‘a al-Dowleh telegraphed the Iranian government, 
on 21 December, accepting the Ottoman proposal and not insisting on the 
withdrawal of the Ottoman troops.47 This did not mean that he had succumbed to 
the Ottomans, but that he was simply attempting to obtain an opportunity to 
negotiate on the border issue. On 29 December, the Ottoman government 
continued to insist that the proposed commission should come to a decision before 
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the troops were withdrawn. 48  Moshir al-Dowleh strongly objected to this, 
asserting that ‘the Persian Government were not prepared to consent to the 
formation of a Mixed Commission to inquire into the Turco-Persian frontier 
dispute until the districts of Lahijan and Vazneh had been evacuated by the 
Ottoman troops.’49 However, Moshir al-Dowleh’s insistence was not supported 
by the British and Russian Ambassadors in Istanbul, N. R. O’Conor and Ivan A. 
Zinoviev. They preferred to obtain a satisfactory solution via negotiations rather 
than opposition. 
On 7 April 1906, O’Conor changed his mind and decided to take further 
measures on the border issue, as the Ottomans had by now advanced as far as 
Pasaveh and Dasht, which were undoubtedly in Iranian territory.50 Zinoviev felt 
the same. The Sultan insisted that the places his troops had reached were within 
his territory, a statement strongly opposed by Zinoviev.51 On 23 April, O’Conor 
suggested that Arf‘a al-Dowleh should inform the Sultan’s Secretary, Izzet Pasha, 
that he would advise Mozaffar al-Din Shah ‘to send Commissioners to Passova, 
on condition that the Sultan will promise that on their arrival the Ottoman troops 
shall be withdrawn within the zone in dispute and proceed with the delimitation of 
the frontier.’52 However, the British Foreign Secretary, Grey, gave no further 
instruction, and meanwhile Russia did not take action on the Ottoman-Iranian 
border,53 presumably because it was embroiled in revolution. The Ottomans thus 
advantages over the disputed area.54 O’Conner still tried to find an opportunity to 
ease the tension by telling the Ottomans their ‘persistence in a policy which 
menaced the preservation of order, not only in Persia but also in the regions of the 
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Persian Gulf, could not be viewed by us (Britain) with indifference.’55 In My 
1906, O’Conor communicated two proposals to the Ottomans:  
 
The first was to the effect that the Porte should agree to refer the whole 
question to the arbitration of the two mediating Powers, and the second that a 
joint Turco-Persian Commission should meet, and that, in the event of their 
being unable to come to an Agreement, the Porte should accept the 
Anglo-Russian Protocol of 1865.56  
 
O’Conor had some justification for this argument, as the 1865 Protocol also stated 
that ‘the two Mahommedan Governments should themselves mark out the line.’57 
In fact, the 1869 map made up by Britain and Russia had not solved the border 
dispute owing to lacking of reliable data, and erroneous judgments. In Firoozeh 
Kashani-Sabet’s view, even the British and the Russians did not actually agree on 
the matter.58  
     Beyond dispatching an Iranian commission to Pasaveh on 18 May 1906, 
Iran was not in any case conciliatory on the border issue at this stage. The 
Ottoman Grand Vizier claimed that a commissioner, Zekki Pasha, would be sent, 
but he was not authorised to reach any settlement.59 The Ottomans thus showed 
that they had no will to deal with this issue with Iran. By 18 August 1906, the 
Ottomans had begun to collect taxes in the area that they had occupied.60 Moshir 
al-Dowleh told Spring-Rice, the British Minister in Tehran, that Iran was 
disappointed that Britain and Russia were not providing help.  
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    Nevertheless, negotiations between Iran and the Ottoman Empire began in 
early October 1906. The Ottoman Empire stated that the River Lahan was to be 
their proposed border line, which ‘would give Turkey Old Lahijan, Vezne, Naalen, 
Fakir, and other important places.’61 Grey considered that the proposed line, the 
River Lahan, would be susceptible to dispute because it was not covered by the 
Anglo-Russian Protocol of 1865.62 Eventually, the Iranian commission decided 
not to accept the River Lahan line,63 and on 21 November 1906, it proposed 
Kandil Dagh as the border between Iran and the Ottoman Empire, which made 
Vazeh a part of Iran. This proposal was rejected by the Ottoman commission.64 
Meanwhile there were more reports from Ormiyeh that many Ottoman troops had 
passed through villages in the disputed area.65 Up to the end of 1906, therefore, 
nothing had been achieved.66  
 
b. The withdrawal of Ottoman troops in 1907 
    Half a year later, the border dispute arose again. On 9 June 1907, Ormiyeh 
was occupied by Ottoman troops,67 and Iranian forces also fought Ottoman ones 
at Mandali on 13 June.68 Disputes this time took place in a broader area covering 
both the northern and southern sections of the border. O’Conor learned from the 
Ottoman Grand Vizier that their border was under disturbance by Iranian tribes, 
and the Ottomans claimed that they had no intention of encroaching on Iranian 
territory.69 The Grand Vizier then suggested setting up a mixed Ottoman-Iranian 
commission to investigate the recent disturbances.70 Grey instructed O’Conor to 
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urge the Ottoman Empire to withdraw their troops completely.71 On 17 August 
1907, the Ottoman Sultan replied to O’Conor that ‘there had been no act of 
aggression committed except by the Persians, who had crossed the frontier and 
pillaged the country, and that the Turks had occupied no place not heretofore 
under Ottoman jurisdiction.’72 O’Conor disagreed with this statement. In his view, 
‘there could be no doubt whatsoever that such places as Mergevar, Sujboulak, and 
the district of Baradost and village of Ban, close to Urumia, were well within 
Persian territory.’ 73  The Sultan did not fully accept O’Conor’s reply, and 
instructed a commission to investigate the disputed area, in order to decide 
whether to withdraw or not. On 18 August, Mohammad ‘Ali Shah agreed to the 
Sultan’s proposal of a commission, but he wanted Britain and Russia to join the 
commission.74 Grey did not accept Iran’s invitation directly, saying rather that it 
would be better to wait to see the results of the Ottoman-Iranian border 
commission just in case it failed.75 Isvolsky, the Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, did not object to Iran’s suggestion either, but he doubted whether the 
commission could reach a satisfactory outcome.76 Both the British and Russian 
governments therefore maintained a reserved attitude to the proposed commission.  
    On 24 August 1907, a telegraph from the British consul in Ormiyeh, H. F. 
Stevens, reported a statement by Ottoman troops that ‘we have no orders to return; 
whenever we are ordered to do so, we shall of course obey. And we do not think 
that such (an) order will be forthcoming, for sixty years ago these districts formed 
part of Turkish territory, ……’77 The Ottoman Grand Vizier also said to O’Conor 
that he:  
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had strongly advocated the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the places 
recently occupied outside the contested zone, but that the Minister of War, 
basing himself on Dervish Pasha’s map, refused to admit that the places 
occupied were in Persian territory or outside the zone.78  
 
Iran, therefore, refused to send a commission to meet the Ottoman commissioners 
if the Ottoman Empire did not withdraw its troops.79  
    At that time, Britain had two concerns with the border issue. The first was 
the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which agreed a Russian zone in northern 
Iran, a British one in the south, and a neutral one in the centre. Generally the two 
powers agreed their role in the development of Iran remained economic rather 
than political. The main disputed areas of the Ottoman-Iranian border were 
included within the Russian zone. Grey telegraphed O’Conor, declaring that, ‘we 
have just signed a Convention with Russia agreeing to respect the integrity and 
independence of Persia. If the Turkish advance continues, as is probable, unless 
checked by energetic representations, it will create a most difficult situation for 
the Russian Government, and indirectly for ourselves.’80 Thus, Britain in fact had 
no right to engage in disputes in northern part of the border. Britain had another 
preoccupation, however, and that was the Mesopotamian oil fields, which led to 
Britain being involved in the southern part. O’Conor considered that a mixed 
commission of Britain, Russia, Iran, and the Ottoman Empire to deal with the 
issue might be rejected by the Ottomans. This would make the border issue even 
more difficult to deal with and ‘will leave a feeling of great irritation which will 
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seriously militate against our general interests, especially the Mesopotamian 
oil-fields.’81 Eventually, a new development emerged. After the discussion on 17 
September 1907 between O’Conor, the Ottoman Sultan, Izzet Pasha, and the 
Ottoman Grand Vizier, the British concluded that the Sultan had been misled by 
Izzet Pasha into thinking that there had been no encroachment on Persian 
territory. 82  The Grand Vizier promised that any Ottoman troops would be 
withdrawn soon. 
 
c. Disturbances and the Ottoman-Iranian commission: 1907-1908 
    In September 1907, Spring-Rice, the British Minister, and Hartwig, the 
Russian Minister, in Tehran urged Moshir al-Dowleh to appoint immediately an 
Iranian commissioner to deal with the border dispute.83 Meanwhile, Wratislaw, 
who as Consul of Ormiyeh was assigned to deal with the border dispute, asked the 
Ottoman commissioner, Tahir Pasha, to deal with any requests of the Iranian 
commission on their arrival, and to follow the 1869 map.84 O’Conor claimed that 
he had ‘no desire to see an inch of His Imperial Majesty’s (the Ottoman Empire) 
territory transferred to Persia, just as he is far from wishing that an inch of Persian 
territory should, in violation of the status quo, be occupied by Ottoman troops.’85 
This statement represented that a main concern of Britain’s was over Iran’s 
integrity and independence. Thus, Spring-Rice in Tehran, Wratislaw at Ormiyeh 
and O’Conor in Istanbul all made efforts to maintain Britain’s policy to Iran, and 
the 1869 map was considered as the only significant source as regards the border 
issue. Iran was in agreement with Britain on this. On 7 October, however, the 
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Iranian President of the Majles expressed a preference for strong measures 
involving military resistance to the Ottomans. Marling thought otherwise, and 
considered such action to be disastrous.86 Of course from Iran’s point of view the 
help of Britain was essential and the British wished to mediate in the border issue, 
but any decision related to it had sensitive implications, and in particular the 
British not want to see the situation deteriorate into armed conflict.   
    The disturbances worsened when Ottoman troops made an attack on 
Savojbolagh on 21 January 1908, which Grey described as ‘the most distinctly 
aggressive act the Turks have as yet committed’.87 Though the area was close to 
the Russian border, Isvolsky, told Nicolson, the British Ambassador in St. 
Petersburg, that so far he had received no evidence of an imminent Ottoman 
attack on Savojbolagh. 88  The Russian Prime Minister, Pyotr Arkadyevich 
Stolypin, preferred to adhere to a strictly defensive policy in dealing with the 
Ottomans instead of taking military action.89 Russia was inactive, and so the 
Ottoman Empire had an opportunity to maintain their strong attitude on the border 
issue, denying that any attack had been carried out by their troops.90 The Ottoman 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mustafa Asim Turgut, assured Isvolsky that military 
preparation on the border ‘were actuated by no unfriendly spirit to, and in no wise 
directed against, Russia, and the Turkish Government wished to assure the 
Cabinet in St. Petersburgh of their pacific and friendly disposition.’91 On 29 
February some Ottoman troops were withdrawn from Savojbolagh,92 a gesture 
that clearly intended to show good will on the part of the Ottoman Empire towards 
Russia, in order to avoid their intervention, rather than towards Iran. 
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As regards the Ottoman-Iranian border negotiations in Istanbul during March 
1908, the two commissions did not come any closer at all. In the first account of 
the negotiations, the Ottoman commission argued that Iran had bound itself not to 
interfere with areas now referred to in treaties which had been signed previously, 
and so Iran’s interference in the disputed areas was not based on any rights. Iran, 
on the other hand, claimed that the 1847 Treaty was the only reference point for 
the current dispute.93 The Ottoman Empire, meanwhile, insisted that all treaties 
between the Ottoman Empire and Iran remained valid. In the second round of 
negotiations the Iranian commission continued to argue that according to the 1847 
Treaty, Iran had not encroached on any areas in Ottoman territory. The Ottoman 
commission criticised Iran for not being able to provide any substantive proof 
indicating the legitimacy of its claims that particular areas belonged to Iran, and 
merely claiming that Ottoman actions were unjustified. 94  Again, the two 
commissions did not in fact display any mutual understanding at all. 
Iran had its own difficulty, which was lack of proof. In a memorandum of 25 
March 1908, addressed to Moshir al-Dowleh by Mohtasham al-Soltaneh, the latter 
complained that the Ottomans had transparently ignored the stipulations of the 
1847 Treaty. However, Mohtasham al-Soltaneh admitted that it was difficult to 
adduce proof,95 and for this reason, Moshir al-Dowleh admitted that:  
 
The point which Mohtashem-es-Sultaneh appears to wish to make is that, so 
long as the Turks are in occupation of Persian territory—by which I presume 
he means the territory under Persian administration previous to the Turkish 
move on Lahijan and Vasneh—it will be impossible for the Persians to obtain 
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evidence in support of their (Iran’s) claim, or, in other words, 
Mohtashem-es-Sultaneh desires a return to the status quo ante, a quite 
impracticable proposition.96  
 
Without proofs, though, Iran could not sustain its position. Unfortunately Iran had 
no tradition of preserving documents in archives, and therefore the only 
documentary evidence at its disposal was that belonging to the British and the 
Russians. Yet, these two European powers took no action. Iran could do nothing 
effective. Meanwhile, a report from Van to the Iranian Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs stated that the situation was not at all favourable.97 On 26 April 1908, on 
the part of the Ottomans, Tahir Pasha argued that ‘parts only of the frontier are 
dealt with by the Treaty of 1847, so that earlier Treaties must be the basis of 
negotiations respecting the remainder,’ and that ‘the Agreement of 1869 (by 
Britain and Russia) as to the status quo was merely provisional.’98 On 1 July 1908, 
he claimed ‘all districts east of the status quo frontier (which was viewed as 
Iranian territory), basing this claim principally on long possession and Article 3 of 
the Treaty of Erzeroum.’ The Iranian commissioner demanded damages for the 
aggression of Turkish troops, and that the troops should be withdrawn,99 also 
claiming that the Iranian government was ready to adopt the measures necessary 
to repel any aggression and plunder, in accordance with Article 8 of the Erzerum 
Treaty of 1847.100 However, Tahir Pasha replied that ‘it was impossible for him to 
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ask the Porte to give him fresh instructions on a point which had already been 
settled, and which his present instructions covered.’101 As can be seen, there was 
thus no conciliation between the Ottoman and the Iranian commissions,102 and 
the Iranian commission kept claiming that the demarcation had been recognised 
since ancient times.103 
After the Ottoman Revolution of July 1908, Sir G. Lowther, the British 
Minister in Istanbul, was anxious that the new Ottoman regime might be 
unwilling to settle the border dispute.104 Lowther’s anxiety, though, was soon 
assuaged. On 22 August 1908, the Ottoman Grand Vizier decided to resolve the 
dispute with Iran, and subsequently indicated that he would send instructions to 
withdraw Ottoman troops from all areas which were incontestably in Iranian 
territory.105 It seemed that the 1908 revolution had caused the Ottoman Empire to 
change its attitude to the dispute over the Ottoman-Iranian border. As a result of 
this assurance, the British and Russian governments both believed that Iran could 
solve the dispute without the assistance of the two powers.106 For this reason, 
they no longer felt the need to discuss joint communications with the Ottoman 
government,107 and were inclined to leave the dispute to Iran and the Ottoman 
Empire alone.  
 
d. The formation of the Anglo-Russian commission: 1908-1911 
   On 27 August 1908, when the Ottoman commission left Ormiyeh, there was 
no defined border,108 and more disputes soon became apparent. Even though most 
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Ottoman troops were instructed by the Ottoman government to withdraw from the 
border on 30 August,109 military camps continued to be maintained in some areas. 
Tewfik Pasha, the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, claimed that ‘there is no 
intention of committing aggressions or encroachments on Persian territory, troops 
now stationed or subsequently to be stationed in the vicinity of the Persian border 
are destined solely to maintain the status quo, ……’110 In reality this referred to 
the developing Kurdish independence movement, which the Ottoman government 
of the Young Turks was determined to suppress.111 Arf‘a al-Dowleh in Istanbul 
argued that Ottoman troops had in fact invaded Iran, but the Ottoman Foreign 
Minister said that no harm at all had been done.112  
On 4 November 1908, ‘Ala‘ al-Saltaneh, the Iranian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, told Barclay, the British Minister in Tehran, that ‘although the Turkish 
troops have been diminished in certain points, no place has been evacuated, and 
further encroachments have been made on certain places, among which is the 
district of Baranduz (in west Azerbaijan) …….’113 The Ottoman Ambassador in 
Tehran informed Barclay that their movements on the border were for the 
protection of Ottoman subjects in Ormiyeh and Khoi rather than an advance into 
Iranian territory.114 News of the advance of Ottoman troops into Iranian territory 
remained in the following months. Ottoman troops were reported arriving in 
Dilman in the Salmas district in June 1909 and in Ormiyeh in July, when Iran was 
in a highly disturbed state owing to the abdication of Mohammad ‘Ali Shah, and 
in December, Mahmediyar. The purpose of the Ottoman troops at that time was 
partly to resist the attacks on Ottoman consuls by the Kurds, but their actions were 
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viewed by the Iranians as an encroachment on their territory. The reasons given by 
the Ottoman government, thus, in response to Iran’s protests were always that the 
Ottomans ‘had no intention of permanently occupying territory belonging to 
Persia,’115 and ‘have no desire to do more than protect their own subjects, and 
disclaim any intention of seeking territorial aggrandizement in Persia ……’116 In 
addition, the weakness of Iran also created an opportunity for Ottoman 
encroachment. Incidents of encroachment into Iranian territory at Ormiyeh, Khoi, 
Salmas, and Pasaveh were continuously reported by British consuls over the next 
few months. 
    The Ottoman government, though, had another proposal on the border issue, 
namely to submit the dispute to the Hague Tribunal.117 The existence of this 
Tribunal might account for the confidence with which the Ottoman Empire acted 
against the wishes of Britain and Russia on the matter of the Ottoman-Iranian 
border. It was also true that Germany made an impression as a strong power at the 
Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907,118 and the close relations in the early 
twentieth century between the Ottoman Empire and Germany in terms of the 
economy and in particular of railway construction might prove advantageous to 
the Ottomans at the Hague Tribunal. Grey professed not to understand why the 
submission of the border dispute to the Hague Tribunal might be the best way 
forward in search of a solution.119 In fact, Britain did not want to lose its prestige 
in the border issue, and neither did Russia. The two powers therefore decided to 
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assert more control over the border issue, in order to avoid loss of prestige. The 
objectives of the Anglo-Russian mission were to examine how far the occupied 
districts had been brought under Ottoman administration and the feeling of the 
local people towards the Ottomans; and to establish as far as possible what the de 
facto frontier in 1905 had been.120 ‘The de facto frontier in 1905’ here referred to 
the situation before the beginning of the whole dispute over the Ottoman-Iranian 
border in 1905, that is, before the Ottoman occupation of Vazneh and Lajan.  
Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire began to take action to oppose the 
Anglo-Russian border commission. The Ottoman Minister in Tehran wished to 
establish an Ottoman-Iranian commission on 1 May 1911. The Treaty of Erzerum 
in 1847 would be the basis for their negotiations, given its role in Iran’s claims in 
the previous negotiations. The two countries agreed to meet in Istanbul.121 To the 
Iranians, this meant that the Ottomans had eventually agreed to pay attention to 
the 1847 Treaty. Although this might have been a temporary strategy by the 
Ottoman Empire to conciliate Iran in order to win its support against the 
Anglo-Russian commission, Iran accepted the proposal to form a commission 
with the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman government purposely attempted to 
exclude the Anglo-Russian commission from any influence on the matter. The 
Ottoman Grand Vizier claimed that he did not see any useful purpose in the 
Anglo-Russian commission, as its claims regarding territory had not acquired any 
recognition.122 Given this situation, an Iranian report from Azerbaijan expressed 
the view that it seemed that no resolution was possible.123 The Ottoman Grand 
Vizier went on to claim that Iran would not be given permission to enter Ottoman 
territory with the Anglo-Russian commission,124 meaning that Britain and Russia 
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had to carry out the work of the commission themselves. When the Russians said 
that they expected Iran’s commissioners to be part of the Anglo-Russian 
commission, Iran declined.125  The Anglo-Russian commissioners, thus, duly 
arrived in Khoi on 15 June 1911.  
 
2. Signing of protocols and transfer of territories 
    With the commissions that Britain and Russia undertook from 1911, the 
Ottoman-Iranian border issue entered a stage of signing agreements. Obviously 
the two European powers needed to protect their interests in Iran over the border 
issue. Maintaining Iran’s independence and integrity had been a principle of 
British policy, agreed to by the Russians. It was also stipulated in the 
Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Nevertheless, as British interests came 
increasingly under challenge, notably in the Ottoman-Iranian border issue, as will 
be explored below, the principle of maintaining Iran’s independence and integrity 
was put to a challenge.  
 
a. The Protocol of Tehran in 1911  
Meetings in Tehran on the border issue between Iran and the Ottoman 
Empire took place in the second half of 1911. A protocol between the Ottoman 
ambassador in Tehran, H. Hassib, and the Iranian Minister for Foreign Office, 
Vusuq al-Dowleh, was signed in Tehran on 21 December 1911. This protocol 
agreed that a commission would meet at Istanbul, that the purpose of its final 
meeting would be to settle any disagreement on the basis of the Treaty of Erzerum 
of 1847, and that any remaining problems over the border would be submitted to 
the Hague Tribunal, if negotiations could not reach a successful conclusion within 
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six months.126 Although the idea of disputes being submitted to the Hague 
Tribunal was an Ottoman one, the 1847 Treaty was to be a reference for the border 
issue, which also fulfilled the wishes of Iran. Mos‘ud Kuhestani-Nejad comments 
that this was a sign that the Ottoman Empire and Iran were finally resolving their 
nineteenth-century disputes, which was very significant.127 It was not the end of 
the border dispute, but at least the protocol gave the possibility of a breakthrough.  
Grey, though, preferred to try and reach a settlement in Istanbul before the 
expiry date, because it would be undesirable, in his view, for the dispute to go to 
the Hague Tribunal. 128  Grey’s insistence on reaching a resolution of the 
Ottoman-Iranian border issue is clear from the way that Britain, as well as Russia, 
attempted to use their prestige to resolve Ottoman-Iranian differences. The Iranian 
delegates thus arrived in Istanbul on 10 March 1912, with discussion sessions on 
the border issue to begin a week later.129 With regard to submission to the Hague 
Tribunal, Buchanan in St. Petersburg was aware that the Ottomans were collating 
their documents, while the Iranians did not have any to support their case.130 The 
bombardment of the Majlis in June 1908 had led to the loss of Iran’s own copies 
of material relevant to the Treaty of Erzerum of 1847.131 This circumstance was 
still advantageous to the Ottomans.  
 
b. Disputes over Mohammerah and the involvement of the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company 
During the negotiations at Istanbul in early 1912, in which the Ottoman, 
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Iranian, British, and Russian delegates took part, the 1848 Note (regarding 
Mohammerah and the Shatt al-Arab) was then the subject of discussion. From the 
beginning of the negotiations in 1912, the Iranian delegates argued that their 
government had no knowledge of the 1848 Note, but in the following sittings they 
were under pressure to accept its premises. On the other hand, the 1848 Note was 
not mentioned in the Protocol of Tehran in 1911, which stipulated only that the 
1847 Treaty formed the basis for the border. This was probably related to 
arguments between Britain and the Ottoman Empire on the subject of their 
respective interests in the Baghdad-Gulf railway line, on which there had been no 
agreement,132 and therefore the Ottomans were using the Iranian border issue to 
bring pressure on Britain by other means. The 1848 Note eventually did, though, 
have an impact on the Ottoman-Iranian border in to the Mohammerah area and in 
connection with the APOC, and this will be discussed below. This area was close 
to Britain’s oil works in Iran, and therefore at this point Britain was paying closer 
attention to the 1848 Note. 
 
(a) Mohammerah 
Mohammerah became specifically involved in the border issue in January 
1908, when encroachment by Ottoman troops in the Ottoman-Iranian border area 
spread southwards. Sheykh Khaz‘al, the Sheykh of Mohammerah, was unhappy 
that the Iranian government had not provided him with any supplies with which to 
deal with the Ottoman encroachment,133 and Britain, meanwhile, was concerned 
with Mohammerah because of its long and traditional relationship with the area. 
Grey telegraphed the following to O’Conor in Istanbul 
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In this district (Mohammerah) His Majesty’s Government are not prepared to 
recognize any other frontier than that laid down by the mediating 
Commissioners in 1850, as indicated in red (Map 6, the black bold line) on 
the accompanying sketch map; and …… the Turkish Government laid no 
claim whatever to Mohammerah.134  
 
The red line (the black bold line) drawn by Britain and Russia on the map 
represented their mediation between Iran and the Ottoman Empire, and it showed 
that Grey was attempting to protect Mohammerah from involvement in the border 
issue. In May 1909 a report by Lieutenant Wilson referred to the 1869 map and 
stated that no border had been marked on it because the two mediating powers 
claimed that the two states, Iran and the Ottoman Empire, should mark the border 
themselves.135 On the Ottoman side, the government claimed that ‘the town of 
Mohammerah only is Persian territory, but not on good authority,’136 implying 
that the Ottomans could have authority over the Mohammerah area. According to 
the British Consul in Mohammerah, W. McDouall, the Ottomans were claiming 
that they had the right to collect duties in Mohammerah, as the town was not 
recognised as Iranian by the Treaty of Erzerum of 1847.137  
The discovery of oil in the South-West of Iran in May 1908 constituted an 
additional, and important, reason why the British had become more concerned 
with the southern part of the Ottoman-Iranian border. In July 1909, the APOC also 
signed an agreement with the Sheykh for to lay pipelines and construct refineries. 
Obviously, the British needed their interests, such as oil, in the area secured. 
According to Wilson’s survey in March 1910,  
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The mediating commissioners’ line strikes the Shatt-el-Arab on the east 
bank ……, thus placing the sheikh’s court-house and official quarters at this 
point in Turkish territory, and giving to Turkey the control of the head of this 
important canal on which extensive date groves depend. Even the sheikh’s 
palace …… and his two other residences …… would all fall in Turkish 
territory.138  
 
It seems clear that the line drawn up by the mediating powers (in 1850) was not 
taken seriously by the local people. Grey’s preoccupation was with protecting the 
integrity of Mohammerah from Ottoman claims to sovereignty over it or any part 
of it. It was vital to the British to maintain the goodwill of Sheykh Khaz‘al. In 
addition, some relevant documents and maps dating from 1850 ‘were lost in an 
accident (in 1851) which occurred at the mouth of the Thames to the ship which 
was bringing them to England,’139 and had never been recovered.140 In August 
1910, Grey claimed that ‘His Majesty’s Government should insist on the 
recognition of the line at present locally admitted in preference to that laid down 
by the mediating commissioners.’141 Grey’s statement demonstrated that Britain 
needed goodwill from Sheykh Khaz‘al, in order to secure their interests at 
Mohammerah and its neighbourhoods. 
    In March 1912, the Iranian delegates in Istanbul, however, thought it feasible 
to ‘lose something near Mohammerah, but gain something in the north if they can 
come to terms by carrying out the arrangement proposed by the mediating 
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Powers.’142 The Iranian delegates intended to accept the 1848 Note, and lose 
some of the eastern bank, in return for the withdrawal of Ottoman troops along the 
border.143 Perhaps, to the Iranian delegates, the disputes on the northern part of 
the border, which arose from 1905, causing conflicts between Iran and the 
Ottoman Empire, and then Russia, were more serious than Mohammerah. Britain 
thought otherwise. Grey did not want Iran to abandon anything in the 
Mohammerah region without first informing the British Minister in Tehran, as 
Britain was anxious that no change in the status quo, as locally recognised, should 
take place at Mohammerah.144 Owing to British interests in the Persian Gulf and 
especially oil, which had been found close to Mohammerah, the British were 
unable to accept the attitude of the Iranian delegates. The British also sent a note 
to the Ottomans that Iran’s territorial rights over Mohammerah could not be 
violated.145  
    During the negotiations over the border issue in 1912, the Iranian delegates 
considered that the 1848 Note did not correspond to the 1847 Treaty, while the 
Ottoman delegates replied that Iran had to provide a clear answer as to whether it 
accepted the 1848 Note or not, or else the disputed point would have to be 
submitted to the Hague Tribunal.146 On 8 April 1912, Vusuq al-Dowleh instructed 
the Iranian delegates to oppose the 1848 Note, claiming that the Iranian delegates 
could not give up Mohammerah in exchange for advantages in the northern 
section of the border.147 On the same day, the Ottoman delegates told the Iranian 
delegates that it was their right to oppose the Note, but that they would still 
consider submitting the question to the Hague Tribunal.148 The Ottomans had no 
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interest in agreeing to the Iranian position, because they were confident that the 
Hague Tribunal would find in their favour. Grey’s intention was to maintain the 
status quo at Mohammerah. This formed part of a British strategy to preserve the 
integrity of Iran, and more specifically, to protect their growing oil interests in the 
south. Cox of Bushehr, furthermore, claimed that the Mohammerah area, which 
included the Shatt al-Arab, was not assigned to the possession of the Ottomans in 
any document,149 and he endeavoured to keep Mohammerah and the eastern bank 
of the Shatt al-Arab in Iranian territory.  
    In July 1912, the Iranian government was for the second time under the 
regime of the Bakhtiyari Khans, who had had in 1909 been in dispute with the 
Sheykh of Mohammerah over his agreement with the APOC on oil works. In 1909 
and 1910 Sheykh Khaz‘al and the Bakhtiayris also had their differences over local 
tribal conflicts in Shushtar, and in 1912 there were arguments over the 
appointment of the governorship of Shushtar.150 Sheykh Khaz‘al believed that the 
Bakhtiyari government had no knowledge of his territories, and feared that his 
interests would probably be sacrificed in the border negotiations.151 This was 
perhaps simply a worry of Sheykh Khaz‘al, given that the Iranian Legation in 
London argued that the Note would not be accepted by Iran as regards 
Mohammerah.152 It is also unlikely that Iran would have agreed to cede its own 
territory in any case. 
 
(b) The Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
    Negotiations on the Mohammerah question began to involve the APOC. In 
July 1912, Marling, the British Minister in Istanbul, argued that if the Ottomans 
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accepted the locally observed line of Mohammerah, there had to be compensation 
that the Ottomans would expect from Iran elsewhere.153 The transfer of the 
district of Zohab to the Ottoman Empire was one option under consideration by 
Britain.154 After all, this area had been in question between the Ottoman Empire 
and Iran in the 1847 Treaty, and the Ottomans desired to obtain it. However, the 
APOC possessed oil wells in Qasr-e Shirin, located in Zohab. Grey considered 
whether the transfer of the area to the Ottoman Empire would affect the APOC or 
not.155 In August, Lorimer, the British Consul in Mohammerah, was of the 
opinion that ‘oil works which are in the tribal country and exposed to attack 
would enjoy a greater measure of safety under Turkish than under Persian rule.’156 
Lorimer’s opinion indicated the most important consideration for British policy, 
which was the security of the oil interests. 
    The Manager of the APOC, Greenway, also considered the transfer of Qasr-e 
Shirin to the Ottomans to be advantageous. Qasr-e Shirin was part of the oil works 
area at Chah Shurkh, the first oil well struck in Iran, in 1903. In his view, if Chah 
Shurkh became part of Ottoman territory this would assist the APOC in its 
objective of ‘maintaining their wells at Tchiah Sourkh to provide for future local 
consumption in Mesopotamia ……’ 157  Greenway did, though, make two 
conditions: 
 
(1) that the Turkish Government shall recognize our rights by granting to us a 
concession for the exploitation of oil and the laying of pipe-lines in the ceded 
territory (Qasr-e Shirin) on exactly the same terms and conditions as those 
contained in the Persian concession (of 1901), and (2) that the Turkish 
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Government grant to Mr. D’Arcy a concession for the exploitation of oil and 
the laying of pipe-lines in the provinces of Mosul and Bagdad on the same 
terms as in the Persian concession (the Oil Concession of 1901).158 
 
Greenway was, therefore, careful to protect the Company’s rights to the 1901 Oil 
Concession. The proposed supply of oil to the British Admiralty by the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company from 1912 led to increased concern in Britain over 
oil interests. On 20 April 1913, Lowther told Grey that the Ottoman Empire would 
gain no benefit from the transfer of the territory under Article 10 of the 1901 
Concession,159 which clearly stipulated that oil shares were meant to be paid to 
the Iranian government only. Oil interests in the Qasr-e Shirin area thus remained 
secure under the 1901 Oil Concession, and the British would not incur any losses 
through this article. Initially, Grey reiterated his intention of retaining Chah 
Shurkh: ‘if this region became Turkish, it might be difficult to secure and to 
maintain the rights acquired by this British company from the Persian 
Government against possible disregard by the Power in whose territory the field 
of their operations would then lie.’160 Eventually Grey assented to the proposed 
cession of the district to the Ottoman Empire when he became aware that the 
Ottomans would not benefit under the 1901 Oil Concession, and that it might take 
place on the condition that the rights of the British company there were duly 
safeguarded. Qasr-e Shirin, which was part of Iran, would thus have come to form 
part of Ottoman territory,161 and the ideal of maintaining the independence and 
integrity of Iran as enshrined in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 was 
ceasing to have any weight at all in the complex scenario of international politics. 
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c. The Protocol of Istanbul in 1913  
Under the pressure of circumstances unfavourable to Iran, on 20 August 1912 
Vusuq al-Dowleh instructed the Iranian Ambassador in Istanbul, Ehtsham 
al-Saltaneh, ‘not to accept (the) explanatory note until the Persian Government 
had been fully informed of the nature of the concessions which Persia might be 
called on to make in the Zohab district.’162 The Ottoman Ambassador in London, 
Tewfik Pasha, insisted that the Ottoman Empire would take over the Zohab area, 
as had been agreed in the Erzerum Treaty of 1847.163 However, in the seventeenth 
session (no date provided), the Iranian delegates suddenly accepted the 1848 Note 
and announced that  
 
Although the Iranian government does not in principle agree with the 
Explanatory Note, as a sign of good faith and a sensible response to the 
efforts which the mediating parties have made for the last seventy years, the 
Iranian delegation accepts the Explanatory Note as a part of the Erzerum 
Treaty.164 
 
This decision by the Iranian delegates might merely be attributable to the 
long-drawn out sittings over a single issue, along with pressures from the other 
three countries. Of course Britain and Russia were not on the side of the Ottoman 
Empire, but the two powers did intend to compromise so as to prevent the issue 
from being presented to the Hague Tribunal.  
During the negotiations, the Ottoman commission made an offer under which 
Iran could continue to hold jurisdiction in Mohammerah if it would accept the 
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Ottoman claims on the whole of the Shatt al-Arab.165 In August 1912, the 
Ottomans also agreed to transfer all the mountainous regions of Zohab to Iran, on 
condition that in return Iran should cede to the Ottoman Empire all the lowlands, 
the western part of Zohab.166 The purpose of the Ottoman Empire was therefore 
to control the whole area around the Shatt al-Arab, where it joined the mouth of 
the Persian Gulf. In addition, as Kurt’s article shows, there were differences over 
the question of Mohammerah between the Ottoman delegates from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of War. The latter saw Mohammerah as 
belonging to the Ottomans, which was not accepted by the British. However, a 
coup in the Ottoman Empire in January 1913 created a new situation. The new 
Ottoman government following the line advocated by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs restarted negotiations with Britain. Britain took advantage of the Ottoman 
weakness, and responded with a conditional offer that it would provide economic 
assistance if certain political issues were resolved in Britain’s favour; one of these 
was Mohammerah.167 
Therefore, under the 1913 Protocol, which was signed in Istanbul on 17 
November 1913,168 the Ottoman Empire obtained the Zohab region, which was 
later to prove to have one of the most important oil reserves,169 while the question 
of Mohammerah became quiet. Article I of this Protocol stated that, from the point 
where the land border joined the Khayin (a branch of the Shatt al-Arab), the 
border should follow the course of the Shatt al-Arab as far as the sea, leaving 
under Ottoman sovereignty the river and all of the islands therein, subject to the 
following conditions and exceptions: “(a) a few islands shall belong to Iran; (b) 
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the port and anchorage of Muhammerah shall remain within Iranian 
jurisdiction ……; (c) Ottoman jurisdiction shall not extend over the parts of the 
Iranian coast, while Iranian jurisdiction shall not be exercised over lands (not 
specified – but probably on the western bank); (d) the Sheikh of Muhammerah 
shall continue to enjoy in conformity with the Ottoman laws his rights of 
ownership in Ottoman territory.” With the Protocol, Ottoman sovereignty over the 
Shatt al-Arab was confirmed, with the exception of certain islands and of 
Mohammerah itself. In addition, the Ottomans agreed to regard as Iranian the 
border city of Qutur, and the Ottomans also gave up their claim to Qasr-e Shirin, 
in return for certain territory farther north.170 Eventually, Iran regained control of 
Qasr-e Shirin under the 1913 Protocol, and Mohammareh was also secured. 
Another important article, particularly relevant to the APOC, was Article 7. 
The Ottoman Empire agreed that the Oil Concession of 1901 should remain in full 
and unrestricted force throughout the territories transferred by Iran to the Ottoman 
Empire, in virtue of the provisions of the present Protocol and of Annex (B). The 
Ottoman Empire also declared its recognition that the (Oil) Concession should be 
maintained in full force and validity in the transferred territories, and that no other 
concession of the same nature liable to harm or prejudice the rights and privileges 
of the APOC would be granted. The Ottoman Empire declared that it had no right 
to claim the APOC shares paid to the Iranian government, and, in return, the 
Iranian government waived its right to claim benefits resulting from the 
exploitation of the Concession within the transferred territories.171 From a British 
point of view, the 1913 Protocol would favour its interests in Mesopotamia and 
lead to no losses for the APOC,172 and was thus highly satisfactory. 
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    A border commission began work in the Mohammerah area in January 1914, 
and ended in October 1914. (Map 7) The commission erected 227 boundary 
pillars, the last of which was put in place just one day before the Ottoman Empire 
and Russia entered into military conflict in October.173  The effects of this 
commission were strikingly illustrated by the fact that it completed the entire 
work in well under twelve months, a great deal less than the three years taken by 
its predecessor.174  However, the Iranian government never ratified the 1913 
Protocol because it did not consent to the outcome in the Zohab area, and neither 
was the Ottoman ratification ever confirmed, owing to the Empire’s entry into 
World War I, against Britain and Russia.175 The border as it already stood 
therefore lasted until subsequent negotiations, which were to be a question 
between Iran and Iraq in 1937. 
 
Conclusion 
    The Ottoman-Iranian border dispute was a complex issue that had remained 
unresolved since the sixteenth century. It consisted of territorial disputes between 
Iran, the Ottoman Empire and Russia, and also latterly came to involve the rivalry 
between Russia and Britain. None of the treaties and protocols signed really 
satisfied any of the states involved, and neither did the Protocol of Istanbul in 
1913. On the outbreak of World War I, the disputes inevitably remained unsettled.  
    After the Ottoman encroachment on the Ottoman-Iranian border in 1905, 
other cities and towns, such as Ormiyeh, Khoi, and Tabriz, came into question. In 
1905, the disputed parts along the northern section of the border were in the area 
under Russian influence. Owing to disturbances caused by the Kurds in these 
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areas, the Ottoman Empire needed to resolve the border issue, and yet it was not 
possible for Iran and Russia to leave the Ottomans in control of in areas which 
were part of Iran and important to the prestige of Russia. However, Russia did not 
get involved deeply because of its weakness after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 
and its 1905 Revolution. During that period, thus, the Ottoman Empire enjoyed 
more advantages than Iran as regards the border issue, and the only concrete 
action taken by the two major powers was to send a mixed commission to the 
border in 1911. This was because the Ottoman Empire was keen to submit the 
issue to the Hague Tribunal, which would have proved harmful to the prestige of 
Britain and Russia.  
    In the early twentieth century, two agreements had an impact on 
Anglo-Iranian relations with regard to the border. The first was the Oil Concession 
of 1901, which granted Britain the right to drill oil in Iranian territory for 60 years. 
In all the events abovementioned, it can be seen that the British focused on their 
oil interests along the Ottoman-Iranian border, such as at Qasr-e Shirin, Zohab and 
Mohammerah, especially the latter. The second agreement was the Anglo-Russian 
Convention of 1907, which meant that the British paid less attention to the 
northern section of the Ottoman-Iranian border. However, there was a significant 
issue with the southern part of the border in that it, with Mohammerah included, 
was in the neutral zone. Therefore Britain had to be more assertive over this part 
of the neutral zone, which by implication would undermine the Convention. 
Fortunately, for Britain, Article 3 of the 1907 Convention secured previous treaties 
and agreements as valid, and which meant that the Oil Concession of 1901 was 
not affected by the Convention. Therefore Britain was able to be more reasonable 
than might otherwise have happened in its demands over the border.  
The British Foreign Office did not become seriously involved in the border 
issue until 1912, when the 1848 Note was introduced in the negotiations in 
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Istanbul: this was because it now involved the Mohammerah region, which had 
played a significant role in British trade for decades. The border dispute became a 
more serious problem for the British mainly because of the discovery of oil in the 
South-West of Iran and oil pipelines and refineries at Mohammerah and its 
neighbourhoods. Britain used the proposals for the transfer of territories such as 
Qasr-e Shirin as a means of smoothing over its difficulties with the Ottoman 
Empire, though the APOC was also involved in the transfer. Although 
Mohammerah and Qasr-e Shirin were both secured as part of Iranian territory in 
the 1913 Protocol, other areas were ceded to the Ottoman Empire.  
In terms of Anglo-Iranian relations, Britain generally supported the 
maintenance of the territorial integrity of Iran by the 1907 Convention, but when 
it came to protecting its own vital interests, namely oil, this principle was quickly 
sacrificed. Britain’s involvement in the border issue also saw their strategy of 
increased interest protection. Annex B attached to the Istanbul Protocol of 1913, 
securing Mohammearh as a part of Iran and the transfer of another part of Iranian 
territory to the Ottoman Empire, can be judged a test of Britain’s commitment to 
the 1907 Convention. The Annex in effect secured the oil interests of the APOC in 
Mohammerah and the whole South-West of Iran. Moreover, it can be seen that the 
security of Mohammerah and its region remained the highest priority in British 
policy.  
    Iran had little influence over the outcome of the border dispute. During its 
revolutionary period, Iran did not have enough strength to deal with the border 
issue, influenced as it was by foreign countries. Iran and the Ottoman Empire had 
different views regarding the demarcation of the border, with Iran preferring to 
use Anglo-Russian agreements and maps as their reference, while the Ottoman 
Empire insisted that the 1848 demarcation by Dervish Pasha was the only reliable 
source. When it came to the 1848 Note, which Iran rejected, in the Istanbul 
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Protocol of 1913, the outcome was different. The Iranian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs strongly opposed the terms of the 1848 Note, but in Istanbul the Iranian 
delegates eventually accepted it owing to great pressure from the other powers. 
However, Iran’s real strategy was not to actually ratify the 1913 Protocol, and the 
outbreak of World War I in 1914 made any settlement of the border issue most 
unlikely. 
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Chapter VI The Employment of Foreign Advisors in Iran 
and British Policy 1911-1914 
 
Introduction 
After the re-establishment of the Iranian constitutional government in July 
1909, the quest of the Iranian government for foreign advisors for financial and 
military purposes impinged upon Iran’s foreign relations. At that time, the British 
and Russians did not want subjects from strong European powers involved in the 
politics of Iran as it might have had a negative impact on their own power and 
interests. Iran, therefore, had to search for advisors from powers that were either 
politically not interested in Asia or from minor powers. As a result, from 1911, an 
American financial advisor, Morgan Shuster, and several Swedish officials for 
Iran’s gendarmerie, who were respectively helpful to Iran’s finances and order in 
the South of Iran, were recruited by the Iranian government. The effect, however, 
was that they caused disputes between Britain and Russia, and between both 
countries and Iran. By the outbreak of the First World War, as will be seen, the 
employment of foreign advisors in Iran resulted in an international dispute.  
Foreign advisors had been recruited in Iran since the nineteenth century. For 
example, military advisors from European countries were brought in to support 
modernization and state-building, not least against foreign power interference. 
The most successful military mission was that of the Russian Cossack Brigade 
established in the 1880s, and lasting for 41 years. 1  Further advisors from 
European countries appeared in the Iranian administration. From the end of the 
                                                 
1
 Stephanie Cronin, ‘Importing Modernity: European Military Missions to Qajar Iran,’ 
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nineteenth century, a Belgian, Joseph Naus, played an important part in 
restructuring the customs and postal tax system of Iran.2 Although the dismissal 
of foreign advisors was a goal pursued by the constitutional movement in 1905, in 
reality their expertise was indispensable to the Iranian government in putting the 
finances into order. The dismissal of Naus in May 1907 was the sign of the 
diminishing of foreign influence. Nevertheless, Iran still needed advisors from 
foreign countries. In 1908, a French adviser, Monsieur Bizot, was brought in to 
organize the tax-collecting system and make it centralized and accountable, so as 
to persuade the British and Russians to grant a loan for the financial reform 
scheme.3 A new director general of the customs, Joseph Mornard, who was the 
successor of Naus, was considered by some to be pro-Russian.4  
In addition, after the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, a mutual 
understanding on Iranian affairs between the European powers was essential, and 
decisions relating to foreign advisors by Iran were complicated and sensitive 
matters that had an impact on Anglo-Russian relations. If decisions made in 
Tehran were to affect Russian interests, Russia would respond seriously and more 
effectively than Britain did, but the Russian response was nevertheless significant 
for Britain. Thus Britain, generally to maintain the 1907 Convention and Russia’s 
goodwill, would attempt to ease tension between Russia and Iran, whilst at the 
same time guarding its own interests.  
Regarding foreign advisors, such as Shuster and the Swedish Gendarmerie, 
there has been some, though not wide, in depth research. Especially notable has 
been Robert McDaniel’s work, The Shuster Mission and Persian Constitutional 
Revolution,5 the only book so far to cover the matter in detail. McDaniel studies 
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4
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5
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the Mission against the background of Iran’s reform and revolution at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, and the long tradition of the rivalry between 
Britain and Russia in Iran. In McDaniel’s view, Shuster was inflexible, and did not 
see, or did not choose to see, the significant implications of Russia’s influence. 
However, the author does not consider the reason why Shuster insisted on his 
policy of reforms in Iran, and the essential factors that formed British policy 
towards the incident. In her PhD thesis, South Persian Rifles,6 Floreeda Safiri 
looks at the formation of South Persian Rifles in the South of Iran by the British 
from 1916, with a few pages on the Swedish Gendarmerie as the historical 
background. Safiri shows that, due to disturbances in the South of Iran from 1908, 
and that British subjects were being attacked by robbers in 1910, the British had a 
scheme for a gendarmerie and pressed the Iranian government for a military force 
in the disturbed area. Stephanie Cronin provides a clear summary of Iran’s 
military development from the nineteenth century to the twentieth century by 
many studies. 7  Cronin considers the development of the Cossack Brigade, 
sponsored by the Russians, and the establishment of a national army under 
Swedish officers by the Majles from 1910. On the question of the national army, 
the author argues it was a means for state-building. Cronin mainly looks at Iran’s 
army in the context of the rivalry between Britain and Russia. She does not 
explore the issue specifically from the perspective of the employment of foreign 
advisors, and how the British, and the Russians viewed the prospect of Swedish 
officers in Iran. Generally, the studies provide much information from a single 
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dimension, either on Shuster or the Swedish officials, but do not see a broad 
picture of the Iranian constitutional government struggling to find foreign advisors 
in the context of great power rivalries and mutual suspicion. This chapter will 
endeavour to assess the employment of Shuster and the Swedish officials in Iran 
from the point of view of Iran’s resistance and subsequent failure owing to British 
and Russian pressures.  
Therefore, this chapter would take Iran’s foreign advisors as the main topic, 
including the Shuster Mission and the Swedish Gendarmerie, to see what were the 
key factors having an impact on its foreign relations. It will also discuss how 
British policy manipulated the issue, and how Anglo-Iranian relations were 
subjected to Russian influence.  
 
1. Looking for foreign advisors  
    From 1910, the Iranian government was looking for foreign advisors for both 
financial and military purposes, with a view not only to putting its affairs in order 
but also to ensure its independence and resistance to foreign influence. However, 
Iran, in its state of weakness, particularly financial, did not have the power to 
achieve its aim. Despite its right to implement its own policies, realistically it still 
needed to consult with foreign powers, namely Britain and Russia. Anglo-Russian 
joint approval was the key many of Iran’s decisions regarding foreign advisors.  
    Iran’s financial difficulties had been a significant problem for a long time, 
and the newly-established government of 1909 believed that a foreign financial 
adviser might be one means of dealing with their predicament in early 1910. 
Britain and Russia suggested that the Iranian government should select a national 
of a third power, that was to say, a nation other than Britain or Russia.8 Iran had 
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first had Bizot, but he decided to go back to France early in 1910,9 and did not 
want to extend his contract in Iran at all.10 Grey’s preference was for Iran to 
choose a small, neutral European country.11 Though Iran was keen to extend 
Bizot’s contract, with the addition of seven French experts destined for the 
Ministry of Finance,12 Britain and Russia wanted Iran to choose Belgians or 
advisors from another minor European power.13 Meanwhile, France replied that 
they were indifferent to Iran’s finances,14 and later Belgium replied that they too 
were not interested.15 Iran did not want to accept a Belgian advisor, as that would 
have looked like capitulation to Britain and Russia’s suggestion to employ an 
advisor from a small neutral European country.  
On 7 September 1910, in any case, the Majles decided to invite America to 
send an advisor,16 a decision based on the desire of Iran to eliminate British and 
Russian influence on policy decisions. The Russian government was concerned 
with Iran’s choice of an American advisor, despite the fact that the Russian 
Minister in Tehran, Poklewski-Koziell, had pointed out to his government that 
America had no political interests in Iran. Barclay, on the other hand, was of the 
opinion that ‘unless we were prepared to insist, it would be useless to raise 
objections,’17 but the Russian government still considered that the Iranians were 
not following the advice given by Russia and Britain,18 and still preferred a 
subject from a small neutral European state, and opposed the choice of America.19 
Iran’s decision to go to America in any case was partly a form of retaliation 
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against the Russian attitude. Russia and Britain did eventually, though, reach a 
mutual understanding that they would drop their objections to American advisors, 
given that America did not indeed have any interests in Iran.20 Nevertheless, 
Sazonov retained his suspicion of America.21 
    Regarding military advisors, the British and Iranians each had the intention 
to build an army for their own interest. In the South of Iran, the Province of Fars, 
the British experienced disturbances, such as robberies and murders of British 
subjects, which had an impact on the security of trading activities. It was a cause 
of considerable concern to the British, who developed a scheme in 1909 of 
providing road guards.22 Owing to Britain’s concerns with the security of their 
interests in the South of Iran, which connected to India, good order was the main 
goal to be reached. Nicolson, the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, considered 
that the British government might be forced, much against their will, to intervene 
in the anarchy in the South of Iran. Otherwise it was at least necessary to give a 
loan to the Iranian government.23 In early 1910, Grey was thinking of a small 
advance to the Iranian government with the condition of the formation of an 
efficient gendarmerie under foreign instructors throughout the whole of Iran.24 
Nicolson telegraphed to Grey that the Russian government argued that the Iranian 
government could only employ officers from a foreign nationality other than 
Russian or British after a preliminary agreement with Russia and Britain, and 
under their supervision.25 Nicolson then suggested to Grey that instructors for the 
gendarmerie must not be selected by the Iranian government.26 In fact, the British 
intended that the Iranians control the situation themselves. The increase of force 
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by the British in the South of Iran was not a well-judged measure, said Marling.27 
Grey agreed that Shuster would be employed in Tehran, while the Swedish 
officers would be in the neutral zone.28 On the other hand, Iran, of course had 
wished to give responsibility to their own troops, but, despite the urgency, debates 
in the Majles ending in nothing.29 By August 1910, however, Iran had not come 
to a decision to appoint military advisors. As with financial advisors, Marling 
preferred Iran to choose military advisors from minor European countries.30 Italy 
was a choice of Iran, but after negotiations between the British and the Italians, 
the latter refused Iran’s request because the Italians learnt that Britain did not 
regard them as a small power.31  
    In October 1910, thus, Barclay, the British Minister in Tehran, informed the 
Iranian government that the British government would organize a local force 
under British officers for the security of the roads if order was not restored within 
a three month period.32  In some academic studies, this note to the Iranian 
government is called ‘the British ultimatum.’33 The Iranian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs told Barclay that it was not possible for a government that was out of 
money, to improve the conditions of the southern roads. Barclay therefore replied 
that Britain, and Russia, would accept Iran’s application for a loan to restore order 
in the South of Iran.34 This was supported by the Russians.35 Grey, in fact, 
viewed Barclay’s method as a threat to Iran, and suggested avoidance.36 However, 
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Barclay remained his attitude.37 Grey’s concern was that if they introduced any 
kind of military control in southern Iran, it would be an excuse for Russia to 
continue the presence of their troops in northern Iran.38  Grey preferred to 
establish a certain military force after communication with Russia. 39  Grey 
insisted that the actions of their military force would not extend their influence 
into the interior of Iran, but simply provide necessary protection for British 
subjects and British trade.40 In November, Barclay informed Grey that a number 
of Swedes were designated to organise the road guards. A minor power was much 
more likely to provide a good impression, in Barclay’s view.41 Subsequently, a 
gendarmerie in Fars Province under foreign officers, called ‘the Government 
Gendarmerie’, was announced by the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs in the 
Majles in January 1911.42 Therefore, as a result of Iran’s efforts and in this case 
Britain’s pressure, the Swedish Gendarmerie for the South of Iran eventually 
emerged as a reality. 
Thus, the quest for foreign advisors for financial and military purposes by the 
Iranian constitutional government from 1911, could not overlook the views of 
Britain and Russia. Iran was fully aware of the pressures from Britain and Russia, 
and therefore neutral countries which had no ambitions in the country and which 
would be under Iran’s control, should be good choices.43 This implied that, with 
the two European powers’ approval, the employment of foreign advisors would 
not result in intervention by foreign powers. Indeed, the Swedish officials were 
actually introduced with the support of Britain to protect its interests. 
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2. The Shuster mission and the Stokes incident 
a. The employment of Shuster 
On 25 December 1910, the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hosein Quli 
Khan Navab, instructed the Iranian Legation in Washington to make a request to 
the American government to suggest a financial expert for Iran.44 Since the need 
to reform the finances was acknowledged as a pressing problem, and America had 
no particular interest in Iran, the British made no objection. The American 
President Taft announced on 28 December that Morgan Shuster was the best 
choice for a financial advisor for Iran.45 President Taft had confidence in Shuster 
because he was a lawyer and financial expert with experience in Customs, in Cuba 
from 1899 to 1901, and in the Philippines in 1906. In terms of sending financial 
advisors abroad, American foreign policy at the time was to encourage and 
support American capitalists abroad to bring home significant profits and to 
provide an incentive for American investments.46 On 14 February 1911, Shuster 
was appointed Treasurer-General of Iran.47 In his memoirs, Shuster did not 
mention why he accepted the post, simply saying that he had never dreamt of 
going to Iran.48 McDaniel’s work provides many details about Shuster’s mission, 
but sheds no light on Shuster’s motives, and Yeselson provides evidence why the 
American government considered Shuster to be the best choice, but, again, not the 
reason why Shuster accepted the mission.49  
The State Department of the United States dissociated the American 
government from any connection with Shuster and his team, who were instead 
held to be private citizens employed by a foreign government.50 It seemed that 
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American advisors abroad were all sent as private citizens, rather than as 
representatives of the American government, and Shuster himself recalled that he 
understood that he was not going to Iran as a representative of the American 
government. 51  The American government’s indifference to the mission was 
probably because, in terms of foreign affairs, they were more interested in Latin 
America, and did not have political or economic interests in Iran.52 Eventually, in 
any case, Shuster left for Iran with seventeen members of staff in April 1911.53 
An American newspaper, the New York Times, revealed that there had been a 
number of instances when the United States had sent experts to assist other 
countries with financial or administrative problems, but Shuster was without an 
exact precedent as an American citizen as he was assigned a high-ranking position 
in Iran.54 
As soon as he arrived, in May 1911, Shuster submitted a bill on foreign loans 
to the Iranian government. This was passed by the Majles on 30 May 1911, with 
the purpose of ‘the collection of Government revenue and taxes of all kinds,’ ‘the 
control of expenditure of all kinds, and the keeping of the accounts pertaining 
thereto,’ as well as ‘banking affairs, the Mint, exchange relating to the loan, 
interests, sinking fund.’ The final version consisted of four articles, the most 
significant of which were:  
 
Article 2: Until the new system has been introduced into the Ministry of 
Finance, control respecting the loan and the above-mentioned expenditure 
will be provisionally entrusted to a branch which will be specially formed 
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under the supervision of the Treasurer-General; Article 3: At the end of every 
month the Ministry of Finance will include in his report presented to the 
Government a financial statement regarding the loan’55  
 
Shuster was authorised by the bill to know all the details regarding loans, and a 
law on financial regulation, in twelve articles, was then passed by the Majles on 
12 June 1911. Article I stated that Shuster was ‘charged with the direct and 
effective control of all financial and fiscal operations of the Persian government,’ 
while Article IV enabled him to ‘establish the services he may consider essential 
for the organization of each of the different provinces.’ Article V gave him power 
of authorisation, stating that ‘no Government expenditure shall, without his 
signature—in the case of direct mandates, –or without his authorization—in the 
case of credit orders, –be made.’56 This law, which was passed in the Majles with 
an overwhelming majority,57 thus brought all the financial issues of Iran under the 
supervision of Shuster.  
As a result of the June 1911 Law, the Imperial Bank of Persia had to refuse to 
recognise a cheque from Mornard because it had not been signed by Shuster. 
Owing to the close relationship between Mornard and the Russians, the latter 
objected to this sudden change having been made without their having been 
notified in advance,58 and Mornard argued that he was only responsible to the 
Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance of Iran.59 The Iranian cabinet decided 
to invite both him and Mornard to a meeting to settle their differences in July. The 
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meeting concluded with a pledge of cooperation between Shuster and Mornard, 
but in fact the two men’s hostility remained.60 Mornard believed that he would be 
supported by Russia on this issue,61 but the British government took the view that 
Russia should accept Shuster’s policy, as it might well lead to improvements in 
Iranian finances.62 This dispute showed that Shuster’s task was a difficult one, 
given that it involved not only Iranian finances but also complex Anglo-Russian 
relations both with each other and with Iran. 
 
b. The Stokes incident  
    As regards the country’s finances, it was Shuster’s view that they were very 
tangled, and indeed that ‘there were no Persian finances in any ordinary sense of 
the word.’63 In the opinion of Shuster, on the other hand, the officials of the 
Ministry of Finance were inexperienced, and this situation was the same 
throughout the provinces.64 Shuster’s proposal to reform Iran’s finances, then, 
involved setting up an armed group, the Treasury Gendarmerie, to collect tax 
throughout the country.65 Shuster decided to appoint Claude B. Stokes, a British 
Major in the Indian Army, to lead the Treasury Gendarmerie, a decision which 
was accepted by the Majles on 6 July 1911. Stokes’s duties would involve 
assignments in northern Iran, which had been part of the Russian zone under the 
Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, where Britain had no right to undertake any 
action.  
    Barclay realised that this appointment would lead to disputes, and so he 
telegraphed Shuster on 14 July 1911 to point out that the appointment of Stokes 
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might give rise to international jealousy, and that a subject of some other minor 
power would be easier for the Russians to accept. Barclay asked Shuster to find an 
alternative,66 but Shuster replied that he had chosen Stokes on the basis of his 
‘military training, four years’ sojourn in Persia, knowledge of the country, of the 
Persian language, …… ’ Shuster emphasised that his decision was not influenced 
by political considerations.67 On the part of Russia, Neratov, the Russian Acting 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, had no objection to the Treasury Gendarmerie as 
long as it was led by an officer from one of the smaller nations, and a Russian or 
British officer could only be appointed as a last resort.68 On 19 July 1911, 
however, the British Foreign Office agreed that Stokes should be in charge of the 
Treasury Gendarmerie, though Barclay informed Shuster that Stokes had to resign 
his commission in the Indian Army before accepting the post in the 
Gendarmerie.69 Grey was aware that the presence of a British subject in the 
Russian zone in Iran would cause problems, but he did not wish to prevent 
Shuster from employing Stokes for his reforms. The Russian Ambassador in 
London, Count Benckendorff, telegraphed Neratov that Grey did not want to see 
himself be accused of having placed obstacles in the way of the financial 
reorganisation of Iran.70 It may be argued that Shuster’s insistence on his views, 
such as on the appointment of Stokes, was because he felt that Iran was running 
out of time for reform, and thus Stokes was his only choice. The Majles’s attitude 
was that the presence of Shuster and Stokes would help to fulfil their anti-Russian 
strategy, as well as carrying out the desired reforms. It was not so much that 
Shuster was inflexible in his ignoring of Russian influence in Iran, but more that 
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the Majles used Shuster as a strong complement to their anti-Russian policy. 
    Count Benckendorff, on the other hand, was not in favour of the presence of 
a British official in the Russian zone, even though Grey explained that Shuster’s 
appointment had no political implications at all.71 Stokes decided to resign his 
post in the Indian Army on 30 July 1911.72 Neratov was of the opinion that 
Russia should also have a Russian official with the same responsibilities as Stokes 
in northern Iran, if Stokes was employed in the Treasury Gendarmerie.73 He 
asked for Britain’s support for giving Russia freedom of action, within a 
framework of respect for Iranian independence. 74  Neratov instructed 
Poklewski-Koziell, the Russian Minister in Tehran, to tell the Iranian government 
that: ‘The Russian Government would regard the appointment, if made, as an 
unfriendly act, and reserve to themselves the right to take such measures as they 
may consider necessary to safeguard Russian interests in Northern Persia.’75 
Neratov’s concern over the security of Russian interests was reasonable, though 
Grey said that he could do nothing, insisting that Britain had no right to object to a 
British subject accepting a post in another part of the world. Grey, nevertheless, 
did advise that Shuster should select an official from a small, neutral European 
state. On 8 August 1911, Barclay warned the Iranian government that it could 
insist on employing Stokes only if his activities did not extend to the Russian 
sphere of influence.76 Grey did not give further instructions, while Barclay in 
Tehran expressed clearly his view that Stokes should not accept the new position. 
    From August 1911 onward, Grey’s position on the Stokes appointment 
gradually shifted. He increasingly advanced the opinion that Stokes’s activities 
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should be restricted to the South of Iran,77 and Barclay was also of the view that 
‘the general European situation (meaning thereby the Moroccan question) was 
such that the British Government felt compelled to take this attitude.’78 On the 
part of Iran, Vusuq al-Dowleh, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared that his 
country would not let Stokes take part in any military operations.79  Vusuq 
al-Dowleh’s statement had the aim of persuading Russia to agree to Stokes’s 
appointment, and he did not want to adopt Grey’s earlier suggestion ‘to restrict 
Stokes’s work to the south,’ because this would suggest that the Iranian 
government had acquiesced to the division of Iran into three parts as agreed in the 
Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.80 The Iranian Majles assured Barclay that 
Stokes’s term in the Treasury Gendarmerie would be for a maximum of three 
years, and after that an Iranian or another alternative from a small, neutral 
European power would continue with the work. If Russia would not agree to 
Stokes’s presence, then Shuster would assign Stokes to Tehran alone, and not to 
other parts of northern Iran.81 Apparently Vusuq al-Dowleh and the Majles soon 
noticed the emerging risk emerging, and responded to Russian objections.  
Shuster also became gradually more aware of the complex situation of Iran’s 
foreign relations, and changed his decision on Stokes. On 21 August 1911 Shuster 
informed Barclay that Stokes’s work in northern Iran would be confined to Tehran, 
that he would stay in Tehran for less than six months and that at the end of his 
tenure he would be sent to Shiraz. Shuster also agreed a counter appointment of a 
Russian officer in the northern zone,82 telling Poklewski-Koziell that ‘in his 
future activity in Persia he would duly consider the interests of both Russia and 
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England, ……’83 Beckendorff in London also telegraphed Neratov noting that 
Shuster’s attitude was changing.84 Both the Russian Ministers in Tehran and 
London were aware of the change in Shuster’s attitude to the Stokes event. 
Nevertheless, Shuster would not yield further. On 2 September 1911, 
Poklewski-Koziell asked Shuster, whether, after his six-month term, Stokes was to 
work in a post outside the Russian zone.85 Shuster argued that Stokes could only 
be under his orders and could pursue no other policy than one which he himself 
might direct.86 Shuster could accept a shorter term for the employment of Stokes, 
but he insisted that he did not want to give up on the appointment. 
Poklewski-Koziell, though, did not accept this reply. Shuster was unable to 
convince Russia that there was no political intention behind the appointment. 
    Eventually, Stokes’s resignation note to the Indian government was refused 
on 2 October 1911,87 as a result of pressure applied by the British Foreign 
Office.88 Britain thus came round to the view that Stokes should not be appointed, 
in order not to endanger its relations with Russia as enshrined in the 1907 
Convention. Russia, meanwhile, was concerned about its prestige in Iran if a 
British official was allowed to work in the north. Nevertheless, Benckendorff 
argued that ‘a close understanding with England is more important and more 
necessary for us than ever.’89 The two powers had to co-operate with each other, 
and the British government asked Stokes to leave Tehran as soon as possible,90 
which he eventually did on 14 December 1911,91 returning to his regiment in 
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India. Russia was well aware that the appointment of Stokes was a reasonable one, 
but it also knew that it would be viewed as a diplomatic victory for Britain if 
Stokes was appointed.92 In other words, for Russia the issue was one of prestige, 
and in the end Russia won.  
 
c. The dismissal of Shuster 
    The Stokes incident did not end Shuster’s disagreements with the Russians. 
On 21 October 1911, Shuster published a letter in the (London) Times. He began 
by criticising Russia for not being neutral as far as Iranian affairs were concerned, 
as was demonstrated by its support of the ex-Shah, despite the Anglo-Russian 
Convention of 1907, and he then went on to argue that the British government had 
threatened him over the appointment of Stokes by ‘warning the Persian 
Government that they ought not to persist in the appointment of Major Stokes, 
unless he is not to be employed in Northern Persia. If the Persian Government do 
persist, His Majesty’s Government will recognize Russia’s right (sic) to take such 
steps as she thinks are necessary in order that her interests in Northern Persia may 
be safeguarded.’93  Shuster also complained that Britain had displayed very 
different attitudes to Stokes’s appointment in July and August 1911.  
    In his memoir, though, Shuster revealed that he had read a document written 
by Spring-Rice in Tehran in 1907 which interpreted the spirit of the 
Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, in Edward Browne’s The Persian Revolution 
1905-1909.94 This ‘document,’ according to Shuster, outlined two fundamental 
points in the Convention: ‘Firstly, neither of the two Powers will interfere in the 
affairs of Persia unless injury is inflicted on the persons or property of their 
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subjects; secondly, negotiations arising out of the Anglo-Russian Agreement must 
not violate the integrity and independence of Persia.’ The ‘document’ supposedly 
also recorded Isvolsky’s statement that, with the support of the Convention, 
‘Persia aided and assisted by these two powerful neighbouring States, can employ 
all her powers in internal reforms,’ concluding that ‘in the future Persia will be for 
ever delivered from the fear of foreign intervention, and will thus be perfectly free 
to manage her own affairs in her own way, whereby advantage will accrue both to 
herself and to the whole world.’ However, the British Foreign Office had never 
seen the document.95  It should be noted that Shuster did not question the 
sentiments expressed in the document, or whether they were likely to be in 
accordance with reality. It may also be argued that there was no proof indicating 
whether Shuster had indeed seen the document in Browne’s book before his 
mission to Iran, or whether he studied it after his return to America, given that 
Shuster’s memoir was published after this, in 1912. The mention of Spring-Rice’s 
1907 document in his memoir in 1912 may perhaps be viewed as a means to 
justify his actions in Iran.  
Shuster continued to dispatch British officials from the Treasury 
Gendarmerie to Tabriz, Shiraz and Isfahan, and Russia strongly objected in the 
case of Tabriz, which was in the Russian zone.96 To Russia this practice was also 
not acceptable, since, as with Stokes, it changed the status quo. 97  Russia 
threatened to occupy northern Iran and to dispatch troops to Tehran,98 and Iran 
received an ultimatum from Russia on 11 November 1911 demanding an apology, 
and threatening that, should it not be forthcoming, Russian troops would be sent 
to Tehran.99 It was Grey’s view that, in order to avoid Russian troops entering 
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Tehran, Shuster must leave.100 On 16 November 1911, the Iranian Prime Minister, 
Samsam al-Saltaneh, whose cabinet had been convened in July 1911, ordered 
Shuster to withdraw the Treasury Gendarmerie by 26 November.101 Samsam 
al-Saltaneh’s action was to decrease Shuster’s authority in order to ease the 
tension between Iran and Russia. America, meanwhile, had no intention of 
becoming involved in the problems Shuster had caused by his actions in Iran.102 
On the part of Britain, Grey regretted his former attitude that America would not 
cause any political disputes in Iran. ‘But it had turned out that Mr. Shuster went to 
such an extreme of political innocence that he disregarded the peculiar situation in 
Persia, and by not taking any political considerations into account ……’103  
On 21 November 1911, after Russia’s first ultimatum, Samsam al-Saltaneh 
and Sardar As‘ad communicated to Barclay their view that the Majles and Shuster 
had not only contributed to the Iranian government’s inaction, but had also 
gravely endangered Iran by provoking Russia. Samasm al-Saltaneh told Barclay 
that they could not remain spectators of the ruin of their country, and were 
hesitating as whether to use their position to set up a coup d’état and take power 
into their own hands.104 In the view of the Bakhtiyari Khans, they were the only 
force capable of stopping the disturbances. Barclay did not wish to comment on 
this.105 Grey had no appetite for any dramatic change in Tehran, and he limited 
himself to stating that a strong and independent Iran was what Britain wanted, 
even though it was impossible.106 Grey also believed that Russia should not 
simply make complaints against Shuster, but should make a formal demand to 
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have him removed.107 Shuster’s letter in the Times was turned into a pamphlet 
that was circulated in Tehran, which led to Russia considering formulating new 
demands on Iran and not withdrawing the Russian troops at Qazvin.108  
On 25 November, Vusuq al-Dowleh sent a telegraph informing Washington 
that Russia was trying to destroy Iran’s independence: ‘I am certain that the 
proposal which they (Russians) will make to us would be the dismissal of Mr. 
Shuster, and on this matter the affair of Persia and Russia will reach the point of 
extreme difficulty, in such a manner that we might either consent to Mr. Shuster’s 
removal or to the actual, immediate destruction of the country.’109 There was no 
response from America. On 26 November 1911, Neratov duly announced a second 
ultimatum to Iran, which demanded the following:  
1. …… Mr. Shuster …… to be dismissed, and the engagement to be given 
by the Persian Government in accordance with demand No.2 to apply to 
all other foreign officials already appointed by Mr. Shuster.  
2. The Persian Government must give an engagement that they will obtain 
the consent of the Russian and British Legations before offering any post 
in the Persian service to persons of foreign nationality. 
3. Expenses incurred by the present (Russian) military expedition to be 
reimbursed by the Persian Government.110 
The principal purpose of the first ultimatum was to ask Iran for an apology, but 
the second included three serious demands, detailed above. The British hoped that 
once the Iranians had complied with the two original Russian demands, the 
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Russian troops would be withdrawn from Qazvin.111 The attitude of the American 
government to the incident, meanwhile, was that it was inappropriate to offer any 
suggestions,112 and they assured Russia that they were not be concerned with 
Shuster much,113 and certainly did not want to break off their friendly relations 
with either Britain or Russia because of the Shuster incident.114 On 29 November 
1911, the second Russian ultimatum was received by Iran, accompanied by a 
demand that the latter comply within forty-eight hours.115 It was Barclay’s view 
that Iran should yield to Russia’s demands,116 and Grey was also of the same 
opinion.117 Nevertheless, Shuster told the American Legation in Tehran that the 
Majles had not revoked his contract,118 and on 1 December the Majles also 
rejected the second ultimatum.119 The American government stated that they had 
no will ‘to interfere or advise as to the present decisions and political questions of 
paramount importance to Persia and directly affecting other powers must be 
clearly understood by the Persian Government.’120 On 7 December 1911 the 
Majles asked America for help, stating that: 
 
    The ultimatum of the Russian Government, threatening our independence, 
having been rejected with one accord by a country which, jealous of its 
liberties (sic), tries to preserve it at any price, the Russian Government would 
impose it (sic) upon us by armed force. Our one offense is, perhaps, that we 
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have understood the necessity of a new regime and wish to enter upon an era 
of reform and organization. Convinced of our perfect innocence and of not 
being guilty of any aggressive act, we appeal to the humanitarian sentiment 
of the United States in saying to them: You who have tasted the benefits of 
liberty, would you witness the fall of any people whose only fault was to 
sympathize with your system to save its future? Would you suffer that Persia 
should fall for having wished to preserve its national dignity and for having 
understood the sentiments so dear to a free people? Trusting in the sentiment 
of honor and justice of the generous people of which you are the 
representatives, we are sure that our appeal will penetrate directly to your 
ears and will gain for us your precious aid in a solution consistent with the 
dignity and independence of Persia.121 
 
There was no response to this request from the Americans. On 24 December, the 
Bakhtiyari Khans, together with the Regent and the cabinet, announced the Majles 
had to be closed. Subsequently, on 26 December, 1911, Shuster was formally 
dismissed.122 On 28 December, the American Legation in Tehran simply reported 
to their Secretary of State that the Iranian cabinet had accepted the second Russian 
ultimatum.123 In the end, Shuster left in January 1912. There was no protection 
for Shuster from America at all.  
As regards the Shuster mission, Grey concluded that ‘his aims were 
admirable and just, but he had not realized that Russian interference in the north 
of Persia could only be ousted by force.’124 This was probably true as the 
disorders which led to the interference could only have been quelled by a military 
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force which the Iranian government could not afford. Buchanan in St. Petersburg 
also considered that ‘Mr. Shuster’s disregard of Russia’s privileged position in 
Persia provoked a still more serious crisis.’125 The event has been also discussed 
by Mehdi Heravi who claims that Shuster did not understand Anglo-Russian 
relations in Iran and had not studied the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.126 
The successor as Treasurer-General was Monard, who was pro-Russian and was 
an opponent of Shuster, demonstrating that Russia’s influence remained strong in 
northern Iran.  
Shuster did, in fact, have no desire to irritate either of the two powers, but he 
simply had his own views on Iranian affairs and Anglo-Russian relations. From 
his perspective an expert like Stokes was an essential prerequisite for the 
completion of the tasks that the Iranian government had requested. Shuster was 
not wrong in his perception of the requirements, and he was flexible as regards the 
difficulties that he encountered. Although it was Russia that demanded Shuster’s 
dismissal, it may be argued that the main factor behind it was the refusal of the 
Majles to comply with the Russian ultimatums. In addition, the two powers were 
concerned about achieving a balance within the broader sphere of international 
politics, which led Britain in particular to focus on its own interests and to choose 
not to object to the Russia’s high handed-actions.  
 
3. The end of the Majles in 1911  
    When the first ultimatum reached the Iranian government on 11 November 
1911, the Prime Minister, Samsam al-Saltaneh, was anxious about Russian 
military activity, given that Shuster refused to comply with Russia’s demands. 
Both Samsam al-Saltaneh and Vusuq al-Dowleh then resigned, and after the 
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remaining ministers followed suit,127 about ten days passed without a cabinet. 
Neratov viewed ‘the resignation of the Prime Minster and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs as (a sign of) a refusal to submit to Russian demands.’128 Naser al-Molk, 
the Iranian Regent, then pressed for the formation of a cabinet,129 and a new one 
was duly set up under the leadership of Samsam al-Saltaneh on 19 November 
1911, with a view to accepting Russian demands.130 Its purpose in doing so was 
to obtain the withdrawal of Russian troops at Qazvin, too.  
    Neratov argued at this point that it would not now be possible for Russia to 
withdraw its troops until relations with Iran had been normalised to their 
satisfaction.131 Grey, however, was of the opinion that if Russia acted in too 
exacting a manner in Iran it would have a most unfortunate effect on its foreign 
policy in general.132 Though Grey had come to accept the dismissal of Shuster, it 
was his view that Russia’s strong reaction regarding his mission might have an 
impact on Anglo-Russian relations, as enshrined in the 1907 Convention. He had 
no wish to see Anglo-Russian relations deteriorate owing to Shuster’s role in 
Iranian affairs, and so he endeavoured to make Iran realise that ‘they must govern 
with a good disposition towards Russian interests, instead of in opposition to 
them.’133 In the meantime, the news reached Tehran that 4,000 Russian troops 
were heading towards Iran from the Caucasus,134 despite Benckendorff’s warning 
the Russian government that marching on Tehran would harm Anglo-Russian 
relations and end the Triple Entente, which in turn would mean the demise of the 
Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.135  
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    After Russia’s second ultimatum on 29 November 1911, yet another new 
cabinet was formed, led by Samsam al-Saltaneh, and Vusuq al-Dowleh still 
Minister for Foreign Affairs.136 To the Majles, the cabinet’s acceptance of the 
Russian demands caused Iran to lose its dignity.137 Vusuq al-Dowleh, meanwhile, 
attempted to persuade the Majles to accept the second Russian ultimatum but in 
vain,138 complaining to Poklewski-Koziell that ‘some of them (the demands) are 
clearly contrary to the independence of the State (Iran), while the time (allowed) 
is so little that it is physically impossible to give them the necessary consideration 
and examination …....’139  Vusuq al-Dowleh attempted to delay the time of 
acceptance of the second Russian ultimatum, even though it could not change the 
result. Russia, of course, insisted on Iran’s acceptance of the ultimatum.140 On 7 
December 1911, it was Grey’s intention to communicate to Russia that Shuster’s 
successor must be accepted by the two powers.141 This was seen as a possible 
way to prevent similar cases to that of Shuster from taking place again in the 
future. The response of Poklewski-Koziell was that ‘this form of wording would, 
in practice, achieve the desired result and would not so clearly attack Persia’s 
independence.’ Poklewski-Koziell also asserted that the Majles should be 
dissolved if it refused to comply with the ultimatum,142 demonstrating thereby 
that Russia had been seriously disturbed by the Majles’s actions since July 1909. 
On 9 December 1911, the cabinet had the intention of accepting the Russian 
demands in return for the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Qazvin.143 The 
main raison d’etre of the cabinet was indeed to eliminate the Russian threat, and 
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on 11 December, Vusuq al-Dowleh, in an attempt to negotiate on the ultimatum, 
stated that: 
 
the Cabinet had decided to make the immense sacrifice of dismissing the 
treasurer-general, and would agree to the second demand in the Russian 
ultimatum if it were modified as follows: ‘In engaging foreigners in Persian 
service, Persian Government will try to avoid any difficulties which might 
injure the interests of the Powers.’144 
 
The second demand of the second Russian ultimatum seriously affected Iran’s 
right and independence to control its own domestic affairs. Vusuq al-Dowleh’s 
intention was to cut Iran’s losses by complying with the ultimatum. Buchanan 
attempted to suggest an amendment to the second demand whereby the word 
‘consent’ might be replaced by the word ‘consultation.’ Neratov refused, but he 
did try to find a formula less wounding to Persian susceptibilities. He was of the 
opinion that the Russian government would not insist on the use of the term 
‘engages to’ or of the word ‘consent,’ and believed that Russia would be satisfied 
if Iran committed to not engaging foreigners without previously coming to an 
understanding or agreement with the Russian and British Legations.145 With 
negotiations thus in progress, on 19 December 1911, the Iranian Minister in 
London, Mehdi Khan, stated Iran’s conditions with regard to Russia’s demands 
were:  
 
that some modification were made in the article respecting the engagement 
of foreign advisers, for which they suggested a formula, ……; and that the 
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Russian troops were withdrawn from Kazvin immediately after the demands 
had been accepted.146 
 
Russia was indeed taking a more conciliatory attitude towards Iran. On the same 
day, the second demand was amended to ‘would enter into an exchange of views 
for the purpose of arriving at an understanding.’147 On 22 December 1911, the 
Iranian cabinet accepted Russia’s demands,148 and on 24 December, the Regent 
issued a rescript ordering the closure of the Majles.  
The end of the Majles was a result that could be foreseen, but the 
modification of the second demand of the second Russian ultimatum represented a 
small success in securing Iran’s rights by Vusuq al-Dowleh. On the other hand, the 
closure of the Majles was meant to stop any further advance on Tehran by Russian 
troops, even though it was a sign of the strengthening of Russian influence in Iran, 
to which Iran was relentlessly to concede. In terms of the Iranian Constitution, the 
Regent did not have the right to issue the rescript, but in that extreme situation in 
Iran’s foreign relations, it was one way to ease tensions. On 27 December 1911, 
the Iranian government informed Shuster of his dismissal, and the condition of his 
departure was the withdrawal of the Russian troops at Qazvin, which had 
previously been promised by Russia. Neratov, however, argued that the troops 
would be withdrawn only when a successor to Shuster had been appointed,149 and 
it certainly seemed that Neratov (and the Russian government) had no inclination 
to withdraw the troops. Nevertheless, Russia announced in return that normal 
relations would resume in January 1912.150  
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The closure of the Majles left Iran without a strong man in the government. 
The Regent should have been the one. On 22 September 1910, the first Iranian 
Regent ‘Azod al-Molk died. Naser al-Molk, who was in Paris, was elected by the 
Majles two days later as the new regent. However, Naser al-Molk argued that 
‘people in Tehran and in (the) provinces expected him to put everything right. 
This showed a misapprehension of his position. By (the) constitution cabinet 
responsibility to (the) Medjliss was (the) proper agency for this.’151 Neratov 
expressed the opinion that ‘In the present state of things Naser-ul-Molk was not a 
strong enough man to cope with the difficulties of the situation.’152 Shuster, in his 
memoir, also mentioned that Naser al-Molk was ‘a most unfortunate choice for 
Regent.’153 In January 1912, the Regent argued that he had no right under the 
Constitution to interfere in internal affairs,154 and he expressed a wish to leave 
Iran for Europe for health reasons. In April, he told Barclay that he retained the 
right to sign decrees, and to give advice on Iranian affairs from abroad.155 It 
seemed, then, that Naser al-Molk did not want to be directly involved in the 
country’s internal politics or foreign relations. He left for Paris on 11 June 
1912,156 and returned to Iran in September 1913. However, after the coronation of 
Ahmad Shah took place in July 1914, and a new cabinet was formed, Naser 
al-Molk soon left Iran.157 The Regent took a firm line through his refusal of the 
resignation of the cabinet and by forcing the closure of the Majles in 1911, but 
after 1912 he attempted to remain outside any situation involving the country, 
owing to his ill health, and his weariness with the long and tiresome period of the 
tense situation in his country. 
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4. The establishment of Iran’s Gendarmerie under Swedish 
officers 
    After the decision to establish a gendarmerie under Swedish officers in early 
1911, Grey telegraphed to Cecil Spring-Rice, who was then the British Minister in 
Stockholm, that the decision must be left to the Swedish government. Whether 
Swedish officers were considered effective or not, the British had no objection on 
political grounds.158 In fact some Swedish officials were anxious to volunteer,159 
and the Swedes did not communicate with the British alone. They were aware that 
their intention of going to Iran necessarily needed Russia’s goodwill. A reply to 
the proposal by the Russian government in April 1911 was that they did not object 
to the employment of Swedish officers in the South of Iran.160 An agreement for 
the Swedish officers to travel to Iran was ready on 18 April, and a few weeks for 
preparation were required.161 In May, the Majles approved the contract for the 
Swedes. 162  In June, three Swedish officers were selected by the Swedish 
government: Captain Hjalmarson, Lieutenant Skjöldebrand, and Leutenant 
Petersen.163 They arrived in Tehran on 15 August 1911.164 In the nascent period 
of the Swedish Gendarmerie, there was British financial support. 
Barclay enquired from Grey whether advice should be given advice to the 
Iranian government that the Swedish officers could be employed as the Treasury 
Gendarmerie.165 The Russian Minister in Tehran concurred with Barclay’s advice 
that the Swedish officials employed as the Treasury Gendarmerie.166 The Swedish 
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officers were a much better choice as far as the Russians were concerned than 
Stokes. However, Grey intended that the Swedes should simply organize a 
gendarmerie distinct from the Treasury Gendarmerie.167 Grey strongly believed 
that the Swedish officers would end up under Russian control, and that Britain 
would consequently lose prestige.  
Barclay, on the contrary, insisted that the replacement of Stokes by the 
Swedish officers was a possible solution to the present deadlock.168 In early 
October 1911, Barclay telegraphed Grey that the Iranian government intended to 
engage a number of Swedish officers to organize a small Iranian army in the 
North of Iran,169 and on 11 October, the Majles approved the project for the 
engagement of 20 Swedish officers to organize such an army.170 However, this 
might not be favoured by the Swedish government, or by Britain and Russia. 
Spring-Rice in Stockholm telegraphed Grey that the Swedish Minister for Foreign 
Affairs had not heard of an engagement of 20 officers to organize an Iranian army 
yet, and there would not be any steps taken by the Swedish government without 
consulting Britain and Russia. 171  Whether or not the Swedish government 
received requests for 20 officers from the Iranian government, this statement by 
the Swedes showed that they did not want the proposed army to lead to pressure 
from Britain and Russia over their officers in the service of Iran. Doubtless the 
Swedish government had heard of the result of Stokes incident, and did not want 
to irritate the Russians in the north.  
Also, the Swedish Minister in Tehran did not regard this project of a small 
army optimistically because it might end up in conflict with the Cossack 
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Brigade.172 On 14 November 1911, Neratov informed the Swedish government 
that Russia would not agree that the Iranian government establish a small Iranian 
army under Swedish officers. The Swedish government acquiesced to Neratov’s 
argument. In addition, Neratov emphasized that the Cossack Brigade was the only 
organized force in northern Iran, and any future increase of the Iranian armed 
forces in the north must be under the Cossack Brigade. No independent force in 
Iran would be welcome to Russia.173 O’Beirne, the British Chargé d’Affaires in 
St. Petersburg, telegraphed Grey that this particular Iranian project of Iran should 
not be further pursued.174 Neratov’s hard position must have resulted from the 
Shuster Mission, which had irritated the Russians owing to the appointment of 
Stokes. In addition, the idea of Swedish officers in the service of a small army at 
Tehran, which might be a competition to the Cossack Brigade at that time, was not 
popular with the Russians at all. After the second Russian ultimatum to Iran on 29 
November, Article 2 became a consideration of concern to the Swedes. In January 
1912, the British Minister in Stockholm, Lord Kilmarnock, was worried that 
Article 2 of the second Russian ultimatum applied to foreigners already in Iranian 
service.175 Later, Grey said that the British and Russian Legations in Tehran 
should inform the Swedish government that Article 2 of the second Russian 
ultimatum had no bearing on the case.176 On 10 January, an Aide-memoire by the 
Russian government asserted that Article 2 of the second Russian ultimatum did 
not apply to the Swedish officers in the Iranian service because it had had the 
preliminary assent of the Russian and British governments.177 Article 2 of the 
second Russian ultimatum was thus not necessarily relevant to the Swedish officer 
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issue. On 9 January, however, the Swedish government decided not to take any 
further steps in Iran without previously consulting the British and Russian 
governments.178 Obviously the Swedish government wished to avert a disaster 
such as that of the Shuster mission and Stokes.  
In the following months, both the British and the Swedish officers found 
difficulties. One was regarding the funds from the loan by the British and 
Russians had already been spent in early 1912.179 Captain Hjalmarson often 
mentioned the want of funds to Townley, the British Minister in Tehran.180 On the 
other hand, order in Iran was not easily restored. Although the gendarmerie had its 
success in Qazvin and Hamadan, in the South of Iran the Swedes did not prove so 
effective.181 By December 1912, it was known that the Swedish Gendarmerie had 
not completely succeeded in Shiraz, the capital of Fars province. The most 
significant reason was money.182 The British Consul at Shiraz also said that there 
was a problem because the Swedes had no experience dealing with eastern 
peoples, and that a British a loan was necessary.183 Townley, in January 1913, 
informed Grey that Britain needed to undertake a prolonged scheme of financing 
the Swedish Gendarmerie because without well-armed power order could not be 
restored, and that would have disadvantageous effects on Britain’s commerce in 
the South of Iran.184 He also emphasized the need for a loan to the Swedish 
Gendarmerie in order to retain these excellent Swedish officers.185 Furthermore, 
Townley asserted that Britain should be more energetic in the gendarmerie 
issue.186 Grey did not respond to the request for a loan, which showed that he, 
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and the British government, did not want to make any extra expenses on the 
Swedish Gendarmerie.  
In the view of Hjalmarson, his work was to prevent the situation of Iran from 
getting worse. In February 1913, Hjalmarson proposed a considerable extension in 
the sphere of his Gendarmerie, to include Isfahan, Tehran, Kermanshah and 
Mashhhad.187  In April 1913, Townley telegraphed Grey that some schemes 
proposed by Hjalmarson were feasible because it was clear that the small 
Gendarmerie force at present would be quite incapable of taking effective 
action.188 From June 1913, some Swedish officers were sent to Kerman, Isfahan 
and Hamadan as well.189 In July, the Iranian government officially decided to 
extend the scope of the operations of the Gendarmerie.190 By February 1914, 
more Swedish officers could be seen in Isfahan, Yazd and Kerman. In Townley’s 
view, the more the force was increased the better chance there was for an 
improvement of the country.191 However, Grey informed Townley that the British 
government would not find funds for paying the Swedes, and the Iranian 
government must take this responsibility,192 and took no action. By March, 
Townley kept warning Grey that without funds coming for the gendarmerie there 
would be no security of roads and British trade in the South of Iran.193 Grey 
argued that they indeed realized the worsening situation did no good to their trade, 
but that he still preferred that the Iranian government should deal with the 
situation themselves.194 On the part of Iran, the payment to the Swedish officers 
was limited and not in regular.195 
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    From 1914, the operations of the Swedish Gendarmerie in Iran gradually led 
to a dispute between Britain and Russia. On 26 February 1914, the Russian 
government said they wished to see a considerable development of the Cossack 
Brigade in northern Iran. However, the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs did 
not think this idea was practicable. He argued that accepting the proposal of 
Russia equaled accepting the partition of Iran. He also added that the actions of 
the Cossack Brigade should be restricted to Tehran and Tabriz only.196 In March 
1914, the Russian Minister in Tehran asserted that if the Iranian government 
allowed the Brigade to operate in the five northern Iranian provinces, rather than 
Tehran and Tabriz only, the Russians would not object to the Swedish 
Gendarmerie being employed in those provinces.197  Grey, then, telegraphed 
Buchanan, the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to let Russia know that the 
British must be involved in the operations of the Swedish Gendarmerie in the 
South of Iran owing to Britain’s interests, but the British also recognized Russia’s 
special position in northern Iran, and Russia would be informed of any extension 
of sphere of the Gendarmerie to the North of Iran. In addition, Grey had no 
objection to the extension of the Brigade to more places in the North of Iran, but 
only on condition that Russian troops were withdrawn from Iran.198 It can be seen 
that Grey endeavoured to negotiate with Russia, though it was likely he realised 
there would be no Russian troop withdrawal from Iran. However, Sazonov replied 
to Buchanan that he did not agree to the presence of the Swedish Gendarmerie in 
northern Iran because Russian troops had already made northern Iran quiet and 
prosperous. In the meantime, there were Ottoman troops near the Russian border 
making it impossible for Russia to withdraw their troops from those districts. He 
also argued that the British governed the South of Iran. Thus, Iran would be wise 
                                                 
196
 FO371/2066, no. 57, 8631, February 26, 1914, Townley to Grey. 
197
 FO371/2066, no. 82, 10725, March 10, 1914, Townley to Grey. 
198
 FO371/2066, no. 132, 10725, March 12, 1914, Grey to Buchanan. 
 249
consent to the extension of the Brigade and the withdrawal of Russian troops 
would not be possible.199  
Grey would not agree to any reorganization and expansion of the Cossack 
Brigade unless it was under the Iranian authorities, like the Swedish 
Gendarmerie.200 Grey thus resisted the suggestion of any expansion of Russian 
influence, and strongly maintained his position on the Swedish Gendarmerie in 
order not to prevent Russia from further expanding their Cossack Brigade. It also 
showed that Grey realized that the expansion of the Gendarmerie could only be 
bought at the price of the expansion of the Cossack Brigade, and of keeping the 
Russian troops in the north. On 29 April 1914, Sazonov argued that he did not 
consent to the Gendarmerie extending to districts that were in occupation by 
Russian troops, or to replace Russian troops after they were finally withdrawn. He 
astutely did not deny that Swedish officers could be employed in northern Iran, 
but made the unacceptable condition that only the reorganized Cossack Brigade 
could be based in the districts where Russian troops were presently stationed. He 
concluded that Russian influence must be maintained in the north, and the British 
had their freedom in the south, sending troops to occupy ports on the Persian Gulf 
if they wished to.201 Both Britain and Russia did not intend to clash with each 
other, but in reality stood firmly for their own interests at the expense of Iran.   
As the dispute between Russia and Britain had not ended, the Swedish 
Gendarmerie saw its end owing to lack of funds. Esme Howard, the British 
Minister in Stockholm, telegraphed Grey that the Swedish government preferred 
their officers to be recalled since there was no use in their remaining in Iran 
without money.202 Grey replied to him that the Swedish officers did not need to 
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return to Sweden. Britain would give them support.203 Grey did not refer to what 
kind of support it was, but as it would absolutely not be financial support, the 
offer was diplomatic but meaningless. It can be understood that the Swedish 
government just wanted to ensure that the task of the Gendarmerie was carried out 
in peace. They paid attention to what their officers did, so that any incident like 
that of Shuster and Stokes would be avoided. The Swedish government did not act 
indifferently to their officers as the American government had done in the case of 
Shuster. They also did not want to do anything that was not to the satisfaction of 
Britain and Russia.204 Their attitude was thus conscientious but ineffective in the 
face of Anglo-Russian interests and prestige. In July 1914, the Swedish Minister 
for Foreign Affairs considered that the Swedish officers should leave Iran by 1 
March 1915.205 At the beginning of the First World War, some Swedish officers 
returned to Sweden.206  
Generally, therefore, financial difficulties were a serious factor in causing the 
Swedes to fail in their mission;207 however in reality Iran’s problems derived 
from the financial crisis, so this issue was not peculiar to the position of the 
Swedish Gendarmerie. As a result of Russia’s opposition in its sphere of influence, 
in addition, the Swedish Gendarmerie could not establish its force throughout 
Iran.208 From the Iranian point of view, by 1914, the north part under Russian 
influence had not decreased at all. A problem for Iran was the fact that in June 
1914 the Russians were collecting taxes at Tabriz. To the Russians, collecting 
taxes had become a habit.209 As James Clark argues, the Russians had in fact been 
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in Tabriz since 1911, in the guise of taking responsibility for bringing security to 
the city.210 After the outbreak of war in 1914, Iran suffered from the clashes 
between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. In October 1914, battles between the 
Russians and the Ottomans took place in Baradost, Soma and Ormiyeh.211 In 
November 1914 Ahmad Shah issued an Imperial farman stating Iran’s neutrality 
and the maintenance of friendly relations with the powers.212 Yet, Iran’s efforts to 
remain neutral and prevent more conflict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire 
on its soil were thus futile.  
 
Conclusion 
    By 1914, foreign advisors under the Iranian constitutional government 
encountered serious obstruction by Russia. It can be understood that Iran was in a 
weak position, with its empty finances and ineffective army, and there was no 
possibility to reverse the situation. The endeavours of the Iranian government to 
make progress with its reforms were unsuccessful. In the meantime, British policy 
stood firm on the issue of foreign advisors in Iran, for example. The British 
insisted that only choices from small powers could be considered, and therefore 
Shuster and the Swedish officers chosen by Iran fitted in with British policy.   
    Foreign advisors in this period could not serve Iran effectively. In fact the 
key point was that the state was too weak to manage its domestic problems, such 
as an empty treasury and the disorders in the southern area. At the same time, 
foreign advisors in Iran encountered Britain and Russia’s entrenched interests, 
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which the Iranian constitutional government had no effective means of 
overcoming, especially in the case of Russia, despite its endeavours to support 
Shuster’s reforms, and to operate the Swedish Gendarmerie under the Swedish 
officials.  
With regard to British policy, the Shuster incident provided an obvious 
example of Britain permitting Russia to apply pressure on Iran through its two 
ultimatums. Shuster, who had support from the Majles, attempted to reform 
Iranian financial affairs by employing a British official in which his intentions 
were worthy, but misguided. The Majles’s intention to resist Russian pressure was 
justified but Russia, which followed the 1907 Convention according to its own 
purposes, could not agree that British influence be strengthened or even appear to 
be strengthened in the Russian sphere of influence. However, it cannot be argued 
that Britain’s policy on Iran was characterised by ever greater accommodation 
towards Russia because of a growth in Russian power. The Anglo-Russian 
Convention of 1907 played a significant part in shaping British policy, and even 
more so did its underlying purpose of permitting Britain to foster as well as 
protect its increasingly significant interests in the south.   
The second demand of the second Russian ultimatum of 1911 played a 
significant role in Iranian affairs. Owing to the experience of the Shuster Mission, 
Russia did not want to see any possible threat caused by other advisors employed 
by the Iranian government. Foreign advisors employed by Iran, hence, must be 
approved by Britain and Russia. This expectation represented a serious violation 
of Iran’s independence. With the 1907 Convention, the independence and integrity 
of Iran was ostensibly pursued by the British and Russians. However, the demand, 
to the Iranians, implicitly undermined Iran’s rights and independence. In 
subsequent incidents, the interests of Britain and Russia were placed well before 
those of Iran, so that respect for Iran’s independence and integrity was often 
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non-existent.  
The British learnt from the experience of the Shuster mission. The Stokes 
incident put Grey in an awkward position because he had no right to intervene in 
the decisions of Shuster and the Majles. After the strong opposition of Russia, 
Grey used diplomatic means to stop the appointment of Stokes. With regard to the 
Swedish officers, Grey endeavoured to support the operations of the Swedish 
gendarmerie. Although there was no substantial British offer of funding, Grey still 
supported their extension to the north, but without much conviction or effective 
opposition to Russian resistance. Still, it can be seen that the British did not agree 
to all Russian proposals or objections, if the matter was in the interest of the 
stability of Iran, and thus of their own concerns.  
British policy at the outbreak of the First World War was thus essentially to 
keep Russia’s goodwill and to intervene in the affairs of the South of Iran where 
its own interests were stronger. Owing to the 1907 Convention, the British had no 
right and power over Russia’s actions. In the Swedish officer issue, it can be seen 
that the British provided diplomatic and financial support, in order to secure their 
interests in the south. To the Iranians, the Swedish Gendarmerie was a means to 
achieve independence and freedom from foreign intervention. Even though the 
Gendarmerie did have success in certain places, lack of funds and foreign rivalry 
meant that the Gendarmerie could not operate effectively. Fortunately the Swedish 
officers and the Swedish government were careful in their relationship with 
Britain and Russia, in order to make sure that their mission to Iran did not result in 
disaster. 
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Chapter VII Conclusion 
British policy towards Iran during the period between 1908 and 1914 has not 
been explored so far in detail in academic studies. The existing literature has 
tended to focus on British policy with regard to relations between London and 
Tehran, but has paid little attention to the margins. It has also seen the subject 
more in terms of Anglo-Iranian relations rather than examining British policy as 
such. In addition, particular events and trends have been highlighted, such as the 
Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 
and Anglo-Russian domination in Iran. This thesis, by contrast, looks more at the 
margins, whilst also not neglecting the role of British policy at the centre and 
British relations with the government in Tehran. The thesis considers the above 
mentioned significant events, not so much in themselves but in particular from the 
point of view of British policy.  
Since great power rivalry was still the main long term factor shaping British 
policy, its implications need to be summarized and assessed before more detailed 
aspects of British policy are discussed. Right up to the beginning of World War I 
and beyond, British control of India and the route to it was a major factor 
influencing British decisions. The result was that Britain concentrated as much on 
the manoeuvres of Russia as on the politics of Iran. Indeed, from the British 
perspective, the two were inextricably linked. The two countries had already had 
their own areas of influence in Iran since the nineteenth century; the north was 
under Russia while the south was under Britain. Britain’s prime objective had 
been the protection of its colony, India; lack of other interests and feared costs 
prevented it from wishing to extend its power further in Iran, which resulted in the 
adoption of a policy of non-intervention in Iranian affairs, provided its main 
purpose was maintained. Russia’s possible expansion southwards towards the 
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Persian Gulf and India, however, represented an ongoing threat to Britain. By 
1900, nevertheless, the two powers, whilst remaining mutually suspicious, had 
achieved a form of consensus on how they operated in Iran. Prompted by the 
situation in Europe, and the rising power of Germany, this consensus produced in 
1907 the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention, which attempted to settle their 
differences in Iran and elsewhere. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 
represented a clear political relationship between Britain and Russia. It eventually 
agreed the exact sphere of influence in Iran of the two European countries, with a 
respect to Iran’s independence and integrity.  
The 1907 Convention made the British keep out of the North of Iran. They 
had no rights in the north, while they mainly paid attention to the south. Although 
the Convention stipulated that the British zone was in the South-East of Iran, 
British influence covered the whole South of Iran, which included the neutral 
zone. Russia did not deny the fact because the area traditionally was under control 
of Britain. This was the main reason why the British were able to take action 
freely in the neutral zone over the issues of the Iranian railways and 
Ottoman-Iranian border. In the view of the British, their concerns in the 
South-West of Iran were obviously relevant to their interests of oil. Thus, 
expanding their transportation in the area by railway construction and mediating 
in the Ottoman-Iranian border issue were all helpful to the British to secure 
themselves. In certain cases, the British seriously intervened in Iranian affairs in 
the South-West of Iran. When issues came to affect British interests in the area, 
the 1907 Convention maintaining Iran’s independence and integrity became 
non-existent. The two powers continued to guard their own interests rigorously, 
and at the same time each was vigilant that the other might not gain an undue 
advantage. A crucial factor was prestige, with each concerned that they might lose 
prestige in the eyes of the Iranians, and thus to the advantage of the other.  
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This thesis has looked at British policy in Iran from 1908-1914 from a 
number of different perspectives, the first was oil. Britain and Iran signed an Oil 
Concession in 1901, with Iran allowing the British to have a 60 year period to 
discover and use oil from Iran. Although at that time the two countries had no idea 
how the discovery of oil would go, this indicated that a new and significant step 
between the two countries had been taken. The Oil Concession of 1901 and the 
discovery of oil in 1908 were in fact a turning point in Anglo-Iranian relations, 
and would have a lasting effect, unlike previous concessions. The discovery of oil 
in Iran was also an issue as regards Anglo-Russian relations. The Oil Concession 
of 1901, which did not grant Britain any rights in the five northern provinces of 
Iran, was aimed at avoiding any Russian opposition, showing that both Britain and 
Iran paid attention to Russia’s reactions. During the process of prospecting for oil, 
the Anglo-Russian Convention was signed in 1907. It also related to oil by 
stipulating that all conventions signed previously were valid and were not affected, 
which secured Britain’s 1901 right to drill oil in the Russian Zone. The Oil 
Concession of 1901 was therefore protected by the 1907 Convention. Britain was 
still able to proceed with oil works in most provinces of Iran. The 1907 
Convention was thus significant in the evolution of British oil development in that 
it secured Russian acceptance of Britain’s rights over this matter. 
Britain had been seeking oil for seven years when promising oil wells were 
eventually found at Masjed-e Soleyman, in the Bakhtiyari territory in 1908. This 
was important with regard to the shaping of British policy from 1908 when the 
discovery of oil produced a change in that policy which gradually shifted to focus 
on the South-West of Iran. In addition, largely owing to the weakness of the 
Iranian government during the revolutionary period, the British preferred to 
negotiate with the local powers for their oil works, such as digging, laying 
pipelines, and constructing refineries. The Bakhtiyari Khans and the Sheykh of 
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Mohammerah, Sheykh Khaz‘al, were therefore the main figures with whom the 
British had to communicate. These negotiations resulted in agreements such as the 
Bakhtiyari Agreement of 1905 and the Mohammerah Agreement of 1909. 
Although the Iranian government did not accept the Bakhtiyari Agreement of 
1905, Britain still considered it to be a legitimate one between themselves and the 
Khans; and although the Mohammerah Agreement of 1909 was never ratified by 
the Iranian government, both the Sheykh and the British viewed it as a means of 
maintaining their mutual goodwill. It can be seen that the British bought land in 
the Bakhtiyari territory in 1911 and signed another agreement with Sheykh Kaz‘al 
in 1914 to protect their oil interests and to maintain their prestige in the area. 
These agreements thus expressed the fact that the British considered their 
relationship with the local powers to be more important than their relationships 
with the Iranian central government. The discovery of oil then enhanced the 
importance of the South-West of Iran in British policy in the country. Furthermore, 
the agreements they signed over oil signaled that the non-intervention policy 
begun in the nineteenth century was non-existent in the area.  
The most significant consequence in relation to oil development was the 
supply of oil to the British Admiralty from 1914, which placed Britain in a 
competitive position in relation to the other countries, such as America and Russia, 
as regards oil, and ensured that the APOC, established in 1909, would avoid the 
risk of being absorbed by other oil companies. It also provided the British 
Admiralty with oil in the First World War. The purchase of the APOC by the 
British government and the supply of oil to the British Admiralty increased 
Britain’s influence in most regions of Iran, and certainly in a much larger one than 
the British zone as agreed in the 1907 Convention.  
    Oil also changed British relationships with foreign powers. With regard to 
Russia Britain became especially concerned in maintaining a balance in terms of 
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advancing its oil interests, whilst staying on amicable terms with Russia and not 
antagonizing that country. With regard to the loan proposed by the APOC in 1910, 
Russia’s concern obliged Britain to be careful to satisfy Russia that there were no 
additional implications. Britain also had to deal carefully with its other rival, 
Germany, when it came to oil. German activities at Mohammerah caused the 
British concern regarding their potential supremacy in the South-West of Iran, and 
led to further assurances by the British to Sheykh Khaz‘al. Furthermore, oil 
supply was an international issue, given the competition faced by the APOC, and 
the signing of the Admiralty Agreement in 1914 and Britain had to take care to 
secure its new interests in the international arena. By 1914, oil had already exerted 
a significant impact on Anglo-Iranian relations.  
This thesis also examines the relations of the British with Mohammad ‘Ali 
Shah and his role in the constitutional revolution as well as his response to them. 
The thesis in addition sees the perspective of Mohammad ‘Ali Shah stabilising his 
country instead of blocking its development. The weakness of the new 
constitutional central government resulted in instability in the country, both in the 
political centre and the marginal regions. Mohammad ‘Ali Shah, who came to the 
throne in 1907, only saw his country in a state of disturbance everywhere and 
governed by a toothless cabinet and a Majles. For this reason, the Shah preferred 
the model of a constitutional government under his supervision, and his aim in the 
bombardment of the Majles in June 1908 was actually to end the chaos, rather 
than to repeal the constitution. Whilst not exactly sympathizing with the Shah’s 
point of view, the British, on the one hand followed their policy of 
non-intervention over the Shah’s coup. The prospect of a new attempt to restore 
order had some merit in their eyes. After the bombardment of the Majles, most of 
the Shah’s rivals in fact came from the provinces, such as the Bakhtiyari Khans 
from Isfahan and Sepahdar’s force from Gilan, and it was they who effected the 
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abdication of the Shah in July 1909. The new constitutional government was then 
re-established with a very young Shah and a regent in July 1909, though it must 
be stated that the new government had no effective means of stablising the 
country in a short space of time, given its state of oppression by foreign powers 
and its empty treasury, which meant from the British point of view that there was 
no change to central policy with regard to effecting security. The return of the 
ex-Shah, however, in 1911 therefore gained support among the Iranian people. 
Mohammad ‘Ali Shah was not an anti-constitutionalist, but rather, the leader of a 
country which faced a crisis but had lost his battle against the opposition. 
Although the constitutionalists obtained political power once more, it could not be 
seen as a sign that Iran was on a path towards improvement. 
The Iranian constitutional nationalists expected the British to provide 
assistance to their revolutionary movement and to their anti-Russian actions, but 
were much disillusioned by the 1907 Convention, which showed that the British 
simply looked to their own interests. With the return of the ex-Shah in 1911, the 
Iranian constitutional government also complained that the British did not prevent 
the Russians from assisting the ex-Shah by the 1909 Protocol. However, there was 
no proof that the ex-Shah received official support from the Russians. The 
activities of the ex-Shah were mostly in the Russian zone, and the British could 
not take any action beyond communicating with their Russian colleagues. They 
also refrained from giving support to the Bakhtiyari Khans over their intention to 
organize a coup in 1911.  
In the North of Iran, the British had no right to argue with Russia’s actions. 
In this case, however, the British had different attitudes to different cases. One 
was being suspicious of the actions of Colonel Liakhov in the bombardment of the 
Majles in June 1908, and the role of the Shah in the matter with regard to Russia. 
The British did not have clear evidence on the incident, but instructions from the 
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Russian government to Liakhov could be conceived of as not impossible, even 
though Isvolsky denied of the fact. The British were also not happy about the 
circumstances of the ex-Shah’s return in 1911. However, there were always 
rumours and reports that the ex-Shah received Russian financial and military 
support, no matter whether it was a fact or not. Although the 1909 Protocol signed 
by Britain and Russia indicated neutrality towards the ex-Shah and preventing 
him from returning to Iran, the British did not completely trust the Russians.  
The discovery of oil in the South-West and their relations with the local 
powers became highly important concerns to the British for a variety of reasons, 
and one was the influence of other powers in the area, particularly Germany. The 
Germans already had close connections with the Ottomans, and were developing 
friendly relations with Iran. Therefore Iranian foreign relations and projects in the 
area touched closely those of Britain. This point is reflected in the British attitude 
to the construction of the German sponsored Baghdad Railway from 1903, which 
approached the Persian Gulf via Mesopotamia. The Persian Gulf had been under 
Britain’s influence and control for a long time, and connected British trade to 
India. From the end of the nineteenth century Germany and Britain were rivals 
over naval power and colonies in the world. The emergence of the Baghdad 
Railway from Europe to the Middle East had a major impact on Britain’s prestige 
in the area, especially the Persian Gulf. Britain was not only concerned to protect 
its interests in the Persian Gulf from German intrusion via the railway, but also to 
prevent any pressure on India from Germany.  
Britain had also to consider Russia in the matter, as with any other major 
issue relating to Iran. With regard to the Baghdad Railway, Russia was concerned 
about a German branch line reaching the North of Iran via Khanaqin. At that time, 
there was a prohibition on railway construction in Iran following the 1890 
agreement between the two countries, which expired in 1910. During this period 
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Britain had continued to consider schemes for railway construction in the 
South-West of Iran. In the wake of the discovery of oil in 1908, Britain attempted 
to discuss the railway issue with Russia, in order to strengthen its position in the 
South-West of Iran. When the veto expired in 1910, it can be seen that a contest 
took place between Russia, Germany and Britain. The latter planned railway 
routes connecting Mohammerah, Khorramabad and some neighbouring cities and 
towns. Mohammerah was located in the oil work areas, and doubtless the railway 
line had the purpose of protecting oil interests by developing transportation. As 
Russia and Germany were negotiating an agreement in Potsdam 1910-1911, 
Britain and Iran were also in the process of signing a contract for railways. A 
concession for a Mohammerah-Khorramad railway granted to the British by the 
Iranian government in 1913 was a start in the railway issue.  
At the turn of the nineteenth century, generally, the failure to build railways 
was caused by commercial rivalry between Russia and Britain. The railway issue, 
however, made little progress in this period, and British concerns were one of the 
main impediments. Because of rivalry the major powers and their mutual attitudes, 
even the impact of the Baghdad Railway project in the early twentieth century, the 
Potsdam Agreement of 1911, the contract between the Persian Railways Syndicate 
and the Iranian government in 1911, and the Trans-Persian Railway scheme in 
1912, did not produce any specific progress on the Iranian railway issue by 1914. 
Iran itself, to which railways would have meant a considerable advantage, was 
weak owing to its poor financial state, which prevented it from constructing 
railways. An indication of this point is that Britain took steps to obtain a railway 
contract from the Iranian government, which focused on railways in the 
South-West of Iran.  
Not only Britain but also Russia was concerned with German plans for the 
Baghdad Railway even though it did not include a planned route into Iran. Britain 
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made some attempts to negotiate with German, but without results, while Russia 
signed the Potsdam Agreement with Germany in 1911. This was of some concerns 
to Britain, which adopted a wait-and-see policy to the event. Russia did not intend 
to damage the interests of the Entente, or undermine the Anglo-Russian 
Convention of 1907. Nor did it intend to give Germany any advantage. All of 
Russia’s actions were to diminish Germany’s influence on Iran in general, and in 
relation to Russia’s prestige in northern Iran in particular. However, the Potsdam 
Agreement did represent a kind of rapprochement with Germany at the expense of 
British interests.  
    In terms of railways, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 remained 
relevant. Russia was concerned to keep the Convention intact in its negotiations 
with Germany, and it provided Britain with a favourable framework in terms of 
monitoring Russia’s relations with Germany. In the Potsdam Agreement of 1911 
Russia also caused all the agreed articles to be restricted to the Russian zone of 
Iran. British policy was also something impediment to the development of Iran in 
terms of railways. For example, the negotiations over the Trans-Persian Railway 
in 1912 between Britain and Russia were ineffective due to Britain’s opposition to 
the lines passing through the British zone. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, 
therefore increasingly became less a means of preventing Anglo-Russian conflict 
in Iran, and more a means by which each country secured its own interests, at the 
expense of Iran.  
The Ottoman-Iranian border dispute mediated by the British was another 
matter in the said period which was also connected to the discovery of oil. This 
dispute was largely down to the fact that Iran and the Ottoman Empire never had a 
mutual understanding of their borders. From the sixteenth century onwards, the 
two countries were demarcated only by an approximated border area; however, 
after mediation by Britain and Russia with the Erzerum Treaty of 1847, the border 
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area was narrowed further, but even the Treaty and Explanatory Note of 1848 did 
not result in a precise and satisfactory solution. The British had been concerned 
with it over Mohammerah since the 1847 Treaty and the 1848 Note. In the early 
twentieth century, Mohammerah became important to the dispute owing to the 
Ottomans claiming that they controlled the Shatt al-Arab, Mohammerah and its 
neighbouring area, but the British did not agree, owing to the Oil Concession of 
1901 and subsequent arrangements over oil extraction. This caused the British to 
focus on their oil interests in places along the Ottoman-Iranian border, such as at 
Qasr-e Shirin, Zohab and Mohammerah, especially the latter. The Anglo-Russian 
Agreement of 1907, on the other hand, meant that they paid much less attention to 
the northern section of the border, which they left to Russia to resolve. When the 
Ottomans proposed to submit the border dispute to the Hague Tribunal in 1911, 
the British were worried that their prestige would suffer. The result was a common 
front with the Russians in the form of a commission to survey the border and 
mediate the issue later on at Istanbul from 1912. During the negotiations in 1912, 
the 1848 Note was an important document that was relevant to the demarcation at 
Mohammerah and along the Shatt al-Arab, where Britain had important economic 
interests, such as oil. The British endeavoured to prevent the Iranian government 
from giving Mohammerah to the Ottomans. On the other hand, the Iranian 
government had never acknowledged the 1848 Note at all. Yet, the transfer of the 
Iranian territory by the British eventually took place. Qasr-e Shirin in Iran was 
ceded by Britain to the Ottoman Empire in 1912. The cession was a condition of 
negotiations with the Ottomans. With this action, one can see Britain’s concern to 
ensure that Mohammerah remained in Iranian territory, in accordance with the 
interests of the APOC, at the expense of yielding other Iranian territory. In the 
view of the British, however, it was a means to secure Mohammerah as part of 
Iran. In the end, in the Istanbul Protocol of 1913, Mohammerah was given up by 
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the Ottomans and in return another part of Iran’s territory close to Zohab 
transferred to the Ottomans. 
The new Iranian government formed in July 1909 was unable to overcome its 
main problem, that of inadequate financing. The Majles was searching for a new 
financial advisor from abroad, and not accepting any suggestions made by Britain 
and Russia; they were keen to obstruct the influence of foreign powers, especially 
Russia. Morgan Shuster, an American with financial experience, was the Majles’s 
choice in 1911, and he was granted the highest authority to reform the country’s 
finances. The Majles used Shuster to build up Iran’s independence in the face of 
Russia, in particular by attempting reform of the finances. Shuster, however, 
believed that, to help Iran, he needed to employ a British official, Stokes, because 
of his knowledge of the Iranians and the Persian language. However, under the 
Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, by which Russia had its sphere of influence 
in northern Iran where Britain could not interfere in any way, Stokes’s proposed 
work in the Russian zone, which could possibly have increased Britain’s prestige 
in the north, was a source of irritation. Russia feared loss of prestige from it. In 
November 1911, the second Russian ultimatum, requesting Shuster’s dismissal 
and the appointment of Iran’s foreign advisors by Britain and Russia was rejected 
by the Majles, and this led to the dispatch of Russian troops to Tehran, the 
announcement of the closure of the Majles by the Regent, and the coup by the 
Bakhtiyari Khans in December 1911. Russia, which followed the 1907 
Convention to its own purposes, could not agree that British influence be 
strengthened or even appear to be strengthened in the Russian sphere of influence. 
However, it cannot be argued that Britain’s policy on Iran was characterised by 
ever greater accommodation towards Russia because of a growth in Russian 
power. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 played a significant factor in 
shaping British policy. The Shuster incident took place in Tehran, and it could be 
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understood that the British had no power to be in a hard position against the 
Russians. The Shuster incident, however, proved the strength of Russian influence 
in northern Iran. 
Although the closure of the Majles in 1911 represented the strong influence 
of foreign powers, especially Russia, this was the only way that Iran could 
eliminate any more serious loss. Then, Iran was not only without a proper 
representative political institution, it was also without a strong leader. Britain, it is 
to be noted, sacrificed the effective reform of the administration of the north, and 
its own  limited interests there, as well as its own official, to maintain what it 
considered most important – good relations with Russia. The essential problem of 
the weakness of Iran, however, was not only that of foreign influence. The fact 
was that the country was too weak for the foreign advisors to effectively improve 
Iran’s deteriorating financial situation and deal with disorder in the country. With 
regard to the Swedish officers, as Sweden was a small European power agreed by 
Britain and Russia, Grey endeavoured to support the operations of the Swedish 
Gendarmerie, particularly in the South of Iran. He also argued to the gendarmerie 
operating in northern Iran, and strongly supported them against Russian 
opposition in 1914. The Russians were anxious to prevent a repeat of the Shuster 
experience. However, the requisite funding from the Iranian government to keep 
the Swedes was not available, and the British government thought that it was 
Iran’s responsibility to provide it.  
Owing to the weakness of the Iranian government in the twentieth century, 
Britain’s policy of non-intervention continued but gradually applied only to 
Iranian affairs in the political centre. The British attempted to retain their 
traditional policy of non-intervention, but simultaneously were drawn more 
deeply into Iran by their interest in the oil producing areas. The discovery of oil 
began changes in British policy in Iran’s marginal area and in their international 
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politics. It can be seen that some issues taking place in Tehran and the North of 
Iran were met by Britain’s indifference, and the British would adjust their policy if 
they encountered arguments with the Russians. For example, the British did not 
provide assistance to the constitutional movement and the constitutionalists from 
1905. When the acceptance of the bastis in the British legation in Tehran was 
designated by the Iranians and Russians as intervention, the British stopped it and 
asked the bastis to leave immediately. Regarding the Shuster Mission with the 
Stokes incident in 1911, the British had no intention of intervening in the 
appointment of Stokes by Shuster in the beginning, but owing to the serious 
opposition by the Russians, Britain found the necessity of recalling Stokes. Yet, to 
the affairs outside Tehran, such as the South-West of Iran, it can be seen that the 
British were concerned to ensure their oil interests in the area by signing 
agreements with the Bakhityari Khans and Sheykh Kha‘zal. The British did not 
care about Iran’s opposition at all. In addition, the railway schemes planned in the 
South-West of Iran were part of a strategy of the British against the Baghdad 
Railway. The Mohammerah-Khorramabad line was to block the Baghdad Railway 
stretching into the South of Iran. The British thus were desirous to obtain a 
concession from the Iranian government. Furthermore, on the disputes of the 
Ottoman-Iranian border, the British tended to mediate, so as not to risk their 
prestige. The issue of the need to restore order in Iran also became more pressing, 
though Britain had other interests in the South and South-West, especially trade, 
which led it to be concerned with solutions to Iran’s security problem. Britain was 
thus closely involved in the introduction of the Swedish Gendarmerie in the South 
of Iran from 1911, to which it gave support. British actions on the margins of Iran 
as a result of oil this connected to a variety of issues in their policy.  
Agreements signed outside the Iranian political centre before the War were 
new in nature in the context of Anglo-Iranian relations. Bakhtiyari Agreement of 
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1905 and the Mohammerah Agreement of 1909 were not acknowledged by the 
Iranian government. In the view of the Iranian centre, the local powers had no 
right to sign any document with foreigners. The agreements were both relevant to 
oil, but the Oil Concession of 1901 should have been the only point of reference; 
in other words, the British should only have obtained benefit from the Iranian 
government. The two agreements were signed at sensitive times, which were the 
constitutional movement in 1905 and the abdication of Mohammad ‘Ali Shah in 
July 1909. This shows that the British government was fully aware that the Iranian 
government was weak and unstable. The Bakhtiyari Agreement of 1905 remained 
valid between the British and the Khans, while the Mohammerah Agreement of 
1909 was reached through mediation by Preece with Sardar As‘ad and Sheykh 
Khaz‘al. The APOC even signed another agreement with Sheykh Khaz‘al in 1914, 
which meant an even the closer relationship between the Sheykh and the APOC. 
With the agreements, the British had more powers in the South-West of Iran. 
Many events during 1908 and 1914 created multiple dimensions in British 
policy to Iran. The Oil Concession of 1901, the Iranian Constitutional Revolution 
of 1906 and the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 were key factors. The Oil 
Concession made the British pay much attention to the oil fields, such as those in 
the Bakhtiyari territory. Paying much attention to Iran’s marginal area increased 
its importance in British policy towards Iran. The constitutionalists in Tehran did 
not receive Britain’s support at all. British policy in Iran could not be viewed as 
one solid entity, but in fact it assumed various characteristics in different regions. 
Thus, in the South-West of Iran it can be seen that the British were very active 
owing to their oil interests by signing agreements with the local powers, making 
plans for railway routes and mediating in the dispute of the Ottoman-Iranian 
border on the part of the Shatt al-Arab and Mohammerah.  
British policy towards Iran from 1908 to 1914 is best viewed from a broad 
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perspective, given that Russia and Germany, were important factors in this 
relationship. Germany represented a new threat, replacing Russia, to Britain in the 
Middle East and Iran. Germany mainly strengthened itself by the Baghdad 
Railway from 1903, owing to the fact that the terminal of the Baghdad Railway 
was Baghdad, that is to say, close to Kuwait and the Persian Gulf. In the meantime, 
Germany also attempted to befriend Sheykh Khaz‘al, which became a threat to the 
British. Russia and Britain both sought to prevent an increase in German influence 
in the area resulting from the Baghdad Railway’s extension towards the Persian 
Gulf and the Russian zone in Iran. Thus the German threat was hardly to be 
neglected. In 1911, Germany had the most influential effect to Britain over a 
number of incidents, such as the possible submission of the Ottoman-Iranian 
border dispute to the Hague Tribunal in June and the signing of the Potsdam 
Agreement by Russia and Germany in August. This situation continued to develop 
up until the outbreak of war.  
To sum up, the course of Anglo-Iranian relations between 1908 and 1914 was 
marked by the major effect on Iran’s international relations caused by the internal 
changes in the country. The changes in Iran, however, could not quell the 
disturbances in the short term, and similarly it proved impossible to resolve all of 
the accompanying political and financial problems, despite the strong action taken 
by individuals such as Shuster. Neither could European countries achieve a 
sustainable balance of power, given that Britain, Russia and Germany were 
involved in growing rivalry both in Europe and in Iran itself. All of these powers 
were keen not to lose their prestige in Iran at any cost, and thus Iran found it 
impossible to avoid becoming embroiled in their rivalries. By 1914, therefore, 
Anglo-Iranian relations still retained some features from the nineteenth century, 
while new factors were emerging as a result of tensions between Britain and Iran, 
and Russia, Germany and the Ottoman Empire. 
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Oil fields in the province of Khuzestan (Reproduced from FO248/962) 
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The British and Russian proposed railways 1913-1914
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The 1639 Treaty between Iran and the Ottoman Empire 
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The Erzerum Treaty of 1847 
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Map 6 
 
The Mediation Line of 1850 (Reproduced from FO881/8800) 
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Map 7 
 
The Ottoman-Iranian Border of 1914  
(Reproduced from C. H. D. Ryder, ‘The Demarcation of the Turco-Persian 
Boundary in 1913-1914,’ The Geographical Journal, Vol. 66, No. 3 (Sep., 1925), 
p. 231.) 
 276
Bibliography 
 
Primary Sources: 
1. British Petroleum, University of Warwick, UK 
2. Edward Browne’s Papers, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK 
3. Foreign Office, The National Archives, London, UK  
        FO60, FO248, FO371, FO881 and FO416 
4. India Office, The British Library, London, UK     
        L/PS Political and Secret 
5. League of Nations Official Journal 
6. Parliamentary Papers 
7. Treaties and Undertakings in Force between the British Government and the 
Shaikh of Mohammerah 1899-1919, Calcutta: Superintendent Government 
Printing, 1919.  
8. Wilson, Lieutenant A. T.. A Precis of the Relations of the British Government 
with the Tribes & Shaikhs of Arabistan. Bushire: 1911. 
9. Foreign Relations of the United States 
10. Sazman-e Asnad-e Melli-ye Iran, Tehran, Iran 
 
Published Sources: 
1. Bourne, Keneth and Watt, D. Cameron. (ed) British Documents on Foreign 
Affairs: Report and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part I, 
Volume 18. University Prince of America, 1985. 
2. Burdett, A. L. P. & Seay, A.. Iran in the Persian Gulf 1820-1966, Volume 2: 
1880-1917. Slough: Archive Editions, 2000. 
3. Hertslet, Edward. Treaties, Etc. Concluded Between Great Britain and Persia, 
 277
and Between Persia and Other Foreign Powers (1891). London: Butterworths, 
1891. 
4. Hurewitz, J. C.. Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East—A Documentary 
Record: 1535-1914, Volume I. Toronto, D. Van Nostrand Company, 1958. 
5. Nezam Mafi, Reza Quli. Ketab-e Sabz. Tehran: Nashr-e Tarikh-e Iran, 
1336/1957. 
6. Schreinder, George Abel. (ed) Entente Diplomacy and the World: Matrix of 
the History of Europe, 1909-1914. trans. De Siebert, B.. New York and 
London: The Knickerbocker Press, 1921. 
7. Torkman, Mohammad. Asnadi Darbareh-e Hojum-e Engelis va Rus beh Iran 
1291 tal 1287. Tehran: Daftar-e Motale‘at-e Siyasi va Baynalmelali, 
1370/1991. 
8. Vahed-e Nashr-e Asnad. Gozideh Asnad-e Siyasi-ye Iran va ‘Osmani: 
Dowreyeh-e Qajariyeh, Jeld-e 6. Tehran: Mo‘asseseh-ye Chap va Entesharat-e 
Vezarat-e Omur-e Kharejeh, 1372/1993. 
9. Vezarat-e Kharejeh-ye Rusiyeh, Ketab-e Narenji Jeld-e 4. Tehran: Ketab-e 
Parvaz, 1368/1989. 
10. Vezarat-e Kharejeh-ye Rusiyeh. Ketab-e Narenji Jeld-e 1. beh Kushesh-e 
Bashiri, Ahmad. Tehran: Nashr-e Nur, 1367/1988. 
 
Newspapers 
    The Times 
    The New York Times 
 
Secondary Sources in Persian: 
1. Abtahi Forushani, Seyyed Alireza. ‘Bakhtiyariha va Naft: Avvalin Gamha 
1319-1323.’ Tarikh-e Mo‘aser-e Iran. Faslname Takhassosi, Sal-e 50, No. 19 
 278
va 20, Paiz va Zemestan, 1390/2011, pp. 119-140. 
2. Abtahi, Alireza. Naft va Bakhtiariha. Tehran: Mo‘asseseh-ye Motale‘at-e 
Tarikh-e Mo‘aser-e Iran, 1384/2005. 
3. Dashtaki, Khodabakhsh Qorbanpur. Engelis va Bakhtiyari 1896-1925 Miladi. 
Tehran: Mo‘asseseh-ye Motale‘at-e Tarikh-e Mo‘aser-e Iran, 1389/2010. 
4. Mohammad Ali Elmi, Sa‘id Qane‘i. Nokhostvaziran-e Iran az Sadr-e 
Mashruteh ta Forupashi Dowlat-e Bakhtiyar. Tehran: Elmi, 1391/2012. 
5. Kuhestani-Nejad, Mas‘ud. Chaleshha va Ta‘amolat-e Iran va Iraq dar 
Nimeh-ye Nokhost-e Sadeh-ye Bistom. Tehran: Markaz-e Asnad va 
Khadamat-e Pazhuheshi, 1386/2007. 
6. Majmu‘eh, Moqalat. (ed) Nehzat-e Mashrutiyat-e Iran, Jeld-e 1. Tehran: 
Mo‘asseseh-ye Motale‘at-e Tarikh-e Mo‘aser-e Iran, 1378/1999. 
7. Mo‘ezzi, Fatemeh. ‘Mohammad ‘Ali Shah Qajar (Nokhostin Sal-e Saltanat).’ 
Tarikh-e Mo‘aser-e Iran. Faslnameh Takhassosi, Sal-e 15, No. 59, Paiz 
1390/2011, pp. 77-110. 
8. Mo‘ezzi, Fatemeh. ‘Mohammad ‘Ali Shah Qajar dar Vapasin-e Sal-e Saltanat.’ 
Tarikh-e Mo‘aser-e Iran. Faslnameh Takhassosi, Sal-e 15, No. 60, Zemestan 
1390/2011, pp. 155-189. 
9. Mujani, Seyyed Ali. Barrasi Monasebat-e Iran va Amrika (1851 ta 1925 
Miladi). Tehran: Mo‘asseseh-ye Chap va Entesharat-e Vezarat-e Omur-e 
Kharejeh, 1375/1996. 
10. Nayyeri, Loqman Dehqan. ‘Anjaman-e Moqaddas-e Melli-ye Isfahan va 
Kudeta-ye Mohammad ‘Ali Shah.’ in Majmu‘eh, Moqalat. (ed) Nehzat-e 
Mashrutiyat-e Iran, Jeld-e 1. Tehran: Mo‘asseseh-ye Motale‘at-e Tarikh-e 
Mo‘aser-e Iran, 1378/1999, pp. 98-116. 
11. Qayyem, ‘Abdalnabi. Faraz va Forud-e Sheykh Khaz‘al. Tehran: Ketab-e 
Amiyeh, 1391/2012. 
 279
12. Taqavi Mogaddam, Seyyed Mostafa. Faraz va Forud-e Mashtureh. Tehran: 
Mo‘asseseh-ye Motale‘at-e Tarikh-e Mo‘aser-e Iran, 1384/2005. 
13. Velayati, ‘Ali Akbar. Tarikh-e Ravabet-e Khareji-ye Iran dar Dowreh-ye 
Avval-e Mashruteh. Tehran: Vezarat-e Omur-e Kharejeh, 1370/1991. 
14. Yelfani, Ramin. Zendeganiyeh Siyasi-ye Abu al-Qasem Khan Naser al-Molk. 
Tehran: Mo‘asseseh-ye Motale‘at-e Tarikh-e Mo‘aser-e Iran, 1376/1997. 
15. Yazdani, Sohrab. Mojahedan-e Mashruteh. Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1389/2010. 
16. Zinoyof, Eivan Aleksiyovich. Engelab-e Mashrutiyat-e Iran: Nezarat-e Yek 
Diplomat-e Rus: Havades-e Iran dar Salha-ye 1905 ta 1911. Tarjomeh: 
Eʻteshami, Abu al-Qasem. Tehran: Eqbal, 1362/1983. 
 
Secondary Sources in English: 
1. Adelson, Roger. London and the Invention of the Middle East: Money, Power, 
and War, 1902-1922. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995. 
2. Afary, Janet. The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1911: Grassroots 
Democracy, Social Democracy, & the Origins of Feminism. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996. 
3. Ahmad, Ishtiaq. Anglo-Iranian Relations 1905-1919. New York: Asia 
Publishing House, 1974. 
4. Al-Izzi, Khalid. The Shatt Al-Arab Dispute: A Legal Study. London: Third 
World Centre for Research and Publishing Ltd, 1981. 
5. Amirsadeghi, Hossein. (ed) Twentieth-Century Iran. New York: Holmes & 
Meier Publishers, 1977. 
6. Atabaki, Touraj. (ed) Iran and the First World War: Battleground of the Great 
Powers. London: I.B. Tauris, 2006. 
7. Ateş, Sabri. The Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands: Making a Boundary, 
1843-1914. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
 280
8. Avery, P. W. and Simmons, J. B.. ‘Persia on a Cross of Silver, 1880-1890.’ 
Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 10, No. 3 (Oct., 1974), pp. 259-286. 
9. Avery, Peter. Hambly, Gavin. and Melville, Charles. (eds) The Cambridge 
History of Iran Volume 7—From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
10. Bayat, Mangol. Iran’s First Revolution: Shiism and the Constitutional 
Revolution 1905-1909. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
11. Beloff, Max. Britain’s Liberal Empire 1897-1921: Volume 1 of Imperial 
Sunset. London: MacMillan Press, 1987. 
12. Berberian, Houri. Armenians and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 
1905-1911. Colorado: Westview Press, 2001. 
13. Bonakdarian, Mansour. Britain and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 
1906-1911: Foreign Policy, Imperialism, and Dissent. New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 2006. 
14. Browne, Edward G.. A Brief Narrative of Recent Events in Persia. London: 
Luzac and Co., 1909. 
15. Browne, Edward G.. The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909. Washington: 
Marge Publishers, 1910.  
16. Buchanan, Sir George. My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories 
Volume I. London: Cassell and Company, 1923. 
17. Burke III, Edmund. (ed) Struggle and Survival in the Modern Middle East. 
London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993.  
18. Burrell, Robert Michael. Aspects of the Reign of Muzaffar al-Din Shah of 
Persia 1896-1907. PhD thesis, London: SOAS, 1979. 
19. Busch, Briton Cooper. Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914. Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967. 
20. Calder, Kenneth J.. Britain and the Origins of the New Europe 1914-1918. 
 281
London: Cambridge University Press, 1976. 
21. Çetınsaya, Gökhan. ‘Challenges of a Frontier Region: The Case of Ottoman 
Iraq in the Nineteenth Century.’ in Peacock, A. C. S.. (ed) The Frontiers of the 
Ottoman World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 271-287.  
22. Chapman, Maybelle Kennedy. Great Britain and the Bagdad Railway 
1888-1914. Northampton: Massachusetts, 1948. 
23. Chehabi, H. E. and Martin, Vanessa. (eds) Iran’s Constitutional Revolution: 
Popular Politics, Cultural Transformations and Transnational Connections. 
London: I.B. Tauris, 2010. 
24. Clark, James D.. ‘Constitutionalists and Cossacks: The Constitutional 
Movement and Russian Intervention in Tabriz, 1907-11.’ Iranian Studies. Vol. 
39, No.2, June 2006, pp. 199-225. 
25. Clark, James D.. Provincial Concerns: A Political History of the Iranian 
Province of Azerbaijan, 1848-1906. California: Mazda Publishers, 2006. 
26. Cohen, Stuart A.. British Policy in Mesopotamia 1903-1914. London: Ithaca 
Press, 1976. 
27. Cohen, Stuart. ‘Mesopotamia in British Strategy, 1903-1914.’ International 
Journal of Middle East Studies. Vol. 9, No. 2 (Apr., 1978), pp. 171-181. 
28. Cottam, Richard W.. Nationalism in Iran. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1979. 
29. Cronin, Stephanie. ‘Britain, the Iranian Military and the Rise of Reza Khan.’ 
in Martin, Vanessa. (ed) Anglo-Iranian Relations since 1800. London and New 
York: Routledge, 2005, pp. 99-127. 
30. Cronin, Stephanie. ‘Building A New Army: Military Reform in Qajar Iran,’ in 
Farmanfamian, Roxane. (ed) War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications 
Past and Present. London and New York: Routledge, 2008, pp. 47-87. 
31. Cronin, Stephanie. ‘Deserters, Converts, Cossacks and Revolutionaries: 
 282
Russians in Iranian Military Service 1800-1920.’ Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 
48, No. 2, 2012, pp. 147-182. 
32. Cronin, Stephanie. ‘Importing Modernity: European Military Missions to 
Qajar Iran.’ Comparative Studies in Society and History. Vol. 50, No. 1 (Jan., 
2008), pp. 197-201. 
33. Cronin, Stephanie. ‘The Constitutional Revolution, Popular Politics, and 
State-Building.’ in Chehabi, H. E. and Martin, Vanessa. Iran’s Constitutional 
Revolution: Popular Politics, Cultural Transformations and Transnational 
Connections. London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010, pp. 81-97. 
34. Cronin, Stephanie. The Army and the Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, 
1910-1926. London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997. 
35. Earle, Edward Mead. ‘The Turkish Petroleum Company—A Study in 
Oleaginous Diplomacy.’ Political Science Quarterly. Vol. 39, No. 2 (Jun., 
1924), pp. 265-279. 
36. Earle, Edward Mead. Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A 
Study in Imperialism. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924. 
37. Elphinstone, W. G.. ‘The Kurdish Question.’ International Affairs. Vol. 22, No. 
1 (Jan., 1946), pp. 91-103. 
38. Elwell-Sutton, L. P.. Persian Oil—A Study in Power Politics. London: 
Lawrence and Wishart Ltd, 1955. 
39. Farmanfarmaian, Roxane. (ed) War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications 
past and present. London and New York: Routledge, 2008. 
40. Fatemi, Nasrollah Saifpour. Oil Diplomacy: Powderkeg in Iran. New York: 
Whittier Books, 1954.  
41. Ferrier, R. W.. The History of the British Petroleum Company Volume 1 The 
Developing Years 1901-1932. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
42. Fisher, Charles A.. (ed) Essays in Political Geography. London: Methuen & 
 283
Co, Ltd, 1968. 
43. Fraser, David. The Short Cut to India: The Record of a Journey along the 
Route of the Baghdad Railway. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood 
and Sons, 1909. 
44. Galbraith, John S.. ‘Britain and American Railway Promoters in Late 
Ninettenth Ceuntry Persia.’ Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with 
British Studies. Vol. 21, No. 2 (Summer, 1989), pp. 248-262. 
45. Garthwaite, Gene R.. ‘The Bakhtiyari Ilkhani: An Illusion of Unity.’ 
International Journal of Middle East Studies. Vol. 8, No. 2 (Apr., 1977), pp.  
145-160. 
46. Garthwaite, Gene R.. ‘The Bakhtiyari Khans, the Government of Iran, and the 
British, 1846-1915.’ International Journal of Middle East Studies. Vol.3, No.1 
(Jan., 1972), pp. 24-44. 
47. Garthwaite, Gene R.. Khans and Shahs: A History of the Bakhtiyari Tribe in 
Iran. London: I.B. Tauris, 1983. 
48. Geiss, Imanuel. German Foreign Policy, 1871-1914. London and Boston: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976. 
49. Geyer, Dietrich. Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and 
Foreign Policy 1860-1914. trans. Little, Bruce. New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1987. 
50. Gillard, David. The Struggle for Asia 1828-1914: A Study in British and 
Russian Imperialism. London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1977. 
51. Greaves, Rose Louise. ‘British Policy in Persia, 1892-1903—I.’ Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies. Vol. 28, No. 1 (1965), pp. 34-60. 
52. Greaves, Rose Louise. ‘British Policy in Persia, 1892-1903—II.’ Bulletin of 
the School of Oriental and African Studies. Vol. 28, No. 2 (1965), pp. 284-307. 
53. Greaves, Rose Louise. ‘Iranian Relations with Great Britain and British India, 
 284
1798—1921.’ in Avery, Peter. Hambly, Gavin. and Melville, Charles. (eds) 
The Cambridge History of Iran Volume 7—From Nadir Shah to the Islamic 
Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 374-425. 
54. Greaves, Rose Louise. ‘Some Aspects of the Anglo-Russian Convention and 
Its Working in Persia, 1907-14—I.’ Bulletin of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies. Vol. 31, No. 1(1968), pp. 69-91. 
55. Greaves, Rose Louise. ‘Some Aspects of the Anglo-Russian Convention and 
Its Working in Persia, 1907-14—II.’ Bulletin of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies. Vol. 31, No. 2(1968), pp. 290-308. 
56. Harris, Norman Dwight. Europe and the East, London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1927. 
57. Head, Judith A.. ‘Public Opinions and Middle Eastern Railways: The 
Russo-German Negotiations of 1910-11.’ The International History Review. 
Vol. 6, no. 1 (Feb., 1984), pp. 28-47. 
58. Heravi, Mehdi. Iranian-American Diplomacy. New York: Theo. Gaus’ Sons., 
1969. 
59. Hinsley, F. H.. (ed) British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977.  
60. Hone, J. M. and Dickison, Page L.. Persia in Revolution with Notes of Travel 
in the Caucasus. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1910.  
61. Hubbard, G. E.. From the Gulf to Ararat: An Expedition through Mesopotamia 
and Kurdistan. Edinburgh: W. Balckwood & Sons, 1916. 
62. Hughes, Hugh. Middle East Railways. Middlesex: The Continental Railway 
Circle, 1981. 
63. Ingram, Edward. ‘An Aspiring Buffer State: Anglo-Persian Relations in the 
Third Coalition, 1804-1807.’ The Historical Journal. Vol. 16, No. 3 (Sep., 
1973), pp. 509-533. 
 285
64. Issawi, Charles. (ed) The Economic History of Iran 1800-1914. Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1971.  
65. Issawi, Charles. ‘European Economic Penetration, 1872-1991.’ in Avery, Peter. 
Hambly, Gavin. and Melville, Charles. (eds) The Cambridge History of Iran 
Volume 7—From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991, pp. 590-607. 
66. Jack, Marian. ‘The Purchase of the British Government’s Shares in the British 
Petroleum Company 1912-1914.’ Past & Present. No.39 (Apr., 1968), pp. 
139-168. 
67. Jackson, William. The Pomp of Yesterday: The Defence of India and the Suez 
Canal 1798-191. London and Washington: Brassey’s, 1995. 
68. Johnson, R. A.. ‘“Russians at the Gate of India”? Planning the Defence of 
India, 1885-1900.’ The Journal of Military History. Vol. 67, No. 3 (Jul., 2003), 
pp. 697-743. 
69. Kaikobad, Kaiyan Homi. The Shatt-al-Arab Boundary Question: A Legal 
Reappraisal. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. 
70. Karsh, Efraim and Karsh, Inari. Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery 
in the Middle East 1789-1923. London: Harvard University Press, 1999. 
71. Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh. ‘Fragile Frontiers: The Diminishing Domains of 
Qajar Iran.’ International Journal of Middle East Studies. Vol. 29, No. 2 (May, 
1997), pp. 205-234. 
72. Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh. Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 
1804-1946. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999. 
73. Kasravi, Ahmad. History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution Vol. I. trans. 
Siegel, Evan. California: Mazda Publishers, 2006. 
74. Kazemzadeh, F.. ‘Iranian Relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, To 
1921,’ in Avery, Peter. Hambly, Gavin. and Melville, Charles. (eds) The 
 286
Cambridge History of Iran Volume 7—From Nadir Shah to the Islamic 
Republic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 314-349. 
75. Kazemzadeh, Firuz. ‘Russia and the Middle East.’ in Lederer, Ivo J.. (ed) 
Russian Foreign Policy—Essays in Historical Perspective. New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1962, pp. 489-530. 
76. Kazemzadeh, Firuz. ‘Russian Imperialism and Persian Railways.’ in McLean, 
Hugh. Malia, Martin E.. and Fischer, George. (eds) Russian Thought and 
Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957, pp. 354-373. 
77. Kazemzadeh, Firuz. Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914: A Study in 
Imperialism. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968. 
78. Keddie, Nikki R.. ‘British Policy and the Iranian Opposition 1901-1907.’ The 
Journal of Modern History. Vol. 39, No. 3 (Sep., 1967), pp. 266-282. 
79. Keddie, Nikki R.. ‘Iranian Politics 1900-05: Background to Revolution: III.’ 
Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 5, No. 3 (Oct., 1969), pp. 234-250. 
80. Keddie, Nikki R.. ‘Iranian Politics 1900-1905: Background to Revolution.’ 
Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 5, No. 1 (Jan., 1969), pp. 3-31. 
81. Keddie, Nikki R.. ‘Iranian Politics 1900-1905: Background to Revolution: II.’ 
Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 5, No. 2 (May, 1969), pp. 151-167. 
82. Kedourie, Elie. England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman 
Empire 1914-1921. London: Bowes & Bowes, 1956. 
83. Kennedy, Paul M.. The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914. 
London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980. 
84. Kent, Marian. Moguls and Mandarins: Oil, Imperialism and the Middle East 
in British Foreign Policy 1900-1940. London: Frank Cass, 1993. 
85. Kent, Marian. Oil and Empire: British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil 
1900-1920. London and Basingtoke: The MacMillan Press, 1976. 
86. Kerr, Ian J.. Building the Railways of the Raj 1850-1900. Delhi: Oxford 
 287
University Press, 1995. 
87. Khatib-Shahidi, Rashid Amin. German Foreign Policy towards Iran before 
World War I: Political Relations, Economic Influence and the National Bank 
of Persia. London: I.B. Tauris, 2013. 
88. Khazeni, Arash. ‘The Bakhtiyari Tribes in the Iranian Constitutional 
Revolution.’ Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. 
Vol. 25, No. 2, 2005, pp. 377-398. 
89. Khazeni, Arash. Tribes and Empire on the Margins of Nineteenth-Century Iran. 
Seattle & London: University of Washington Press, 2009. 
90. Klein, Ira. ‘British Intervention in the Persian Revolution, 1905-1909.’ The 
Historical Journal. Vol.15, No.4 (Dec., 1972), pp. 731-752. 
91. Kumar, Ravinder. India and the Persian Gulf Region 1858-1907: A Study in 
British Imperial Policy. London: Asia Publishing House, 1965. 
92. Kurt, Burcu. ‘Contesting Foreign Policy: Disagreement between the Ottoman 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of War on the Shatt al-Arab 
Dispute with Iran, 1912-1913.’ Iranian Studies. Vol. 47, No. 6, September 
2014, pp. 967-985. 
93. Lauterpacht, E.. ‘River Boundaries: Legal Aspects of the Shatt-al-Arab 
Frontier.’ The International and Comparative Law Quarterly. Vol. 9, No. 2 
(Apr., 1960), pp. 208-236.  
94. Lederer, Ivo J.. (ed) Russian Foreign Policy—Essays in Historical Perspective. 
New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1962. 
95. Lenczowsky, George. Russia and the West in Iran, 1914-1948: A Study in 
Big-Power Rivalry. London: Cornell University Press, 1949. 
96. Lieven, Dominic. Russia and the Origins of the First World War. London: 
Macmillan, 1983.  
97. Lynn-Jones, Sean M.. ‘Détente and Deterrence: Anglo-German Relations, 
 288
1911-1914.’ International Security. Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall, 1986), pp. 121-150. 
98. Mahaja, Sneh. British Foreign Policy 1874-1914: The Role of India. London 
and New York: Routledge, 2002. 
99. Martin, Bradford G.. German-Persian Diplomatic Relations 1873-1912. 
Gravenhage: Mouton & Co., 1959. 
100. Martin, Vanessa and Nouraei, Morteza. ‘Foreign Land Holdings in Iran 
1828-1911.’ The Royal Asiatic Society. Vol. 21, Part 2, 2011, pp. 131-145. 
101. Martin, Vanessa. ‘Hartwig and Russian Policy in Iran 1906-08.’ Middle 
Eastern Studies. Vol. 29, No. 1 (Jan., 1993), pp. 1-21. 
102. Martin, Vanessa. Islam and Modernism: The Iranian Revolution of 1906. 
London: I.B. Tauris, 1989. 
103. Martin, Vanessa. (ed) Anglo-Iranian Relations since 1800. London and New 
York: Routledge, 2005. 
104. McDaniel, Robert A.. The Shuster Mission and the Persian Constitutional 
Revolution. Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1974. 
105. McLachlan, Keith. (ed) The Boundaries of Modern Iran. London: UCL Press, 
1994. 
106. McLean, David. Britain and Her Buffer State—The Collapse of the Persian 
Empire, 1890-1914. London: Royal Historical Society, 1979.  
107. McLean, Hugh. Malia, Martin E.. and Fischer, George. (eds) Russian 
Thought and Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. 
108. McLean, Roderick R.. Royalty and Diplomacy in Europe 1890-1914. 
Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
109. Medlicott, W. N.. The Congress of Berlin and After: A Diplomatic History of 
the Near Eastern Settlement 1878-1880. London: Frank Cass, 1963. 
110. Mejcher, Helmut. Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq, 1910-1928. London: Ithaca 
Press, 1976. 
 289
111. Melamid, Alexander. ‘The Shatt al-‘Arab Boundary Dispute.’ Middle East 
Journal. Vol. 22, No. 3 (Summer, 1968), pp. 350-357. 
112. Millspaugh, Arthur C.. Americans in Persia. New York: Da Capo Press, 
1946. 
113. Moore, Arthur. The Orient Express. London: Constable & Company Ltd., 
1914. 
114. Mowat, R. B.. ‘Great Britain and Germany in the Early Twentieth Century.’ 
The English Historical Review. Vol. 46, No. 183 (Jul., 1931), pp. 423-441. 
115. Murray, Gilbert. Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey 1906-1915. Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1915. 
116. Myers, Denys P.. ‘The Origin of the Hague Arbitral Courts.’ The American 
Journal of International Law. Vol. 8, No. 4 (Oct., 1914), pp. 270-311. 
117. Nazem, Hosein. Russia and Great Britain Iran (1900-1914). PhD thesis, 
Columbia University, 1954.  
118. Oberling, Pierre. ‘British Tribal Policy in Southern Persia 1906-1911.’ 
Journal of Asian History. Vol. 4, No. 1, 1970, pp. 50-79. 
119. Oehler, Julie. ‘Bibi Maryam: A Bakhtiyari Tribal Woman.’ in Burke III, 
Edmund. (ed) Struggle and Survival in the Modern Middle East, London and 
New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993, pp. 129-142.  
120. Olson, WM. J.. Anglo-Iranian Relations During World War I. London: Frank 
Cass, 1984. 
121. Peacock, A. C. S.. (ed) The Frontiers of the Ottoman World. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009. 
122. Potter, Lawrence G.. ‘The Evolution of the Iran-Iraq Border.’ in Simon, 
Reeva Spector and Tejirian, Eleanor H.. (eds) The Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, pp. 61-79. 
123. Rabi, Uzi and Ter-Qganov, Nugzar. ‘The Military of Qajar Iran: The Features 
 290
of an Irregular Army from the Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Century.’ 
Iranian Studies. Vol. 45, No. 3, May 2012, pp. 333-354. 
124. Rabi, Uzi and Ter-Qganov, Nugzar. ‘The Russian Military Mission and the 
Birth of the Persian Cossack Brigade: 1879-1894.’ Iranian Studies. Vol. 42, 
No. 3, June 2009, pp. 445-463. 
125. Ramazani, Rouhollah K.. The Foreign Policy of Iran: A Developing Nation 
in World Affairs. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1966. 
126. Reguer, Sara. ‘Persian Oil and the First Lord: A Chapter in the Career of 
Winston Churchill.’ Military Affairs. Vol. 46, No. 3 (Oct., 1982), pp. 134-138. 
127. Rezania, Akbar. Iran-Ottoman/Iraq Conflicts since 1514 and the Role of 
International Politics. PhD thesis, Nottingham Trent University, 2000.  
128. Ryder, C. H. D.. ‘The Demarcation of the Turco-Persian Boundary in 
1913-1914,’ The Geographical Journal, Vol. 66, No. 3 (Sep., 1925), pp. 
227-237. 
129. Safiri, Floreeda. The South Persian Rifles. PhD thesis, Edinburgh: University 
of Edinburgh, 1976. 
130. Sarolea, Charles. The Anglo-German Problem. New York and London: The 
Knickerbocker Press, 1915. 
131. Sazonov, Serge. Fateful Years 1909-1916 The Reminiscences of Serge 
Sazonov. London: Bulter & Tanner, 1928.  
132. Schofield, Richard N.. Evolution of the Shatt Al-’Arab Boundary Dispute. 
Wisbech: Middle East & North African Studies Press, 1986. 
133. Schofield, Richard. ‘Interpreting a Vague River Boundary Delimitation: The 
1847 Erzerum Treaty and the Shatt al-Arab before 1913.’ in McLachlan, Keith. 
(ed) The Boundaries of Modern Iran. London: UCL Press, 1994, pp. 72-92. 
134. Schofield, Richard. ‘Narrowing the Frontier: Mid-Nineteenth Century Efforts 
to Delimit and Map the Perso-Ottoman Border.’ in Farmanfarmaian, Roxane. 
 291
(ed) War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and Present. London 
and New York: Routledge, 2008, pp. 149-173. 
135. Sevian, Vahé J.. ‘The Evolution of the Boundary between Iraq and Iran.’ in 
Fisher, Charles A.. (ed) Essays in Political Geography. London: Methuen & 
Co, Ltd, 1968, pp. 211-223. 
136. Shahnavaz, Shahbaz. Britain and the Opening Up of South-West Persia 
1880-1914: A Study in Imperialism and Economic Dependence. London and 
New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005. 
137. Shaw, Stanford. ‘Iranian Relations with the Ottoman Empire in the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries.’ in Avery, Peter. Hambly, Gavin and 
Melville, Charles. (eds) The Cambridge History of Iran Volume 7—From 
Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 297-313.  
138. Shuster, W. Morgan. The Strangling of Persia. New York: The Century Co., 
1912. 
139. Sicker, Martin. The Bear and the Lion—Soviet Imperialism and Iran. New 
York: Praeger, 1988. 
140. Siegel, Jennifer. Endgame: Britain, Russia and the Final Struggle for Central 
Asia. London: I.B. Tauris, 2002. 
141. Simon, Reeva Spector and Tejirian, Eleanor H.. (eds) The Creation of Iraq, 
1914-1921. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. 
142. Sontag, Raymond J.. ‘German Foreign Policy, 1904-1906.’ The American 
Historical Review. Vol. 33, no. 2, Jan., 1928, pp. 278-301. 
143. Soroka, Marina. Britain, Russia and the Road to the First World War: The 
Fateful Embassy of Count Aleksandr Benckendorff (1903-16). Surrey: Ashgate, 
2011. 
144. Spring, D. W.. ‘The Trans-Persian Railway Project and Anglo-Russian 
 292
Relations, 1909-14.’ The Slavonic and East European Review. Vol. 54, No. 1 
(Jan., 1976), pp. 60-82. 
145. Spring, Derek William. Anglo-Russian Relations in Persia, 1909-1915. PhD 
thesis, London, 1967.  
146. Stebbins, H. Lyman. British Consuls and “Local” Imperialism in Iran, 
1889-1921. PhD thesis, The University of Chicago, 2009. 
147. Steiner, Zara S.. The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914. London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1969. 
148. Steiner, Zara. ‘The Foreign Office under Sir Edward Grey, 1905-1914.’ in 
Hinsley, F. H.. (ed) British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 22-69.  
149. Stieve, Friedrich. Isvolsky and the World War: Based on the Documents 
Recently Published by the German Foreign Office. trans. Dickes, E. W.. 
London: George Allen & Unwin, 1926.  
150. Strunk, William Theodore. The Reign of Shaykh Khaz‘al Ibn Jabir and the 
Suppression of the Principality of ‘Arabistan: A study of British Imperialism in 
Sourthern Iran, 1897-1925. PhD thesis, Indiana University, 1977.  
151. Sumner, B. H.. ‘Tsardom and Imperialism in Far East and the Middle East 
1880-1914.’ Proceedings of the British Academy. Volume XXVII, London: 
Humphrey Milford Amen House, 1940, pp. 3-43.  
152. Tapper, Richard. ‘The Tribes in Eighteenth- and Ninettenth-Century Iran.’ in 
Avery, Peter. Hambly, Gavin. and Melville, Charles. (eds) The Cambridge 
History of Iran Volume 7—From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 506-541. 
153. Thornton, A. P.. ‘British Policy in Persia, 1858-1890 I.’ The English 
Historical Review. Vol. 69, No. 273 (Oct., 1954), pp. 554-579. 
154. Touse, Reza Ra’iss. ‘The Persian Army, 1880-1907.’ Middle Eastern Studies. 
 293
Vol. 24, No. 2 (Apr., 1988), pp. 206-229. 
155. Tryon, James L.. ‘Proposals for an International Court.’ The Yale Law 
Journal.Vol. 23, No. 5 (Mar., 1914), pp. 415-436. 
156. Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates. The Logistics and Politics of the British 
Campaigns in the Middle East, 1914-22. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011. 
157. Viscount Grey of Fallodon. Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916 Volume I. New 
York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925.  
158. Volodarsky, Mikhail. ‘Persia and the Great Power, 1856-1869.’ Middle 
Eastern Studies. Vol. 19, No. 1 (Jan., 1983), pp. 75-92. 
159. Volodarsky, Mikhail. ‘Persia’s Foreign Policy between the Two Herat Crises, 
1831-56.’ Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 21, No. 2 (Apr., 1985), pp. 111-151. 
160. Westwood, J. N.. Railways of India. Vancouver: David & Charles, 1974. 
161. Williams, Beryl J.. ‘The Strategic Background to the Anglo-Russian Entente 
of August 1907.’ The Historical Journal. Vol. 9, No. 3 (1966), pp. 360-373. 
162. Williamson, Graham. ‘The Turko-Persian War of 1821-1823: Winning the 
War but Losing the Peace.’ in Farmanfarmian, Roxane. (ed) War and Peace in 
Qajar Persia: Implications past and present. London and New York: 
Routledge, 2008, pp. 88-109.   
163. Wilson, Sir Arnold. SW. Persia—A Political Officer’s Diary 1907-1914. 
London: Oxford University Press, 1941. 
164. Wolf, J. B.. The Diplomatic History of the Baghdad Railway. New York: 
Octagon Books, 1973. 
165. Yapp, Malcolm E.. ‘1900-1921: The Last Years of the Qajar Dynasty.’ in 
Amirsadeghi, Hossein. (ed) Twentieth-Century Iran. New York: Holmes & 
Meier Publishers, 1977, pp. 1-22. 
166. Yeselson, Abraham. United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations 1883-1921. 
New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1956.  
 294
167. Yodfat, Aryeh Y.. The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran, London & 
Canberra: Croom Helm, 1984. 
 
